Office of the Historian

376. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

Washington, February 13, 1958—4:31 p.m.

560. One of Department’s major concerns at this point in French-Tunisian crisis is personal position of Bourguiba himself. Careful examination of the Tunisian scene makes it clear that were he to relinquish office or be forced out because of popular dissatisfaction with Western action most of present governing group who have similar [Page 826] ideas would leave with him. In such event either younger hotheads of Neo-Destour would take over or, even worse, Cairo-oriented Youssefist elements would do so.

Any wavering of Tunisia’s Western orientation would have considerable effect on Libya and would greatly complicate our problems there. It would also have marked effect on FLN movement itself because, despite French-Tunisian differences emanating from Tunisia’s contact with FLN, we believe Bourguiba’s influence on leadership of that movement may be of critical importance in preventing sharper FLN turn towards Cairo and the Soviets.

Department therefore desires your appraisal of Bourguiba’s present position internal pressures on him and probable effect Security Council action on Sakiet incident. You will be in position gauge current US approach Security Council consideration problem after receiving following telegram which reviews present instructions to USUN.2 Repeat your comments to USUN and other addressees this telegram.3

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/2–1358. Secret. Drafted by Porter; cleared by Sisco, Elizabeth A. Brown, and Looram; and approved and signed for Herter by Porter. Repeated to Paris, London, Rabat, and USUN.↩
  2. Telegram 561 to Tunis, February 13, reported the Department of State had instructed USUN to impress upon Slim the need to frame the Security Council agenda item as neutrally as possible, to consult with the British and French U.N. Delegations, and to provide the Japanese and Canadians with the text of a U.S. draft resolution on Sakiet Sidi Youssef. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 949 from Tunis, February 14, noted that U.N. Security Council action on Sakiet Sidi Youssef was the “acid test” of Bourguiba’s pro-West policy, but he intended to remain allied with the West and to oppose Communism. If he did not receive support in the Security Council, however, Bourguiba would probably resign. (Ibid., 651.72/2–1458)↩