82. Letter From Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to Acting Secretary of State Dillon1
Dear Mr. Dillon: I am writing to thank you for your letter of 21 May2 in which you convey the reactions of the Department of State to the draft of my report on UNRWA.
I am happy to note your favorable reaction to the analysis of the refugee problem and your understanding of my reasons for avoiding a suggestion of any more specific solution of the problem. In fact, an attempt to that effect would have gone beyond my terms of reference.
I hope that the report presents a picture of the refugee question as solid and realistic as possible. Of course, what is said about the role of economic development—which I hope will be helpful from a tactical point of view—is in my opinion nothing but a statement of fact: what Government, anywhere, would survive an integration into its population of new elements if this integration had to be paid for by a reduction of a standard of living which, at all events, is even now intolerably low?
I fully appreciate the reasons for the concern you express. I understand that the United States Government may face difficulties if the report is presented as it stands. Indeed, I would have been happy to be able to prepare the ground in a more helpful way for your efforts to get the necessary contributions. If I feel that I cannot do so, it is, as I believe you would understand, because I am convinced that more far-reaching proposals for a re-modeling of the United Nations assistance to the refugees would create even greater difficulties—also for you—as such proposals are likely to raise all Arabs up in arms and render it impossible to register even the slight progress which, with some luck, the report may achieve.
Indeed, I fear that I am already straining our possibilities in proposing the transfer of education and in insisting on a revision of the lists. My hope to get these two things finally accepted, in spite of the resistance they undoubtedly will provoke, is based on the fact that I do not put in question the continued operation of UNRWA; were I to leave any doubt about my stand on the future of the United Nations assistance, I am sure that I would fail to get the necessary acceptance of what I now propose. On the other hand, were I to propose a more complete transfer of responsibilities, I am convinced that we would [Page 181] not get even what I am now suggesting—apart from the fact that I would then probably introduce a charge of dynamite into the whole Middle Eastern situation.
However, I wish to stress that, although the recommendation for an indefinite—which obviously does not mean perpetual—continuation of UNRWA has the tactical advantage to which I referred, my stand is not based on tactical considerations but on the fact that an honest analysis of the problem leads me to conclusions with which any proposal for a time limit from my side would be incompatible. Obviously, there would be no logic in saying that integration of the refugee population requires an economic development of unknown duration and, on the other hand, to state that United Nations assistance should be of a certain limited duration. If it is considered necessary to put a limit on the duration of UNRWA, the suggestion to that effect has to come from the contributing countries, as they, while accepting my argument, might state that they wish to have a new look at the matter within a certain time for reasons of their own. Were the United States to wish to follow this line, I would, however, recommend that you test it out rather cautiously in the debate, because a premature proposal to that effect from the United States side might well have a rather disastrous impact.
I am sure you will appreciate the reasons which have prompted me to strike the balance you find in the report. I guess that it will be criticised from practically all sides. But just because it is based on an obviously straight analysis of the problem—while taking into account basic psychological complications in the area with which we are concerned, to the extent that they seem to be hard facts—I hope that, at the final last, the line presented in the report may become a rallying point for the various governments concerned. It would be unwise for me to play a short-term tactical game. It is imperative that the report, whatever the reactions in 1959, will stand up in following years so as to let us have at least this firm point in the touchy policy-making in the Middle East.
Yours sincerely
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.511/6–459. No classification marking.↩
- Document 79.↩