Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, August 5, 1958—7:23 p.m.

105. Department impressed with importance moving as quickly as possible with coordinated arms program which will meet genuine internal security, as well political, requirements of Bourguiba and his government. Department concerned that present complicated pattern of consultations which US relationships with France presently require may give rise to misunderstandings both with France and Tunisia and result inadequate action in Tunisia. In these circumstances, Department is considering whether interests of France, Tunisia and US might be effectively reconciled through US grant military assistance program to Tunisia utilizing off-shore procurement France for whatever part of immediate Tunisian arms needs it may be decided US should supply.

If such program appeared practical we envisage following advantages would flow from it:

1) For France: a) standardization arms with Tunisia with implications of assurance against over-supply; b) demonstration to French public of fact of supply French arms; c) badly needed dollar exchange.

2) For Tunisia: a) coordinated program for systematic buildup of army with no equipment cost to Tunisian budget; b) although arms would be French, Bourguiba would be under no obligations whatsoever to France for their supply but to US which purchased them and gave them with no unacceptable political strings attached; c) firm demonstration of US support for Tunisia.

3) For US: a) strengthening of courageous and friendly pro-Western voice; b) relief of inevitable pressure which will otherwise exist for military assistance program involving US equipment. Past experience has demonstrated that in analogous circumstances provision of US equipment to forces primarily equipped with arms of other manufacture results in supply, logistics and other problems frequently necessitating extensive re-equipping at significant cost to the US; c) serves US objective of close Franco-Tunisian cooperation by encouraging Tunisians continue to look to France for military training, doctrine, as well as future needs arms and spare parts, etc.

While we recognize that advantages cited for France may also constitute disadvantages for Tunisia and vice versa, we nevertheless believe that there are sufficient overriding common advantages in arrangement of this kind as to warrant its urgent exploration. We believe for maximum effect, program of this kind should be suggested against background of demonstrated US willingness meet police requirements with US-type weapons and demonstrate availability US commercial market to Tunisian purchases which we would still hope minimize. Moreover, we believe that US military assistance program for army should be sufficiently flexible permit us furnish certain specialized types of US equipment where standardization not a basic consideration.

Without discussing with either government, Department desires your urgent comments re foregoing. Department of Defense has suggested possibility of utilizing Franc receipts resulting from Dillon–Monnet agreement.² While we are skeptical objectives cited above, particularly those relating to French agreement in our proposal, could be accomplished without dollar OSP, your comments solicited.³

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/8–558. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Palmer on August 4; cleared by Dolgin, Barnes, Rountree, Jandrey, FitzGerald, and the Department of Defense; and approved and signed for Herter by Palmer. Also sent priority to Paris.
2. In this January 1958 agreement, the United States agreed to extend to France certain financial facilities amounting to $274 million; see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1958, pp. 269–274.
3. Telegram 164 from Tunis, August 7, listed the conditions the Tunisians would probably apply to a plan for offshore procurement, and suggested how it could be presented to the Tunisian Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/8–758) Telegram 512 from Paris, August 8, reported the Embassy found the idea impractical. (Ibid., 772.56/8–858)