Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, June 29, 1960—3:49 p.m.

1682. Dept has carefully considered Tunisian suggestions that US contacts with PGAR reps be established at higher level, but for reasons cogently outlined Paris 6095 (being repeated Tunis and Cairo),² we believe change in present levels of communication would be premature and subject misinterpretation both sides.

PGAR and, to lesser extent, French will of course seek to attract US sympathy for their respective positions, and we can expect govts whose interests also affected by Algerian problem especially Tunisian and Moroccan may urge that US adopt more active role. However, in Dept’s view, this delicate moment is not appropriate time for US to become engaged even indirectly in negotiating process. Rather US should adopt listening role unless at some later time it becomes apparent that our influence can be constructively employed. Posts who are approached on this subject should therefore be cautious in their discussions with Algerians, with the French or with third countries to avoid giving impression that US would consider intervening to facilitate settlement. Instead posts should make clear US is confident that both sides will work sincerely for mutually acceptable and workable solution and is sure that neither will disappoint expectations of most of the world.

For Tunis: Slim seeing Secretary June 30.³ Meanwhile would appreciate your assessment motives underlying Tunisian suggestions re high-level contacts. In this connection we find Ladgham’s remarks to Knight re Tunisia’s ultimate security needs (Tunis 1864 para V)⁴ extremely interesting.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/6–2560. Secret. Drafted by Chase on June 28; initialed by Porter; cleared by McBride, Satterthwaite, Root, Calhoun, and S; and approved and signed for Herter by Merchant. Also sent to Rabat, Tripoli, and Cairo and repeated to Paris, Algiers, and London.
2. Telegram 6095, June 25, stated that high-level U.S. contact with the Provisional Algerian Government could undermine De Gaulle’s program for Algeria and create political problems for him in France. It also noted that third parties had always been available to act as intermediaries in U.S.–PAG contacts, and that the United States still had some influence with both France and the PAG. (Ibid.)
3. Slim asked that the United States continue to work toward peace in North Africa and against Algeria’s partition. Herter promised to bring Slim’s remarks to Eisenhower’s attention. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 751S.00/6–3060)
4. Paragraph V of this June 24 telegram reported that Ladgham had stated that improvements in Tunisian internal security made delivery of U.S. arms less urgent, but that an Algerian settlement would make improving the efficiency of Tunisian security forces more important. (Ibid., 672.00/6–2460)