Office of the Historian

61. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, January 21, 1959—7 p.m.

563. Re: SYG’s trip to ME (Deptel 627).2 Following information supplied by Bunche (Secretariat) since Hammarskjold on short vacation. (See also memo for record dated January 15, pouched UNP January 29.)3

1.
Freedom of transit from Jordan across Syria: Bunche reported transit problem remained unsolved when Hammarskjold returned from me. SYG therefore sent strong appeal to Fawzi (UAR). Within 24 hours (based on telegram dated January 19 which Bunche read to us) UAR officers in Damascus telephoned Jordan officers Amman and declared intention allow petroleum truck transit. Jordanian officials, during telephone conversation, raised problem of excise of phosphate shipments. Latter problem thereupon also settled. Bunche said he had not received any subsequent information transit agreements not in effect. He therefore assumes transit problems overcome. He considered episode reassuring as indication Cairo could control Damascus officials and also as indicative UAR desire reduce difficulties between UAR and Jordan.
2.
Damascus UN presence: Bunche said he following up transit solution with efforts establish Damascus office. Who to be in charge of office not yet determined. (Bunche mentioned Gaillard, American in Secretariat, as one possibility.) He reported UAR had been reluctant accept any personnel now in Amman who would appear to move from Amman to Damascus. Therefore necessary find person elsewhere. Another obstacle in getting UAR acceptance was difficulty in explaining to UAR what Damascus office would actually do. We suggest existence such office might have made negotiations easier on transit problems. In maintaining ground already gained might be useful have mechanism for overcoming irritants as they develop and Damascus office might be part of mechanism.
3.
Demarcation frontier between Syria and Israel: Bunche repeated report given us by Von Horn that Israelis now willing implement agreement reached with SYG on marking frontier. Bunche explained [Page 141] Israeli procrastinations led to threat by SYG to ask for SC meeting. At that point Israelis agreed to carry out demarcation. (Von Horn told us demarcation would be on Syria-Israeli border, not on DZ’s.)
4.

Palestine refugees: Bunche reported Hammarskjold surprised by universal interest in refugee problem wherever he went. Even in such places as Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Benghazi problem of refugees considered most urgent. He attributed this, of course, to language in Harrison’s GA speech4 which implied end of UNRWA. Hammarskjold was deeply impressed and a little surprised by extent of interest in refugees and also by misery in refugee camps. Bunche reported Hammarskjold had long, frank talk with Ben Gurion (Israel) on refugee problem.5

Ben Gurion began by taking line resettlement only answer. Hammarskjold answered by analyzing possibilities that exist for resettlement country by country in ME with conclusion only Iraq provided significant possibility which for political purposes appeared most unpromising in near future. Hammarskjold made point with Ben Gurion that 2 and ½ billion dollars spent to settle little less than million Jewish immigrants in “relatively fertile coastal plain”. Financial implications of this for resettlement of Arab refugees obvious.

Ben Gurion’s attitude regarding token repatriation by Israel characterized by Bunche as tougher even than public position of Israelis. Bunche said Ben Gurion and SYG in conversation finally agreed on two points: 1) no settlement in ME was possible without providing for Israeli existence and 2) refugee problem appeared insoluble.

Bunche said Hammarskjold came back from ME considering refugee problem as toughest one facing him in ME.

Comment: Hammarskjold’s attitude as emphasized by Bunche concerning virtual impossibility of significant progress re refugee problem may not only be evaluation of problem but also may be beginning of attempt to convince U.S. that UNRWA for all practical purposes must continue. In view Harrison’s statement with subsequent softening of U.S. position during assembly, Hammarskjold may feel U.S. position not final and therefore wishes to give us his estimate of obstacles blocking shift from UNRWA as now established.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 315/1–2159. Confidential.↩
  2. Telegram 627, January 20, asked the Mission to get Hammarskjöld’s impressions of his Middle East trip at the end of December and early January. (Ibid.) Reports given to U.S. representatives during the course of the trip are ibid., 315/1–359 through 315/1–2159.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 48.↩
  5. A more extensive report on this talk was transmitted in telegram 1611 from Amman, January 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/1–559)↩