353. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, November 21, 1958, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follow a list of participants at the meeting and agenda item 1]
2. Moroccan Bases
General Twining indicated that the JCS was greatly concerned with the situation regarding the Moroccan bases. We must not be pushed out of Morocco. A great threat is posed to our defense posture if these bases are lost. They are still a vital element in the U.S. strategic concept. There would be a slippage in our whole position in Africa if we were forced out and there would be a corresponding increase in our problems in Spain. It appeared to him that much of our current deteriorating position was the result of Soviet pressure on Morocco following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR and the resulting large Soviet mission to Morocco.
[Page 773]Mr. Murphy asked if we now required all of the Moroccan bases in the complex. General LeMay responded that all were needed except Boulhaut which was built as a fighter base and could not be converted to bomber use. He added that the bases were not significant enough for our strategic operations to justify submitting to blackmail, but he felt that to give in to Moroccan demands would adversely affect our position concerning retention of base rights elsewhere. The issue was therefore more than the essentiality of the Moroccan bases. He felt that even a 7-year limit for retention of the Moroccan bases might not be adequate. He suggested that perhaps the best U.S. move at the moment was to delay any further talks with the Moroccans at least on the big questions of evacuation and utilization, and to hope that by stalling we can keep the situation from freezing now in a manner which would be detrimental to U.S. objectives. He was in favor of further economic and other assistance to the Moroccans but opposed to “blackmail” which was his view of the most recent developments. He opined that the latest pronouncement of the King2 may have been aimed primarily at the French and the Spanish but that it was necessary to lump the U.S. into the same category for internal political purposes. Our past relations with Morocco had been good.
Mr. Murphy indicated that he, too, felt that the primary Moroccan concern was the evacuation of the French. He felt it was unfortunate that the Moroccan Government had been led to believe that the U.S. attached such importance to the Moroccan bases that they, as a result, could attach a higher value to them for bargaining purposes. General LeMay suggested, as another possible approach, that we propose that the Moroccans buy the bases, in which case we would move out. This started a chain of discussion about the original cost of the bases, during the course of which Admiral Russell indicated that the total cost was around $463 million which did not include $100 million spent by the Navy on its facilities. He also indicated that the U.S. forces were annually injecting about $36 million into the Moroccan economy in the form of salaries, local contracts and expenditures of U.S. personnel.
Admiral Russell3 discussed the importance of Port Lyautey. He indicated that the communications facilities in particular were essential to the operation of the Sixth Fleet as well as a relay point to the entire Middle East. The Port itself is good for shallow draft vessels and the airfield is an important installation. Lyautey from the Navy point of view provides logistic support for the Mediterranean area. [1 line of source text not declassified]
[Page 774]General Twining discussed briefly the Spanish concern over loss of all Moroccan bases, primarily over the aspect of their availability for use by unfriendly powers. He said that he had received a very strong reaction from the Spanish Defense Minister on this point as well as from Ambassador Lodge. Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department was aware of this understandable reaction on the part of the Spanish Government.
Mr. Murphy returned to General LeMay’s suggestion on the advisability of suspending talks for the time being. General Twining commented that it would be a good idea “if we can get away with it”. He then raised the question of economic help to Morocco to which Mr. Murphy responded that approximately $45 million was earmarked from the regular MSP program for economic aid and that we were proposing an additional $10 million to be provided from Defense funds as an incentive to a more cooperative Moroccan attitude. He speculated as to whether this might have a positive or negative effect but indicated that the Ambassador has recommended that the $10 million be made available as a help to him in the event negotiations continue.
General Lemnitzer asked whether there was evidence of direct Soviet influence or pressure from the Soviet Embassy on the Moroccan Government in this case. Mr. Murphy gave a brief exposition of the current political situation in Morocco including the role of the King and the Istiqlal party, of which the so-called “left wing” elements are most vocal in demands for U.S. evacuation. He felt that this element particularly was sensitive to ideas and propaganda emanating from the USSR as well as Cairo but that the Soviet Embassy had barely been opened and there was no proof that the current Moroccan line was Soviet-dictated. Mr. Penfield elaborated on the political aspects. He pointed out that the basic problem is the resolution of the country’s internal troubles. There will shortly be a Cabinet reorganization which will reflect the increased strength of the extremist groups. There is no question that the King is a moderating influence and a good friend of the U.S., but reports from Rabat indicate that he feels he must be committed to a policy of evacuation of all foreign forces including those of the U.S. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Murphy then commented on General LeMay’s proposal to stall negotiations. He felt that this might be an effective short-term move but that we will have to accept that there will be a formal demand on the part of the Moroccans which must be faced up to at some point. Mr. Penfield added that there seemed to be recent evidence that even the economic distress caused by loss of employment by Moroccan labor as a result of the shutting down of certain U.S. operations was not building up pressure for the maintenance of U.S. forces. On the contrary, it was being accepted as a necessary concomitant [Page 775] to the evacuation of all foreign forces and was a manifestation of the strength of the nationalist feeling. Mr. Irwin wondered how long this point of view would be held in the face of continued unemployment.
There followed a general discussion in which Mr. Murphy raised the question as to whether or not we should take a more firm position in negotiations; we had not yet “talked tough”, because of our Embassy’s view that this would not be productive. General Twining suggested that this should be done as a last resort. There was also discussion of the status of U.S. forces, particularly jurisdiction, in which Mr. Irwin suggested that this was a less important aspect of the negotiations and there would be no profit in detailed discussion at this meeting in light of the larger issues involved.
Mr. Irwin asked the status of the proposed $45 million aid program, wondering whether it had been held up. Mr. Bovey responded that Ambassador Yost had been authorized to discuss with the GOM a figure of $40 million some time ago; that he has been authorized to offer the full amount but has not yet done so. Mr. Irwin indicated that although he had no quarrel with the amount of $45 million, he wished to point out that any instructions authorizing Ambassador Yost to discuss this amount with the Moroccans had not been cleared with Defense. Mr. Murphy responded that we expected to look carefully into the question of aid levels and, until we had agreed on a plan of action, we should not communicate our proposals to the Moroccan Government. (It was later ascertained that the Department’s instructions were cleared with Defense.)
There followed a discussion of the duration of the U.S. need for the Moroccan bases in which General LeMay indicated that he was extremely worried about a two-three year limitation on use. General Twining pointed out that the NSC decision affirmed the period as one extending up to seven years. In response to Mr. Murphy’s query concerning the possibility that weapons development may make the SAC bases of less value, General LeMay indicated that they would still be important for the 7-year period but that they were needed for many other reasons than just the strategic one. There was then further general discussion on the Spanish situation as it would be affected by our evacuation of Morocco.
Mr. Irwin commented that the seven year limit developed in NSC considerations, not as a magic figure based on missile availabilities, but on the consideration that this would be the maximum that we could secure in negotiations with Morocco. It was implicit that we might wish to prolong our use of Moroccan bases beyond that time and that intervening developments might improve the possibility of [Page 776] success in future negotiations. Admiral Russell stated that from the Navy point of view there is no time limit on the desirability of retaining Port Lyautey.
The discussion was concluded with the agreement that the matter would be taken up at the next State–JCS meeting for further discussion.4
[Here follows agenda item 3.]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Porter and cleared by NEA and INR. The source text bears a typewritten notation that it was a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Admiral J.S. Russell, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.↩
- No record of this discussion has been found. On December 1, however, Nes and Porter participated with Department of Defense personnel in a meeting on Moroccan bases. (Memorandum for the files; Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, M–12, Base Negotiations)↩