Office of the Historian

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

Washington, May 3, 1958—5:28 p.m.

916. Department disturbed for evident reasons by outcome Tangier Conference2 which appears to have adopted in many respects bellicose and negative tone we feared and hoped to avoid by proffering friendly and positive advice indicated Deptel 763 Tunis and 975 Rabat.3 We see no point in reproaching governments for party decisions but are apprehensive re actions former may take in response emotions generated by Conference. Rabat and Tunis should therefore make following points Mokkadem, Balafrej and other appropriate officials at earliest suitable time.

1.
We had hoped concept North African cooperation toward which we well disposed would be launched on positive note. While we aware Conference not governmental in character and aware intensity feeling in North Africa re Algeria, we cannot but be disappointed our advice this regard had little or no visible effect.
2.
With regard to formation Algerian Government we continue consider such move at this juncture would create most serious problems. Formation would have grave repercussions in France. It would in our view reduce chances for French Government with realistic approach to Algerian problem, strengthen hand of intransigent elements on right, and drastically reduce effectiveness current and future US efforts induce French accept principle peaceful settlement. Thus hostilities would be prolonged and negotiated solution postponed. We honestly [Page 636] doubt formation such Government would be taken as index of strength and believe GOT and GOM are aware serious legal and diplomatic consequences which recognition would entail.
3.
We therefore hope GOM and GOT will weigh matter long and carefully and in considering recommendations conference will lay great stress on consultative features which allow for delay and give room for maneuver and cool examination future courses action. While we agree desirable keep FLN within GOM and GOT orbit, we believe precipitate response to Party recommendations on Algerian Government might by prolonging hostilities and producing recognition from wrong quarters actually operate against this objective. We hope GOM and GOT will exercise all possible influence on FLN to bring home realities of situation.4
4.
Finally we continue desirous encouraging closer North African cooperation and hope good sense GOM and GOT will prevail in giving such cooperation most constructive form by keeping always in mind vital importance North Africa and Western Europe to one another.

London inform FonOff above. Paris may act at discretion.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770A.00/5–358. Secret. Drafted by Bovey, cleared by Jova, and approved and signed for Herter by Rountree. Also sent to Rabat, Paris, and London and repeated to Tripoli, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Madrid.↩
  2. Representatives of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, Tunisian Néo-Destour, and Algerian National Liberation Front met in Tangier April 27–30.↩
  3. Dated March 22, this telegram advocated supporting projects that might provide a constructive outlet for moderate North African regimes. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/3–2258)↩

  4. At this point in the source text, the following paragraph was deleted before transmission:

    “4. Re US aid to France, our assistance given in context widest Western interests and not for prosecution Algerian war. We sure GOM and GOT aware popular misconceptions this regard both as to real scope and purpose US aid. While we understand and have much in mind feelings North African peoples this matter, we cannot feel it would be wise depart from our general policy avoiding use of aid programs as political pressure devices. Judging from attitudes GOM and GOT we believe they share this view.”

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