Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 10, 1958—7:39 p.m.

911. Spanish Ambassador requested urgent appointment Elbrick March 10 to transmit message from Castiella to effect [1 line of source text not declassified] GOM planning infiltrate army units across Dra into Southern Zone in order face Spanish with fait accompli. Preparatory steps have included incorporating AOL units into RMA by device issuance arm bands and removal French officers from RMA units southern Morocco. While both these steps admittedly within discretion GOM Castiella wished make point any military infiltration in advance negotiated arrangements could not but invite armed resistance Spanish garrisons which now limited to coastal area. This would be completely unnecessary since GOS remains ready hand over territorial control by negotiation only insisting that results be formalized by simple written protocol. Under questioning Areilza appeared certain Moroccans had so far made no effort open such negotiations (this appears inconsistent with Rabat’s 938).² After extended discussion present Spanish requirements it appeared (if Areilza is fully informed) that Spaniards agree possibility RMA control encouraging and that economic preference conditions are not serious problem. However GOS will insist that GOM agree to specific limits of territory they are taking over. They believe this necessary because present boundary established under protectorate and Moroccans can always disclaim acceptance. Areilza observed agreement on boundary does not require renouncing forever claims to additional territory.

Areilza said all GOS wished prior to withdrawing from Southern Zone was conference which could be brief and signed protocol which could be simple. They would be glad to have US Government participate such discussions. Earnestly hoped however GOM could be dissuaded from taking further rash military adventures.

Elbrick replied US certainly did not desire participate negotiations nor to get involved in anything resembling mediation. Without assuming responsibility however we would of course look into matter and ascertain whether we could by informal representations pave way for pacific settlement.

For Rabat: 1. Embassy should approach Balafrej soonest (Madrid 953 rptd Rabat 79)³ stating Spaniards have expressed concern over reports of possible attempt military fait accompli in Southern Zone, and express US hope GOM will refrain from any action which would prejudice peaceful solution. At same time you may state we have repeated assurances from Castiella Spaniards have no intention attack Morocco. Spanish Foreign Ministry has made similar declaration to press. We believe atmosphere would be cleared should GOM give public assurances it has no aggressive intentions. At same time GOM could remove any doubts its position by public offer discuss outstanding problems and by actual commencement discussion modalities Spanish withdrawal Southern Zone. Spanish assure us they prepared proceed such discussions.⁴ We also have reason believe Spaniards susceptible reasonable negotiated compromise re Ifni.

2. We see only greatest dangers for all concerned any resumption hostilities and hope that Morocco may assist in creating atmosphere conducive restoring its relationship with Spain on basis mutual understanding and bilateral discussions. Balafrej should understand that Spain also has public opinion problem in that Spanish consider liberation army was aggressor and until improvement in atmosphere takes place it is difficult return to path of negotiations. In this connection, recent Moroccan statements had been interpreted Madrid as setting forth Moroccan aspirations of such magnitude as not to be conducive to fruitful negotiations.

For Madrid: You should speak to Castiella as follows:

1. Our Ambassador in Morocco last week followed up Secretary’s advice⁵ to Balafrej re need controlling irregular forces and again pointed out to GOM equivocal character of AOL and other irregulars; he emphasized that people everywhere take it for granted that irregulars have aid and encouragement GOM. Ambassador again urged that negotiations be undertaken and that GOM currently demonstrate its authority within country and exert restraining influence in adjacent area. In reply Balafrej again indicated to us that notwithstanding general worsening of Moroccan relations with Spain he is still ready to act along lines our previous suggestions.

2. As a consequence of Ambassador Areilza’s démarche we are now instructing Ambassador Cannon to tell Balafrej that in view Spanish assurances that Spain has no intention attacking Morocco, we believe atmosphere would be cleared by:

A. GOM public assurances it has no aggressive intentions;

B. GOM public offer discuss outstanding problems and by actual discussion with Spain modalities Spanish withdrawal Southern Zone.

3. While we consider Spanish desire written acknowledgement precise border Southern Zone to be taken over by Moroccan Government reasonable, it would appear insistence on formula involving complete renunciation any further Moroccan claims could unreasonably obstruct settlement. Recommend in any discussions Foreign Office Embassy stress importance flexibility this formula and attempt clear up discrepancy between Areilza statements re willingness negotiate and Balafrej assertion first para Rabat’s 94 to Madrid.

4. We see only greatest dangers for all concerned in any resumption hostilities, particularly in Ifni, and hope negotiations both sides can avoid this. We recall previous Spanish offer arbitrate Ifni and believe public reiteration willingness arbitrate or negotiate would have useful effect. FYI. Areilza during conversation stressed at length Spanish willingness negotiate reasonable settlement Ifni which would protect Spanish requirements and dignity but satisfy Moroccan sovereignty aspirations. End FYI.⁶

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.022/3–1058. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Torbert and Jova, cleared by Porter, and approved and signed for Herter by Jandrey. Also sent to Madrid and repeated to Paris, London, Tunis, Algiers, and Dakar.
2. Telegram 938, March 6, repeated to Madrid, reported Balafrej had discussed the urgent need for settlement by negotiation with the Spanish Ambassador to Morocco on March 4. (Ibid., 771.022/3–658)
3. Telegram 953, March 10, reported Castiella had said a joint French-Spanish operation had destroyed AOL troops in the Spanish Sahara, after which Moroccan troops had been sent to the Ifni area. Morocco intended to occupy the Southern Zone without prior negotiation with Spain, which could cause war between the two countries. (Ibid., 771.022/3–1058)
4. At this point in the source text, the phrase “with which Spaniards continue assure as they prepared proceed” was deleted and the sentence “Spanish assure us they prepared proceed such discussions” inserted before transmission.
5. At this point in the source text, the word “admonition” was deleted and the word “advice” inserted before transmission.
6. Telegram 1131 to Madrid, March 11, sent additional arguments to use with Castiella. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.022/3–1058) Telegram 961 from Rabat, also March 11, reported Balafrej had stated a public declaration would not improve the situation, but had agreed to consider one further; and that he would seek instructions to call in the Spanish Ambassador to try to settle the transfer of southern Morocco. (Ibid., 771.022/3–1158) Telegram 988 from Madrid, March 14, reported the Acting Foreign Minister had said Spain was willing to negotiate a settlement on Ifni, and felt that without a guaranteed southern boundary, Moroccan occupation of the Southern Zone would allow further encroachment of Spanish territory. (Ibid., 771.022/3–1458)