Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, February 1, 1958—5:09 p.m.

2794. Department considerably concerned by impasse French-Tunisian negotiations and particularly by present tension along Algerian-Tunisian border which could reach crisis proportions resulting in Tunisian decision resort to Security Council with all that implies.

It is realized that current sentiment French Parliament greatly inhibits Government from sending Gorse back Tunis to resume negotiations.² However, obvious that if long outstanding issues remain unresolved, they will constitute areas of grave friction. Side issue of arms supply is but one of matters that must be resolved if same situation as existed last fall not to arise again which we certainly wish avoid.

More immediate concern is present tension along border which may worsen as FLN continues build up its forces Tunisia. As rebel activities Eastern Algeria increase and should FLN concentrate forces along Tunisia–Algeria border preparatory new military offensive there will be strong temptation on part local French military commanders Algeria to carry out more extensive “hot pursuit” policy and attempt break up FLN formations in so-called “privileged sanctuary.”

Department realizes French-Tunisian relations bound continue uncertain at best as long Algerian conflict continues given diametrically opposed policies respective governments. Moreover questionable that Bourguiba even if he wanted could drastically restrict FLN activities Tunisia. Seems also unlikely at this juncture that any formula for patrolling frontier would be acceptable both parties or realistic given length and terrain of border. Despite foregoing and fact US not directly involved believe US should strongly urge resumption talks and at least try prevent dangerous crisis arising in French-Tunisian relations.

Embassy Paris should accordingly convey US thinking at high level not only Foreign Office but also if feasible Prime Minister or his office and Defense Minister on earliest appropriate occasion along following lines:

1. US Government deeply concerned by growing tension along Tunisian-Algerian frontier. We fully appreciate provocation inherent in FLN operations directed against French forces in Algeria from Tunisia. Moreover, French-Tunisian relations primarily matter between two parties concerned. Obvious, however, that present tension could erupt at any time with grave consequences for West.³ It is therefore hoped that border incidents may be avoided or kept to minimum. We are similarly concerned by possibility local French military authorities might decide take action against Tunisian territory which would have unpredictable repercussions throughout North Africa. Apart from immediate tension we are hopeful French Government may find it possible resume talks with Tunisian Government with view restoring close French-Tunisian relationship. Should situation continue worsen there is possibility Tunisian Government might again turn for assistance to US with resultant misunderstandings in US-French relations or otherwise might be induced to reorient its policies along Egyptian-Syrian lines.

2. Inform French substance US démarche below to be made Tunis.

Embassy Tunis should similarly approach Bourguiba and Tunisian authorities along following lines:

1. US greatly concerned by growing tension along Tunisian-Algerian border and trusts Tunisian Government will continue exercise moderation. We particularly preoccupied by provocation to French forces Algeria inherent in reported FLN military build-up Tunisia. Urge that Tunisian Government use utmost influence FLN prevent its territory being used as base for military activities against Algeria.

2. Inform Tunisians that approach being made French Government urging avoidance military incidents along frontier and resumption talks. Accordingly express hope Bourguiba will continue moderate line publicly vis-à-vis French in order permit French Government in face Parliamentary difficulties resume negotiations.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/2–158. Confidential. Drafted by Looram on January 3, cleared by Elbrick and Palmer, and approved and signed for Herter by Murphy. Also sent to Tunis and repeated to Rabat, London, and Algiers.
2. On January 10, rebels attacked a French patrol in Algieria, killing several soldiers and capturing four. Charging that the Tunisian National Guard had aided the rebels and that the prisoners were being held in Tunisia, France suspended military negotiations with Tunisia. Gaillard recalled Gorse when Bourguiba refused to meet with French emissaries to discuss the incident; Gorse and the envoys returned to Paris January 17.
3. At this point in the source text, the phrase “all of NATO” was deleted and the word “West” substituted before transmission.
4. Foreign Minister Pineau told Ambassador Houghton on February 3 that France questioned whether Tunisia could secure the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, had decided against actions across the Tunisian border except “local action” arising from individual incidents, and intended to negotiate with Tunisia on civil aviation, maritime security, and Bank of Issue. (Telegram 3619 from Paris, February 4; Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/2–458) Telegram 860 from Tunis, February 4, reported that Ladgham had stated the rumors of an FLN military build-up in Tunisia were false and that Tunisia had several “pressing” problems with France which had to be resolved. (Ibid.)