323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1

1002. Re: Algeria, urtel 1530.2 Dept’s objective on Algerian question in UN is as you described it in last para urtel 1540.3 Emphasis our effort remains as stated in Secretary’s Nov 15 letter to Couve de Murville4 (i.e. we are motivated by desire insure, if possible, that outcome UNGA debate will facilitate putting into effect de Gaulle’s program for settlement Algerian question or at least not raise obstacles to such action; furthermore, that passage moderate resolution is perhaps best way of achieving our purpose). We desire work closely with France and French Community African states to develop such moderate resolution which we strongly hope will not only have broad co-sponsorship but will command wide support and, we would hope, necessary two-thirds majority. In this connection, resolution calling for UN supervised elections Algeria clearly in unacceptable category. We [Page 713] are prepared not only oppose such resolution but at appropriate time let our position be known. We therefore do not see this operation, as we have made clear to French and as you should make clear to Berard, as a limited effort secure blocking one-third on referendum proposal. We are convinced that such a limited approach would not even get one-third. We will make same point again with French Ambassador here.

Before approach to Slim on specifics of a resolution can usefully be made, views of French Community leaders must be more precisely defined. When Nouakchott discussions are completed we should have clearer picture of kind of resolution French Community states are prepared support. Believe it would also be important for USUN carry forward with discussions with French Del on possible text of resolution using both French text and USUN text as base. This connection, French text should not be regarded as “frozen”. In discussions thus far, we have been careful to talk in terms of text “along lines of” French text, clearly reserving prospect of changes in res on basis further discussions with French.

While discussions in detail with Slim re res therefore not yet feasible, we do see advantage in early approach to Slim to lay groundwork for subsequent discussions with him in which we hope African states will play predominant role. We suggest you make following principal points to Slim: We would be compelled oppose res calling for UN referendum; US anxious work for and support moderate res which would facilitate solution of problem and we are encouraged at continued evidence Bourguiba thinking along these lines; we understand various African states are considering kind of constructive res which might facilitate negotiations; we hope therefore Slim will seek opportunity take their views into account before proceeding with elaboration of precise proposals; we would like to keep in close touch with Slim as work on Algerian item progresses.

You should advise your British and French colleagues of your intention approach Slim along foregoing lines.5

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–2560. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newlin, Cargo, and Sisco on November 28; cleared by McBride and Penfield; approved by Bohlen; and initialed for Dillon by Cargo. Repeated to London and Paris.
  2. Telegram 1530, November 25, requested clarification of instructions on Algeria. The U.K. and French Delegations thought the U.S. instructions were designed to block a Tunisian draft resolution, while the U.S. Delegation understood it was to work in consultation with Tunisia, France, and the United Kingdom for a moderate resolution. (Ibid.)
  3. Not found.
  4. Document 320.
  5. Bohlen informed Dillon in a November 30 memorandum that he had discussed the U.S. position with Alphand, who had agreed with it. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–3060) Telegram 1583 from USUN, November 30, reported that the Mission had discussed the U.S. position with the French Delegation (ibid.); telegram 1587 from USUN, December 1, reported on Barco’s November 30 conversation with Slim. (Ibid., 751S.00/12–160)