Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 4, 1963, 2 p.m.

1100. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embassy’s telegram 1097.² I saw Thuan for about 15 minutes at 11:45, after which he returned immediately to President’s office.

In response my opening question re GVN plans for dealing with Hue situation, Thuan said that he could tell me in strict confidence that at Cabinet meeting yesterday afternoon presided over by Vice President Tho it had been decided to recommend to President that government reestablish direct contact with Buddhists. President had approved and arrangements were being made for Counselor Nhu to meet with Buddhist leaders from Hue. He repeated that this decision was still highly confidential but GVN wanted Washington to know of it.

I said that I was glad to hear that contact would be reestablished, as this was obviously essential to any solution. It seemed to us equally essential, however, that population in Hue know of what government was doing and that in our view more dramatic action was called for. Thuan urged me to put forward any suggestions—indeed his attitude throughout was most receptive, and worried—and I said that it seemed to us situation called for prompt and public announcement by President Diem of his readiness to discuss Buddhist grievances further and that effectiveness such move would be greatly heightened if President himself would go to Hue for these discussions and to assess situation generally. I said that I was aware of risks in this course. GVN concession in replacing principal officials in Hue June 1 apparently had no effect unless it was to stimulate further agitation. Nevertheless it seemed to me risk had to be taken. I told Thuan that I was diffident about making specific suggestions about handling of internal Vietnamese problems. Nevertheless U.S. was involved in this matter and I felt bound to tell him that in my opinion, U.S. support for GVN could not be maintained in face of bloody repressive action at Hue.

I said that problem was made vastly more difficult by reports of use of blister gas yesterday. Thuan seemed incredulous. (Believe this was first he had heard of this; I even had to explain what a blister is.) I said I was by no means sure what sort of agent was used but that evidence was compelling that something other than tear gas had been employed in last incident about 1800. Helble had himself observed blistering on victims and fact that some appeared be having respiratory difficulties. These were symptoms which could be associated with mustard gas. I added that it was probably well known in Hue that 60odd people had been hospitalized last night and that press reports could be expected at any time. It was therefore vital, I thought, for GVN to investigate matter immediately. If there were any suggestion of poisonous agent being used, GVN should at once disclaim responsibility and proceed to punish individuals who were responsible. I made it quite clear that unless effective measures of this sort were taken, U.S. would probably be forced to condemn action publicly.

In course of discussion, I pointed out that one of the unfortunate, and explosive, aspects of Hue situation was open hostility of population toward troops. I asked whether it would not be possible to remove them and leave security controls to police. Thuan said that it was his understanding that police in Hue (unlike those in Saigon) had not been trained in riot control techniques and the like. I also told Thuan that in my view, GVN made solution of problem more difficult by fixing blame for agitation on VC. There were many factors involved in situation. He indicated assent.

Thuan said he would report our conversation to the President immediately and would let me know the result. I said that I would like if at all possible to have a reaction during the course of the day and particularly on the matter of employment of blister gas. I stressed that Washington was very concerned over developments. Thuan indicated that he would do his best.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA.
2. In telegram 1097 from Saigon, June 4, noon, Trueheart reported that he was seeking an urgent appointment with Thuan to make the points outlined in telegrams 1171 and 1173 to Saigon (Documents 147 and 148). He noted that the gas used by government forces in Hue had not yet been identified, but he added that Helble had observed blistering on victims who appeared to be having respiratory difficulties. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)