370. Memorandum of a Conversation, Pentagon, Washington, December 21, 1960, 11:40 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Call of Ambassador Yost on Mr. Knight
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Charles W. Yost, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco
- Mr. Stephen McClintic, Moroccan Desk Officer, Department of State
- Mr. Robert H. Knight, Deputy ASD/ISA
- RAdm E. B. Grantham, Jr., Dir/NESA/ISA
- Mr. William E. Lang, Dir/FMR/ISA
- Mr. Ray W. Bronez, Deputy Dir/FMR/ISA
- Capt William B. Wideman, J–5, Jt. Staff
- Lt Col M.J.L. Greene, Asst for African Affairs/NESA/ISA
Conversation was held in Mr. Knight’s office at the Pentagon beginning at 1140, 21 December 1960.
Ambassador Yost opened the conversation by stating that he was back in this country on two months home leave and wanted to take this opportunity to bring certain factors of the Moroccan scene to the attention of the Department of Defense. He drew attention to certain recent cables from the Chargé d’Affaires in Rabat which indicate development of potentially serious situation as Soviet arms arrive in Morocco; presumably for FLN (Algerian Nationalists) but the Royal Moroccan Army may hold some. The Ambassador added that we should be prepared to approach the Crown Prince shortly about the next phase of the military assistance program for Morocco. He assumed [Page 815] that it would be similar to the FY 61 program but that he would like to be able to add the jet aircraft and indicate to the Moroccans that we are prepared to discuss this subject with them.
Ambassador Yost then discussed the developments since the Soviet offer of jet aircraft to Morocco. He said he presumed the Soviet aircraft will be delivered on schedule but that he had received firm assurances from the King and the Crown Prince that Soviet instructors and technicians would not come into Morocco. However, the Ambassador cautioned that the views of the King and the Crown Prince could change. Mr. Yost indicated the Moroccans are considering two courses: (1) storage of Soviet aircraft unused; or (2) training of Moroccan pilots in UAR or some other place thus avoiding direct reliance on Soviet Union. The Ambassador said that standby authority to offer U.S. jet aircraft would be helpful and he may not have to make offer at this time. There then followed a general discussion of the Moroccan capability to fly the Soviet jet aircraft.
Mr. Knight as a preliminary to discussion of the military assistance program for Morocco, stated that the U.S. does not seem to be getting much support from Morocco in return for such assistance. He noted that in the recently concluded session of the UN General Assembly, Morocco had supported the USSR on six issues and the U.S. on none. Ambassador Yost said that these UN votes are misleading; it would be more correct to say that the USSR was supporting the independent African states in order to embarrass the Western alliance. In this case the quarrel is between the Africans and the former colonial powers, rather than an East-West issue. Mr. Yost said the Moroccan Government is not pro-Soviet but is becoming more and more neutralist primarily because of (1) sensitivity to the opposition charge that they are U.S. stooges; and (2) the Algerian situation which overshadows everything. In this regard he stated that a positive solution of the Algerian crisis is needed without much further delay and for the foreseeable future, the U.S. can continue to expect the Moroccans to follow a non-dependence line.
In reply to a question from Mr. Knight, Ambassador Yost indicated that the Crown Prince is apparently agreeable to our continued utilization of the communications facilities after 1963 depending upon developments in the Algerian crisis. [11/2 lines of source text not declassified] Thus the U.S. will probably get nowhere on this item until the Algerian problem is resolved.
Ambassador Yost indicated that the French military forces seem to be leaving on schedule. The departure of civil servants from positions in the Moroccan Government is slow.
In a general discussion of the military assistance program for Morocco, the Ambassador said that he would like to be able to present our program as soon as possible, preferably before February. Mr. Knight [Page 816] and Admiral Grantham emphasized that we will have problems with Congress in light of the Moroccan acceptance of Soviet aircraft and their general failure to support the U.S. Admiral Grantham reiterated and the Ambassador agreed that our need for military assistance to Morocco is primarily a political one. Admiral Grantham also noted that the aircraft offer would be over and above the rest of the program. Mr. Knight, while noting the main purpose of our program is preemptive, wondered whether we were really getting anything from the Moroccans and that Morocco, as so many other countries, now seems to be trying to play both sides in an effort to get more assistance. Mr. Knight said that we need to review our overall plan and determine in each case how much preemptive aid we should dispense. The Ambassador said that under present circumstances we must continue the assistance program and he urged more flexibility.
In response to a question raised by Mr. Lang, Ambassador Yost indicated that the base question is quiet these days, probably because the Moroccans are devoting their attention to the evacuation of the French bases. He urged closer study of the long-range problem of utilization of the bases after our withdrawal. While aware of the JCS concern about the possibility of bases falling into Soviet hands he believed we should follow up on his earlier recommendations for Moroccan use of the bases in the future (Embtel 500 from Rabat 15 Sep 60). Mr. Lang noted that this problem had been discussed with the Crown Prince during his recent visit in the Pentagon.2 He was asked to consider emergency reentry rights for the U.S. subject to Moroccan agreement at the time. We would be prepared to share runway maintenance costs on an agreed and equitable basis.
The Ambassador indicated that the recent ruling pertaining to the return of dependents from overseas3 would create no significant problem in Morocco. In response to a query by Mr. Knight as to the impact in Morocco of the new procurement policy, the Ambassador indicated that he has submitted a caveat. Mr. Knight told the Ambassador that we would look into this problem and the other matters that he had raised in hopes that we could have some answers for him before he returns to Morocco.
- Source: Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, Jets 1961. Secret. Drafted by Greene on December 23.↩
- A copy of telegram 500 from Rabat is ibid., Central Files, 771.56311/9–1560. Regarding the Crown Prince’s October 12 visit to the Pentagon, see Document 368.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩