Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, September 10, 1960, 9 a.m.

665. Governor Harriman accompanied by Embassy Officer had interview with Lumumba for approximately one hour and a half. He reiterated points made to me September 6 reported our telegram 640.¹

In addition Prime Minister stated:

1. Despite obstructions by Belgians, he had won resounding victory at polls last May. If elections were held today he would obtain support 80 percent population.

2. He was not communist and was not surrounded by Russian or communist advisers. To him communist dictatorship was as bad as colonialism. As he had previously stated numerous occasions he wished Congo to steer policy of neutralism between East and West blocs.

3. Kasavubu had been egged on by Belgian and French advisers when he tried dismiss Lumumba as Prime Minister. Now that he had received overwhelming support from population and parliament, Prime Minister was soon going to take steps resolve Kasavubu question. He stated country had never desired establishment of country with Chief of State, rather it preferred type of government headed by working President.

4. He did not like idea of all countries channeling their aid through UN. This would make Congo subservient to UN. As sovereign nation Congo should be able negotiate bilateral treaties with various nations.

5. He was not happy with action taken by UN in closing down airfields and radio station. Also he had been informed by Cordier he was no longer legal Prime Minister after his dismissal by Kasavubu.

6. His country needed such financial and technical assistance from US even he was planning to lead Congolese delegation to forthcoming session UNGA. Governor asked Prime Minister to be patient and try understand action UN which had come to bring assistance to Congo. He told Prime Minister US trying keep cold war out of Congo but by asking direct aid Soviets Prime Minister was pushing country between two blocs. Governor declared all African leaders with whom he had spoken desired Lumumba work closely with UN.²

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1060. Official Use Only. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and USUN.
1. Document 200.
2. In telegram 662 from Léopoldville, September 9, Timberlake concluded that Harriman’s conversations with Kasavubu, Lumumba, and Dayal reinforced Harriman’s opinion that effective parliamentary opposition to Lumumba was unlikely. Timberlake forecast a Lumumba victory unless the Secretary-General secured a tougher mandate in regard to law and order or, more probably, the opposition resorted to violence. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–960)