374. Editorial Note
During a 10 a.m., February 10, meeting at the White House, Secretary Dulles briefed President Eisenhower on his conversation the previous evening with Ambassador Alphand:
The President spoke of the Tunisian incident. I reported on the talk I had had with Alphand. The President asked whether I had referred to the impact this might have on our French financial assistance operation. I said I had alluded to this. The President expressed himself as very discouraged over the French attitude. [51/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Memorandum of conversation with the President; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings With the President)
Regarding the French raid on Sakiet Sidi Youssef, see footnote 2, supra. Regarding Dulles’ conversation with Alphand, see footnote 5, supra. Dulles also discussed the incident at his press conference the following day. For text of his comments, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1086–1088.
At the February 13 National Security Council meeting, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles reported:
“Events in Tunisia have been pretty largely reported in the press. At present the Tunisians had clamped a virtual siege on all French troops and naval vessels. Bourguiba, hard pushed by public opinion, had decided to take the case to the United Nations. Gaillard had admitted that the bombing had been done without the authority of the Government in Paris, which, however, felt compelled to assume the responsibility. Both sides were now attempting to avoid incidents, and had been successful so far. Tunisia hopes the United States will intervene.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 355th meeting of the National Security Council, February 14; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
That afternoon, Acting Secretary Herter informed Secretary Dulles, who was vacationing in Atlantic City, New Jersey, as follows:
“A number of conferences on the Tunisian question had been held with the Tunisian and French ambassadors. He said he felt that the boarding up of the French garrisons might lead to an incident at any time. It is possible that the French consulates may be closed. The French are taking a very strong position and would like the US to support this position, which CAH will not agree to. CAH believed there were no legal grounds to have French troops in Tunisia, but Alphand took the opposite stand. CAH felt the French should make some sort of gesture, such as withdrawing French troops from the south. No request had yet been made for an SC meeting but this will probably be done today or tomorrow. CAH felt that Tunisia’s demand for withdrawal of troops would be favorably received by other nations, particularly in South America. The Secretary said he felt we should be very careful about tying ourselves up with the French. CAH said all [Page 824] conversations were being reported to Amb. Houghton. At a press conference this morning Line White had been asked what we planned to do about the situation. He replied that our good offices were always available, if requested. A Bourguiba statement had just come over the ticker to the effect that the US would be asked to mediate. Alphand is shying away from this. The Secretary said he did not think the French would accept us in this role. CAH said it was a very difficult situation since one thing was being said in private and another in public.” (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations; neither the press conference nor Bourguiba’s statement has been further identified)
Documentation on the conversations with Alphand and Tunisian Ambassador Slim is in Department of State, Central File 651.72. Numerous discussions were also held with British Ambassador Caccia; documentation on these conversations is ibid.