Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

171. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 9, 1958, 3:44–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• China Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• His Excellency Sir HAROLD CACCIA, British Ambassador
• The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

The British Ambassador raised several aspects of the China problem. He first referred to his recent letter with which he transmitted information given the Indians by the Chinese Communists in Peiping, and which raised the question of possibility of using this channel to reach Peiping.¹ The Secretary expressed appreciation for the letter. Sir Harold then said that our Embassy in London might already have informed us but in any event he had a message asking him also to tell us that the Norwegians on October 6 had informed the British that they had sought the reaction of the Chinese Communists to the possibility of exercising the good offices of Mr. Hammarskjold. Sir Harold gave the Secretary a brief excerpt which indicated that the Chinese Communists felt that in view of their exclusion from the UN, intervention by Mr. Hammarskjold would not be appropriate.² The Secretary expressed doubt that an intermediary could be useful in the present situation.

Discussing the question in more general terms the Secretary questioned the thesis that we could arrive at a formalized agreement through intermediaries and negotiations. The cessation of bombardment was not arrived at in Warsaw through negotiation but came about with a unilateral statement. Warsaw, of course, might have had some influence in Peiping’s deliberations but the action was taken independently. It was possible that each side might move further on more or less parallel lines without any expressed agreement and that progress would be made in this way. The Chinese Communists said they wished us to stop convoys. We did so and publicized it, whereupon they took some credit for obtaining this result. Nevertheless, there has been progress. If the shooting continues to be suspended, there might be more. For instance, we have instructed Beam to try to get the Chinese Communists to be more precise in regard to what they mean in their references to harassments and provocative actions.

The Ambassador said that if the Nationalists were using the offshore islands to blockade the mainland it would be easier to understand their recent actions. The Secretary replied that the Chinese Nationalists have not so used the islands to any great extent, at least not lately; nevertheless, the potentiality to do so presumably had some significance. Continuing, the Secretary said that there would be great difficulty in getting the Communists or the Nationalists to accept an intermediary. Probably we could do as much as anyone in this situation although we do not know if it will be enough. He had thought that if fighting was resumed and there was no progress at Warsaw, the possibility of resorting to an intermediary might be considered. The Secretary then described the nature of the discussions between Wang and Beam, particularly the constant, categorical, immediate rejection of our proposals by the Communists and the endless repetition by them of their charges.

The British Ambassador mentioned that there was perhaps one other use which a resort to Indian or Norwegian intermediaries might have. We could at least make sure that the Chinese Communists felt certain they knew what our position actually was. The Secretary replied he thought they knew pretty well although he acknowledged that some of our military had from time to time made statements which might be confusing in this respect.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–958. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Parsons. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. Document 147.
2. Not printed.