43. Editorial Note
In telegram 823 to Saigon, February 25, 1963, the Department of State provided the Embassy with the following guidelines for discussion of the Mansfield report with the South Vietnamese Government:
“Report should only be discussed with GVN if they bring it up. If queried Embassy may wish note emphasis which report paces on importance Vietnamese winning their own war and, if occasion arises, report’s clear implication that GVN political practices need improvement to-obtain fuller mobilization of people.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/MANSFIELD)
The report prompted a stronger reaction in South Vietnam than in the United States. On March 1, Consul John J. Helble reported from Hue that President Diem, who was in Hue, was “quite upset” by the report. (Letter from Helble to Trueheart, March 1; Washington National Records Center,RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 360.01 Hue) In telegram 798 from Saigon, March 8, the Embassy reported that important Vietnamese officials, including Vice President Tho, feared that the report was based upon the premise that “the less US involvement in SEA, the better for US interests.” (Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 US/MANSFIELD) On March 24, the majority “Personalist Bloc” in the Vietnamese National Assembly issued to the press a comment on the Mansfield report which took issue with a number of the statements in the report, and attempted to rebut “doubts expressed as to Viet-Nam’s political stability.” (Telegram 848 from Saigon, March 27; ibid.) On April 3, Assistant Secretary of State-designate Hilsman sent a memorandum to Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, in which he assessed the overall impact of the Mansfield report on relations with South Vietnam:
“The reaction within the GVN, particularly at the higher levels, has been sharp. We are informed by Saigon that the GVN, and in particular Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu, sees the report as a possible prelude to American withdrawal. Uncertainty about our intentions has become an obstacle in current negotiations of importance.” (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Leg-Mansfield Report)
For John Mecklin’s assessment of the impact of the Mansfield report on relations between the United States and South Vietnam, see Document 60.