Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

364. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, March 24, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Letter to King of Morocco

To capitalize on the good will produced in Morocco by your agreement with King Mohamed at Casablanca last December to withdraw U.S. forces by the end of 1963, and to pursue certain important matters resulting from your conversation with him,² I recommend that you send him a personal letter and enclose a suggested text. The Department of Defense and our Ambassador at Rabat concur.

The letter will be an entirely natural sequel to your visit and will avoid certain difficulties entailed in using the normal diplomatic channels. It will not go into the details of any arrangements but will play a vital part in setting the stage for further action on matters of urgent interest to us—specifically, separate arrangements on communications facilities (as mentioned by you to the King); denial of hostile third party use of our bases when we withdraw; and a satisfactory status of forces understanding for the period remaining until their withdrawal.

The letter will also recall your undertaking to give sympathetic consideration to the King’s request for U.S. training assistance to help the Moroccans take over the bases and ask for any suggestions Morocco might now have. The Department of Defense believes the letter will be of the utmost value in pursuing current Joint Chiefs of Staff objectives.

If you approve the letter, I recommend that the Department send it by telegram to our Embassy at Rabat for delivery.

Christian A. Herter³

Enclosure 1

BACKGROUND PAPER⁴

The Moroccan Government and public are pleased with the agreement you reached with the King in Casablanca about the withdrawal of United States forces by the end of 1963. However, certain aspects of these talks, not mentioned in the communiqué, evidently warrant further attention:

1. The special status of United States communications centers. At the time of your visit the King agreed to discuss separate arrangements for these facilities. It seems desirable to ascertain how far he is prepared now to enter into this matter. The present state of Moroccan public opinion may not permit the Government to announce, or even to conclude, detailed arrangements providing for U.S. tenure at the communication centers beyond 1963, since this might be taken to interfere with Moroccan plans to seek the evacuation of French and Spanish forces. It might also be taken by anti-Palace opinion in Morocco and by Arab opinion abroad as indicating that a secret arrangement, vitiating the United States withdrawal agreement, had been accepted by the King. (Remarks to the King’s party on its recent trip to the Middle East confirmed the existence of such suspicion.) It is considered highly useful, however, to refer to the understanding that exceptional arrangements are to be reached in this case, to indicate our readiness to negotiate detailed arrangements at any time, and to elicit the King’s views as to what time would be suitable.

2. The King’s appeal to you for United States assistance in training Moroccan personnel to utilize bases released by the United States. It is desirable to meet this request, so as to have a better chance of eventually obtaining Moroccan approval of United States access to these bases after 1963 in the event of wartime necessity. Further, our willingness to train Moroccan personnel in the operation and maintenance of these bases justifies our seeking assurance that Morocco will not allow hostile third powers to use these installations, considering their evident implications for United States security.

The foregoing steps would serve certain general military objectives in Morocco recently recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These are: (a) retention of certain communications facilities for an indefinite period beyond 1963; (b) non-utilization of released air bases by third powers unfriendly to the United States; and (c) re-entry upon released air bases if this should be required by future developments. It appears possible now to approach the first two points directly. We doubt that the King or any other responsible political figure in Morocco could safely commit himself now on the last point (re-entry rights), which appears to depend largely on our ability to develop the appropriate political atmosphere in Morocco.

I believe that our present objectives can best be attained by a letter from you to the King, along the lines of the attached proposal. Prime Minister Ibrahim and his cabinet have an uncertain future, he was not present at your talks with the King, and we are not confident that he would be as receptive as His Majesty on these points. Accordingly, diplomatic channels, which do not normally provide access to the King, are not likely to be effective. Moreover, an exchange of letters at the chief of state level would reduce the risk of awkward counterproposals from the Moroccan side, such as for a timetable of United States evacuation or early Moroccan assumption of supervisory functions at United States bases.

3. Prime Minister Ibrahim’s Letter to Me.⁵ On February 14 Prime Minister Ibrahim wrote a short letter to me in which he expressed his “complete personal satisfaction and that of the Moroccan people” over the base evacuation agreement. He went on to say that the solution of this problem and the way in which it has been achieved “are a striking example of the sincere cooperation existing between our two peoples.” It is to this letter with its expression of satisfaction over the agreement that reference is made in the second sentence of the first paragraph on the second page of the enclosed suggested message.

Enclosure 2

SUGGESTED LETTER⁶

Your Majesty: Events of great consequence have occurred since my memorable meeting with Your Majesty in Casablanca last December. Our hearts are heavy at the thought of the terrible ordeal which Morocco has undergone in the disaster at Agadir.⁷ The rapidity with which the Moroccan authorities, under the direction of Your Majesty and the Crown Prince, have organized relief efforts has mercifully spared further suffering and brought consolation to the unfortunate victims.

On a happier note, I trust that your historic tour of the Arab world, with its high promise of greater international understanding, has fully met your expectations. In this regard, my own visit to South America,⁸ I am glad to say, was very gratifying. I believe that the opportunity to meet friendly chiefs of state personally, and to discuss problems frankly with them, contributes significantly to the pursuit of peace and mutually advantageous relations between states.

Certainly our meeting in Casablanca, of which I retain very pleasant memories indeed, was an unusually important event in this respect. Secretary Herter has informed me of the letter he received from your Prime Minister expressing particular satisfaction with our agreement about the bases operated by the United States in Morocco, as an example of the sincere cooperation which exists between our two countries. I assure you that the United States shares this feeling. It is in this spirit that I now feel it desirable to write to Your Majesty about certain matters left in suspense by our conversation.

I recall Your Majesty’s request that the United States assist in training Moroccan personnel to utilize the bases from which United States forces are to be withdrawn by the end of 1963, and my own assurances that the United States would give this matter sympathetic consideration. In connection with the recent withdrawal from Ben Slimane, I wish to confirm that the United States would be happy to provide such training assistance as may be agreed upon by our two Governments and would be pleased to receive suggestions from your Government in this regard.

I am, of course, confident I can count on Your Majesty’s assurance that bases constructed by the United States will not be made accessible to any third power whose policies contain a threat to the security of my country. I feel free to anticipate Your Majesty’s confirmation of this point because it seems an inevitable corollary of Moroccan-American friendship and entirely consistent with the principles of Moroccan policy which Your Majesty has expressed to me.

As for our reference to separate arrangements for certain communications facilities, I have asked the appropriate United States authorities to be prepared to discuss our needs for the period following 1963, and would be glad to learn Your Majesty’s wishes concerning the negotiations we envisaged.

Finally, I trust that any necessary clarifications of the status of United States military forces during the remaining period of their presence in Morocco can be worked out to our mutual satisfaction by our respective representatives directly concerned.

With my warmest personal good wishes, and with the highest respects,⁹

Sincerely,

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret. Although the source text bears no drafting information, another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Root on March 21, and cleared with Bronez and L. Dean Brown. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/6–2460)
2. See Document 362.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
4. Secret. Drafted by Root and Stokes on March 21.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/2–1460)
6. Secret. Although the source text bears no drafting information, another copy of the letter indicates Root and Stokes drafted it and that it was cleared with Satterthwaite on March 21. (Ibid., 771.11/6–2460)
7. On February 29, an earthquake destroyed Agadir, a seaport and tourist resort in southern Morocco.
8. Eisenhower visited Puerto Rico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay February 22–March 7.
9. Telegram 1756, March 31, transmitted the letter to Rabat for delivery to the King. Dated March 30, the text contained minor editorial changes in the first paragraph. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/3–3160) Yost delivered the letter at 4:30 p.m., April 4. The King read it, promised to reply in the near future, commented that he was gratified U.S.-Moroccan relations were improving, and asked about the status of Morocco’s request for U.S. arms. (Telegram 2109 from Rabat; ibid., 771.11/4–460)