172. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Future Moves Regarding Offshore Island Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. Martin, Director, CA
The Secretary told Ambassador Yeh that he had invited him in for a chat so that they might look into the future. He said that of course if the fighting were to resume in the offshore island area, the situation would revert to that which had existed before the Communists stopped firing, i.e., to United States escort of GRC convoys, etc. The Secretary noted that the present resupply situation seemed to be in good shape. In this connection he mentioned an encouraging report which had just been received from Taipei.
The Secretary said the Communists now faced the situation which he foresaw as occurring if we were able to prevent them from gaining the full results of their interdiction of GRC resupply by artillery fire. They were faced with the alternatives of letting their military effort gradually die or of raising the level of this effort, which would have increased the danger of the conflict’s spreading. Maybe the Communists had suspended the hostilities for a week to consider the problem which confronted them. There seemed to be a fair chance that they would decide that it was too hard a nut to crack and they would therefore attempt to gain their ends by political means both in the area and outside of it.
The Secretary noted that the situation which the GRC faced with regard to the outside world was not satisfactory. The Communists wished to spread the idea that there was dissension between the GRC and the United States Governments and were attempting to create sentiment against President Chiang and his Government in the United States.
Ambassador Yeh asked, when the Secretary said the situation did not look good for the GRC, did he refer to the fact that the initiative had been taken by the Communists?
The Secretary replied no—he had not meant this. He had meant that only with the greatest difficulty was the United States holding back some [Page 360] of its friends from recognizing Communist China and from agreeing to its admission to the UN. In this connection he mentioned specifically Canada, Belgium, France and New Zealand. It was only by our exerting the strongest efforts that we could prevent these countries from adopting such policies. We almost had to say to them that we would regard such actions as unfriendly to us.
The Secretary said that these feelings were present even before the flare-up on the offshore islands. Governments like to have relations with the source of power, whether this power is good or evil. Some of these governments felt that it would be better for Communist China to be in the UN than to be out of it. They feel that power demands recognition, although this does not mean that they like the power. Therefore the Secretary saw difficult times ahead. He said that the “two of us in the room” are almost alone in wanting to carry on our policy. A great many of our friends feel that we can’t expect the Chinese Communists indefinitely to put up with having on their doorstep a revolutionary government. Moreover, they are worried about United States involvement and the Soviet Union’s involvement with the consequent danger of another war. All this presents problems that we need to think about. The Secretary said that he did not have the answers but we cannot be blind to the problems. It won’t do us any good to bury our heads in the sand and go ahead on the assumption that the positions which we occupy will be valid for the next year or two. We should try to meet the situation together.
The Secretary stressed that there was no disposition on the part of the United States Government to change its basic policy, which could be summed up as recognition of the Republic of China and the extension to it of military and economic assistance; non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and its continued exclusion from the UN. The problem was how can we make this policy succeed. The Secretary said he had no formulas.
The Secretary said that he wished to discuss this possibility: that after we see what happens on Sunday (October 12) and after reflection, he would be willing to come out to Taipei to talk to President Chiang about the problem of making our policy more palatable to the people of the United States and our allies. The Secretary pointed out that there was a rising tide of opinion against our policy. There was even a change in the United States. Two or three years ago this was a bipartisan matter. Now it is no longer the case. We must face up to bitter opposition and to the feeling that people don’t want another world war. Before World War II a similar feeling in England was summed up in the phrase “Don’t die for Danzig.” Now people are saying “Why die for Quemoy.” There is a trend in Europe toward pacifism. There is a tendency there to sacrifice Asia reminiscent of the feeling there when the Lytton Commission went to Manchuria in the early ‘30’s.
[Page 361]However, the Secretary felt that actually the situation was better than it appeared to be publicly. The British Government had stood by us very well. Recently the Netherlands had taken a very strong line of protest against the Chinese Communists’ use of force. The German Ambassador had recently made a good statement. The Secretary had spoken to the German Ambassador, who said the Germans did not like the analogy that the Secretary had made between Berlin and Quemoy.1 The Secretary said the Germans did not like the analogy because it was true. It was a question of the spirit in which we approached these crises. A spirit which would lead the United States to quit in Quemoy would also lead us to quit in Berlin. One can always rationalize retreat. If the United States is in the mood to rationalize retreat we might as well write off Berlin.
The Secretary emphasized that it is now time to think about and to do something with regard to the offshore island situation in order to get the support we need for our policy. It is important that the initiative come from Ambassador Yeh’s government. It is important for their prestige and their position in the world. The Secretary asked that Ambassador Yeh convey to President Chiang this thinking and the fact that the Secretary was willing to go out to Taipei to talk with him directly.
The Secretary realized that President Chiang had his problems. We of course have ours. Our problem is the terrific pressure by our allies and our own public opinion. We must have the support of our own country and our allies. Sometimes it has been necessary (as in his last press conference) to say some things which would gain the support we need. What would help President Chiang in his problem would not necessarily help us with our problems. The important thing was to try to get a convergence of GRC and United States lines on some course that would give our policy the best chance of success. We must take some course which will stem the mounting tide of opposition from such countries as Canada, France, and New Zealand and which will keep them with us.
The Secretary had recently talked with Canadian Ambassador Robertson and asked him to bear in mind that the United States had the main responsibility for the security of the free world in the western Pacific.2 Canadians should not allow local pressures for a little business with Red China to undermine our ability to discharge these responsibilities. The Secretary said that only by such pressures as these were we able to hold allies such as Canada in line.
[Page 362]In response to a question by Ambassador Yeh regarding the position of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the Secretary said that Mr. Diefenbaker was strongly influenced by his close friend, the editor of the “Toronto Globe and Mail”, who had taken a trip to Communist China.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that only as a result of the talks with the Secretary and the President3 had Mr. Diefenbaker held back. He mentioned also the powerful influence of the Secretary’s talks with Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand.
The Secretary said that his talks with Nash4 had prevented the latter from plunging right into the recognition of Communist China, which had actually been a plank in the platform of his political party. Mr. Robertson pointed out that only these personal discussions with the Secretary had been able to make Nash see things more clearly.
The Secretary also referred to a recent speech by Spaak5 in which he talked about seeing things more clearly regarding the relationship between the security of Europe and security in the whole world. The Secretary said you can’t draw a line around Europe.
As he was about to leave, Ambassador Yeh reverted to the Secretary’s mention of Sunday. He had not been quite clear as to the significance of that date.
The Secretary said that Sunday was presumably the last day of the cease-fire and we would know after that whether hostilities are resumed or whether there would perhaps be a fairly prolonged breathing spell. If it were to be such a breathing spell then he thought it might be useful to discuss these problems with President Chiang, but he would want a little more time to get his own ideas formulated.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1058. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Martin. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)↩
- Reference is to the conversation cited in footnote 2, Document 169.↩
- Reference is apparently to a conversation on October 8; a memorandum of the portion of the conversation on the subject of the “Chinese Situation” is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩
- On July 8; see Document 17.↩
- See Document 144.↩
- NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak.↩