97. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 26, 19591
SUBJECT
- UNRWA Item at 14th General Assembly
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Nadim Dimeshkie, Lebanon
- IO—Woodruff Wallner
- UNP—William I. Cargo
- NEA—James M. Ludlow
- UNP—Stephen E. Palmer, Jr.
Note: Ambassasdor Dimeshkie endeavored to call upon Under Secretary Murphy for a “very important talk” about the Palestine refugees. The Ambassador claimed to have urgent need for the definitive US position on this item.
The Ambassador commenced by stating that there were variations in the Arab countries’ appraisals of the US position on the UNRWA item. Some have pessimistic interpretations of our attitude; some are more optimistic. At a recent Arab delegation meeting, there was so much disagreement about this point that it was decided to seek the Department’s stand directly. Can the US and the Arabs agree on a pleasant solution? Will the US agree to the continuation of UNRWA, or not? If the US does agree, how would it be continued?
Mr. Wallner replied that we have not yet decided upon our final position. We realize that there will be a Palestine refugee problem after June 30, 1960, and we certainly do not expect that the refugees will be left to starve after that date. However, we certainly hope that some progress in getting at the roots of the refugee problem can be made; that some good ideas will come out of the debate. We must keep in mind the views of Congress on this matter.
The Ambassador inquired if the US would support or oppose the Hammarskjold Report. Mr. Ludlow observed that apparently the Arabs, in their letter of October 6, had rejected the SYG’s recommendations. The Ambassador denied that this was the case. Mr. Cargo commented that it was his impression too that the letter constituted a rejection of the Report. The Ambassador explained that the Arabs had accepted the “only operative” portion of the Report, i.e., paragraphs 1 and 2 which called for the continuation of UNRWA. The Arab letter had disputed only some of the assumptions on which the SYG’s extensive economic analysis was based.
Ambassador Dimeshkie suggested that there was no point in having a bitter discussion of the UNRWA item this year. Why could not a simple resolution be tabled, calling for the extension of UNRWA as suggested by the SYG, and making unnecessary a prolonged, political debate?
Mr. Wallner pointed out that the contributors’ enthusiasm for the UNRWA program wanes as year after year goes by without progress. The Ambassador asked if the US had any concrete proposals. Mr. Wallner replied that we are looking for new ideas from the States in the region directly involved. Ambassador Dimeshkie retorted that the US, not the Arabs, has influence with Israel; if we want progress we should insist that the Israelis carry out UN resolutions on Palestine. The Ambassador expressed appreciation of how difficult it would be for the US to deal thus with Israel. The Arabs too hope for real progress, just as does the US. The US evidently believes it cannot make substantial concessions; neither does Israel, and neither do the [Page 214] Arabs. Therefore, it seems obvious agreement should be reached upon a stop-gap, compromise measure; i.e., the continuation of UNRWA. It was in order to reach mutual agreement on this realistic basis that the Ambassador had called.
Mr. Cargo recalled the practical problems posed by our having to answer critics of the UNRWA program when no progress was evident. The Ambassador implied that we could influence Israel by calling off our aid program. Mr. Wallner replied that a free world economic aid program simply is not run on the basis of turning off aid every time a recipient does not agree with us on an issue.
Mr. Wallner suggested that the Ambassador keep in close touch with USGADel, for the Delegation is fully aware of the Department’s views on this item and would be eager to hear any proposals the Ambassador or other Arab spokesmen might have.
Ambassador Dimeshkie asked if it were correct to assume that the US favored the extension of UNRWA’s Mandate. Mr. Wallner said that perhaps we would favor an extension and perhaps not, but that certainly the status quo is unattractive to Congress. The Ambassador wondered how the continuation of UNRWA could be made “slightly less unattractive” to the US. He stressed that the status quo is the least attractive alternative the Arabs could possibly accept. UNRWA has worked passably well. Of course it should not be permanent, but as an essential stop-gap, it is the only answer. The Ambassador then averred that he wanted the UNRWA debate to be as devoid of bitterness as possible. He pointed to the improvement of US-Arab relations over the past 6 or 8 months. He was disturbed about any possibility which would prejudice these better relations. Mr. Wallner said that we would not bring any bitterness into the UNRWA debate.
The Ambassador said that if agreement could not be worked out in advance, the Arab delegations would be forced to make strong statements and to “fight with all their means” against any denial to the refugees of their rights under previous UN resolutions, etc. Messrs. Ludlow and Cargo said that the US had no intention of favoring any steps which would prejudice the refugee’s basic rights. The Ambassador asked again if the US would “continue the UNRWA rations” after June 30. Mr. Wallner repeated that the problem would not cease to exist after that date, but that the form of aid to the refugees is a question we shall all have to see about, and that we would be interested in the ideas which emerged in the UN discussion.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.511/10–2659. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer on October 27. On October 26, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, who was in the United States for the U.N. General Assembly session, held a brief but similar conversation with Herter. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., 884.411/10–2059.↩