Office of the Historian

215. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, July 9, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

I attach an analysis of the Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam2 by [less than 1 line not declassified]. While I don’t believe it warrants being passed on to President, I think it does present a point of view which is shared by Ambassador Nolting.

The main points are:

(a)
The Buddhist crisis is more political than religious.
(b)
Diem cannot be persuaded to dispense with the services of his family and will probably adopt more rigorous and oppressive policies toward the activist Buddhist leadership.
(c)
While there has been a potentially dangerous increase in coup plotting, it is too early to predict an overthrow of the Government within the next few months.

Harriman and Hilsman would agree with (a) but would tend to disagree with (b) and (c). Their main point is that the United States must avoid allowing its own interests to be confused with those of the regime in Saigon. If our estimate is that Diem will take appropriate measures to pacify the situation and will thus survive, then in our own best interests we could be active in our support of him personally. If, on the other hand, our estimate is that his political ineptitude in recent weeks has so weakened his support within Vietnam that he cannot be expected to hold out much longer, then we should be careful to maintain a reasonably friendly touch with potential leaders of non-Communist coup attempts. Our dilemma at the moment is that we cannot yet agree on the estimate. In general, people in Washington are somewhat more pessimistic about Diem’s chances of riding this one out than people in the field. You can argue both ways on whose judgment is better at this particular moment. In light of this, my own judgment is that we are entering a period in which our policy must be one of fence sitting, realizing of course that such a policy constitutes something less than full identification between our own interests and those of President Diem.

As a practical matter, Ambassador Nolting’s return to Saigon will tend to encourage Diem to feel that he continues to enjoy our support. On balance I think that this is probably the right course to take, [Page 482] provided the Department is vigorous in needling Nolting to attempt to guide Diem into more political measures to stabilize the situation. It is, perhaps, the last effort we can make in this direction and should be taken if only for that reason.

It may not work, however; and we should be prepared to recall Nolting before Lodge’s arrival if our estimate of Diem’s surviveability turns markedly adverse. At such a time it would be better, in my opinion, to leave Trueheart (the DCM) in charge pending Lodge’s arrival. Trueheart has handled the situation with great skill and with somewhat less personal involvement than Nolting and could, I think, be useful in maintaining a degree of flexibility in the U.S. position which would give Lodge a reasonably clean slate to start with.

Michael V. Forrestal3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, South Vietnam. Secret.↩
  2. Document 212.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩