Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

356. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, June 12, 1959, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, June 12, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of participants at the meeting.]

1. The Moroccan Base Question

Admiral Burke emphasized, in opening the discussion, the high degree of importance of the Moroccan bases to U.S. security. He felt there would be a continuing need in the foreseeable future for these bases.

Ambassador Yost then reviewed the current situation in Morocco. He described as his mission the retention of the bases for the longest possible time. The only question to be discussed was that of tactics. There was no difference between the two Departments on objectives. He described the job of retaining our base rights as a very difficult one. There is a profound emotional feeling among the few thousand Moroccans who count in opposition to the presence of foreign troops. This is largely a hangover from the period of French rule and applies more to the French and Spanish than to the U.S., but feeling is strong against any and all foreign troops. In addition, the Moroccans are trying to stay out of the cold and hot wars. They are sincerely worried about nuclear attack and believe it is possible to follow a course of non-intervention. These strongly-felt feelings will result in continuing heavy pressure on us to withdraw from Morocco.

He indicated that there is no outward hostility as yet to the American presence but this could change. The extreme leftist political factions have come out for a six months’ limit for U.S. base retention. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] There is no question that the government would like to have us leave under conditions that will preserve our friendship and economic aid. But the desire for our friendship and continued aid cannot be counted on to bottle up the motivation leading to the request for withdrawal.

Among other factors at work in Morocco are the propaganda influences of the Chinese Communists and Soviets, both of whom now have embassies. Egyptian propaganda has also added to the neutralist point of view.

Ambassador Yost proposed that in his view the best approach to the problem is to make conciliatory gestures to the Moroccans that do not cause us to lose any of our vital base facilities. We must give the King and our other friends sufficient political ammunition to stave off the pressures pushing for our departure. Even then he said he is not sure we can get commitments on which we can depend, but this course represents the best chance of success. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] The GOM has resisted up to this point making public demands or criticism of us. If it should change its policy and go all out in this regard, our position would be extremely difficult. In addition to taking a public posture directed against us, it could place in effect such very restrictive steps which would add to the pressure as the rigid enforcement of the customs and taxation laws and comparable measures of harassment. Not only would this affect us in Morocco, but the knowledge of our unwillingness to leave an area where we were not wanted (plus the concessions that might be wrung from us in the process), would have a strongly adverse effect upon our posture around the world in other countries where our base position is important.

He discussed the French and Spanish problems in Morocco. Both are under heavy pressure to leave. The French have not revealed their next step. But the King is to meet with DeGaulle early in August and there are strong indications that the French might make a gesture towards further withdrawal at that time. They have already withdrawn from numerous installations and have reduced their troops to about 20,000 (the Spanish total is now about 11,000). The French now hold ten facilities. They have proposed to the GOM that they reduce to four, if they can get permanent base rights for the four. The French are obviously concerned that we do not take any bilateral actions with the GOM until after the DeGaulle–King meeting, their concern being that we might weaken their position. Ambassador Yost felt that if the Executive Branch could agree on further steps for him to take, it might be best for him to announce them quietly to the Moroccans on his return. This could lead in turn to prolonged negotiations with a withholding of public announcement until after the King–DeGaulle meeting.

With reference to Spain and Ambassador Lodge’s suggestion that the Spanish and French be persuaded to withdraw from Morocco in return for a firm agreement for retention of U.S. base rights,² Ambassador Yost commented that the French would not accede to such a suggestion even though the Spaniards might. Admiral Burke also felt the Spaniards might agree but Mr. Murphy suggested that General DeGaulle’s negative reaction could be rather specifically predicted.

[11 lines of source text not declassified] Ambassador Yost closed his comments by referring to the recent statement of Prime Minister Ibrahaim³ to the effect that we had already agreed to the principle of evacuation of Moroccan bases. He thought this was simply another pressure tactic to keep the heat on the U.S. to reach early agreement on the matter.

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] Our friends are not in a position to oppose the government on this particular issue; they remember the object lesson of the developments in Iraq last summer.⁴ General LeMay wondered as a question of tactics whether or not we couldn’t request Morocco to pay for our evacuated bases. He pointed out that we had made a tremendous financial investment and our rights were based on agreement with the then existing government. If the present government would not accept these obligations, then it should be held financially responsible. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Murphy indicated that the Moroccans say they were never consulted by the French when the U.S. base complex was established and that they never agreed to the establishment of our bases. We had thought that the French did consult and we are now in a situation where we are “holding the bag.” [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

General Pate⁵ inquired as to the nature of the “bones which could be dropped” to the Moroccans. Ambassador Yost answered: (1) a public declaration of evacuation and (2) the giving back of certain facilities. He said the Moroccans wished a public, not private, declaration on point 1. With reference to point 2, we were fortunately in a position to give up some facilities we don’t need or want, i.e., the Boulhaut fighter strip and also the Y–11 facility. We have not yet formally made an offer to evacuate these two facilities, however. Mr. Murphy added that there was another factor which might apply, namely, the amount and nature of U.S. economic aid, now at the level of $45 million per year. We have tried to impress on the Moroccans the significance of this aid together with other dollar revenues deriving to the country from the presence of U.S. forces. Ambassador Yost agreed that this was an important consideration but not decisive.

Admiral Burke felt we would always be under heavy pressure. “The bones we drop will stop only the wolf that gets that particular bone.” Mr. Murphy commented that the basic question was that of time. If we are playing for time, the small concessions we make may enable us to hold on to the significant installations over a substantial period. If we expect to stay indefinitely we should not expect such concessions to accomplish this latter objective. He referred to the NSC decision of 29 August 1958⁶ in which it was agreed and approved by the President that we should endeavor to hold onto the bases for up to a maximum period of seven years. Several members of the Joint Chiefs professed ignorance of this decision. Admiral Burke commented that there was a military need for beyond seven years. Commenting on the naval communications facilities at Port Lyautey he said it would be impossible to build duplicate facilities in Rota before 1964 if work were started now. Ambassador Yost thought it would be much easier to negotiate for the retention of the communications facilities than for the strategic bases in Morocco.

Admiral Burke stated that if we negotiated for a seven year period the Moroccans will force us to compromise at a much shorter period. They will always ask less than our goal. They will be unhappy until we pull out of the country and then they will be dissatisfied at the decrease of income which would result. He wondered if they were indulging in blackmail of the U.S. Ambassador Yost did not believe they were. He stated he would be prepared not to give an inch if he thought blackmail were the objective. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Admiral Burke referred to Ambassador Lodge’s comments. He agreed that evidences of weakness on our part in Morocco will make Spain increasingly nervous and our base position in Spain will be weakened as a result. If our position is eroded in Morocco the repercussions will be felt not only in Spain but, for example, in the Philippines, Libya and Japan as well. These repercussions are even more serious than the actual loss in Morocco itself. In response to a question from Admiral Burke, Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department was not advocating a specific time period for evacuation in our relations with the Moroccans. We had proposed to use the phrase “as soon as they can be spared” in our negotiations without mentioning a specific period. He pointed out that it had been clearly stated on past occasions by the Secretary of State that we do not propose to stay in countries where we are not welcome or where our national security no longer requires our presence. He reminded the group of the arguments we used with the UK during the negotiations leading to the evacuation of the Suez bases when similar British arguments were used for retention of the bases.

Mr. Knight discussed the “snowball” effect of the concessions in one section of the world which promptly stimulate politicians in other countries to ask for as much or more. If we should make a public announcement on the subject of the principle of evacuation there would be a demand for even more concessions—eventually the public gets carried away by the emotional issue to the point where the political leaders cannot resist the pressure. He thought that somehow or other a policy would have to be hit upon that would make it attractive politically to retain American bases rather than to clamor to get rid of them. In response to Mr. Murphy’s request for this magic formula he added that he had no specific ideas in mind. Mr. Murphy commented that we have had these problems very much in mind over the last several years. The Nash Report⁷ was intended to improve our posture with regard to overseas bases. It is clear that there is no neat formula which will apply to all situations or be acceptable to all peoples or political leaders. In any case, he said we have a practical political problem in Morocco facing us now and the solution will not wait for long-range thinking. He asked for the specific comments of the Joint Chiefs on the desirability of making the proposed public announcement. Admiral Burke responded by referring to an “inadequate” paper which represented the Joint Chiefs position on Moroccan bases at this time. He said it did not apply to the short-term problems (he then passed a copy of the paper to Mr. Murphy—see attached).⁸ Specifically, Admiral Burke thought that a public statement would not ease the pressure on us or do much good. Mr. Murphy said our choices appear to be limited. We have dragged out the economic aid offer in the hope this would have some effect. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In this situation Ambassador Yost has reported that none of these appears to be valuable as a method to adjust the situation in our behalf.

General LeMay then wondered if we could offer to pay Morocco for the bases, to which Ambassador Yost replied that no political leader could admit that he would take money for this purpose. Admiral Burke wondered whether the leaders didn’t really want us to stay but were being pressured by the masses. Mr. Murphy thought this was not necessarily a sound assumption. General Lemnitzer wondered if the Moroccans were under the illusion that we would continue economic aid if they forced us to evacuate the bases. Ambassador Yost answered that he presumed that the leaders were aware that there would be a substantial decrease in the economic benefits now received by Morocco but they would hope that some aid would be continued. Mr. Murphy added that this was a very competitive situation with the Soviets and ChiComs urging that the Moroccans accept aid from them, which would be given without strings or conditions. He mentioned that arms are already being purchased from the Czechs.

The discussion then shifted to whether we should evacuate Boulhaut and Site Y–11. Admiral Burke thought we could give up these bases since they are apparently not needed. Ambassador Yost said that the relinquishment of these two installations would help and this is indeed the Department’s first proposal. However, the King [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] wants a public declaration. We could only hope that our evacuation of the two bases would serve as a demonstration of our good intent. Admiral Burke felt that the American people would find it difficult to understand that friendship does not work both ways. If we are forced out it would be extremely difficult to maintain friendly relations with Morocco, particularly since we are under the terms of agreements entered into in good faith. He wondered whether the Moroccan leaders were aware of the potential reaction in this country. Ambassador Yost said he had referred to this line of argument many times but that it apparently did not influence Moroccan thinking.

General LeMay commented that a new situation would develop if aid were accepted from the Soviets by Morocco. The U.S. could not stand for such a development in his opinion.

General Lemnitzer thought that the proposed public announcement would do us a great deal of harm. Much harm has already been done by the statement of the Prime Minister which indicated that we accepted the principle of evacuation. He thought the Philippines particularly would take advantage of this in their base negotiations with us. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the proposals on the principle of evacuation were not induced by the U.S.—they were at the request of the King of Morocco. Ambassador Yost replied that the King was under heavy pressure. He was genuinely trying to prolong our stay in the country. He wanted us to hold on and not be required to give up anything of value to our national security. He felt that this was the least harmful request he could make of us. Mr. Murphy added that the King could not help but be emotionally motivated. He was a little fearful both for his person and his position. The chances of assassination were very real. Ambassador Yost said it would be very easy for the Government of Morocco to stir up the public rather than to keep it quiet as it was now doing. If the U.S. were faced with adverse public opinion in Morocco the repercussions in other areas of the world would be much worse. Mr. Murphy endorsed this point of view.

Admiral Burke suggested that returning Boulhaut and Y–11 without a public declaration might be the best solution. Mr. Knight further suggested that during the course of the turn-back of these two bases we could give the King the opportunity to make a statement on the principles of evacuation in which he could cite these two examples without a statement by a U.S. spokesman.

Mr. Murphy summed up the discussion by requesting further thought by the Joint Chiefs on the question. We had to face up to the practical facts of the situation in Morocco. He asked specifically if there was any JCS objection to our telling the French that we proposed to notify the Moroccans that we were going to evacuate Boulhaut and Y–11. We had already informed the French confidentially of our intention to do so but the French were dragging their feet and had not responded in almost four weeks. There was no objection expressed to moving ahead with such notification.

Admiral Burke concluded by reiterating that the JCS paper would not be helpful in this connection. He added that it was invalid in one regard since it did not reflect the JCS [NSC] decision establishing the seven year maximum on evacuation. He repeated that there would be a requirement for the bases for more than seven years.

1. Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. The source text bears a typewritten notation that it is a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense.
2. Transmitted in telegram 1387 from Madrid, May 31. (Ibid., Central Files, 711.56371/5–3159)
3. Not further identified.
4. Reference is to a July 14, 1958, coup d’état during which King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdul Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri el-Said were assassinated and a republican government established under General Qassim.
5. General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
6. See footnote 4, Document 351.
7. Reference is to United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President, December 1957, prepared by former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank C. Nash.
8. Not printed; it advocated using all feasible means to retain the bases, stated the United States should not leave them in a condition to be used by potential enemies, and noted a U.S. withdrawal from the Moroccan bases would exacerbate problems concerning U.S. bases in France, the Philippines, and Libya.