Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

206. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, September 10, 1960, 1 a.m.

632. Verbatim text. Re: Congo. Following are papers from which I read to SYG (mytel 631):¹

I. Action in Congo

a. U.S. Govt continues stand behind you in supporting Kasavubu’s effort to oust Lumumba and, in spite setback of last few days, hopes you can take further action to reinforce his position.

b. UN position would obviously have to be in support Congolese constitution. Our lawyers have concluded Kasavubu’s action to remove Lumumba govt was taken in accordance with constitution, while later Chamber and Senate actions were extra-constitutional. Lumumba’s attempt to usurp office of Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of army provides strong constitutional justification for counter action. We hope you can proceed on basis of Kasavubu action and on basis Lumumba legally removed from office.

c. Normal procedure would now be for Kasavubu to propose another cabinet for parliamentary approval. We think he would stand excellent chance of obtaining this approval after some time for maneuver if you can give following instructions to ONUC:

1) Kasavubu, Ileo, Bolikango and others to be afforded UN protection.

(2) Parliament building security to be taken over by UN forces.

(3) Leopoldville police and FP to be disarmed (immobilized in some other way, or shifted in allegiance). The Congolese Chief of Staff Mobutu has kept contact with others in Kasavubu s camp and may be favorable to such approach.

d. We think Lumumba’s demand for UN withdrawal offers suitable opportunity to you to act.

e. Subsequently we think constituent assembly should be convened with protection assured all participants. This might solve Katanga problem also on basis acceptable to govt, Tshombe and African states. Tshombe’s recent expressions of desire for reunited but federal state should help.

f. If you are willing take action along these lines we will exert all practicable influence on Kasavubu and other Congolese leaders.

II Action in SC

On current SC action, U.S. views are:

a. We hope you will say in SC, as you told us earlier you were planning to, that Force Publique is obviously unable maintain peace and order in Congo and withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to foreign intervention and breach of peace.

b. We continue think best course of action is to phrase your remarks and handling of situation so, in absence of resolution calling for withdrawal, retention of UN troops will be endorsed. Final key, of course, is whether African troops will remain. We are prepared give you any support you feel is required on this.

c. While we think retention of UN force in Congo is primary objective, we would also like see further results as follows:

(1) Reiteration of call to states against steps which would impede law and order, as you have already included in your draft resolution of yesterday. We would prefer it even be more pointed. (We want to strengthen your hand against Soviet intervention and will give strong statement on this at appropriate point.)

(2) We would like paragraph calling on you to intensify efforts to restore law and order in Congo and take such further steps as you may deem necessary.

(3) If you think resolution incorporating these points would be vetoed, we would think resolution approving your report and requesting you intensify your efforts and take further steps implement your recommendations would be good idea.

d. We hope you will keep close touch with UK and France about Belgian problem so as avoid situation where they might have to vote “no”.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1060. Secret.
1. Dated September 10, telegram 631 from USUN reported a conversation with Hammarskjöld in which Wadsworth read the papers transmitted in this telegram and the Secretary-General commented on them. The telegram stated in part: “He still convinced he must break Lumumba and believes he will be able to do it. He commented it was extremely difficult “to break Hitlers when alternatives were Hindenbergs.”” (Ibid.) The conversation took place prior to the Security Council meeting of September 9/10. For text of Hammarskjöld’s statement at the meeting, in which he asked the Council to declare explicitly that all assistance to the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations, see U.N. doc. S/PV.896 or Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 162-170.