Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

269. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for NATO (Holmes) to the Secretary of State²

Washington, February 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

• United States Initiative on North Africa

Pursuant to your instructions conveyed orally to me by the Under Secretary, I submit the following suggestions.

Assuming that the immediate crisis in Tunisia³ is surmounted, I feel that we must not miss the opportunity to endeavor to persuade France to make a fresh start in North Africa and reach a negotiated settlement of the Algerian problem. So long as the fighting continues there, the danger progressively increases of eruptions anywhere from Tobruk to Dakar, a fusion of the Algerian and Spanish Saharan conflicts, and inevitably the entire Maghreb amply and effectively supported by the Egyptian-Soviet axis against the West. Furthermore, the United States is increasingly regarded by the Africans as underwriting “colonialism” in the area and through the provision of MAP equipment as an active instrument in the present hostilities. The eventual effect of this state of affairs on Africa south of the Sahara is not difficult to forecast.

In my “Report on Africa” submitted to you on February 6,⁴ I expressed the belief that before matters get worse in North Africa we should attempt, with British concurrence, to persuade France to change its attitude, and should that attempt fail, serve notice that we propose to do what we can to save the North African littoral in the name of Western security. The current crisis has convinced me that this action should be taken as soon as the situation permits.

I would propose as the first step a secret démarche at the highest level in Paris designed to persuade the French to modify their thesis that Algeria is an integral part of the metropole and to make a fresh start. We would suggest that they propose a cease-fire in Algeria to be followed immediately by a conference of representatives of Tunisia, Morocco (and possibly Libya), France, the United States and the United Kingdom to discuss the future of North Africa including the Algerian problem, with a view to achieving a negotiated settlement based on eventual self-determination for the Algerians. Possibly the United States and the United Kingdom would only have observer status; moreover, consideration might be given to including Italy and Spain. Alternatively, and based on the Tunisian-Moroccan offer of good offices, the conference might initially be limited to these two countries and France.

In exercising our good offices in the Franco-Tunisian dispute, we shall undoubtedly find it necessary to raise certain aspects of the Algerian situation, at least the question of the border with Tunisia. This may create a favorable opportunity to raise the basic problem of Algeria.

Attached for your consideration are short papers outlining the basic elements in this plan; the United States démarche (Tab A), the cease-fire (Tab B), and the conference (Tab C).⁵ These are not intended necessarily as fixed positions, but principally as initial guidance that would be subject to subsequent modifications.

It is fully realized, given the precarious situation of the Gaillard Government, particularly his dependence on the Right, that there would probably be limited chances for a successful outcome, at least in the first instance, of this démarche. The immediate future, however, would appear to provide a better opportunity for making such an approach than to delay too long. It is also appreciated that this initiative might provoke strong reactions in the French Government and inasmuch as it would probably become public knowledge eventually, could create severe strains on United States-French relations, possibly result in unpredictable repercussions in the French domestic scene, and might have serious effects in NATO. For this latter reason consideration would have to be given in due course as to whether and how the North Atlantic Council might be informed of our initiative. It would also have to be recognized that considerable pressures would have to be exerted on the Moslem countries, once France showed signs of making concessions, to prevent their pushing their demands beyond the bounds of mutual interest. Should the French eventually reject the démarche, we would then have to advise them that in the circumstances, we should feel free to follow an independent policy vis-à-vis Morocco and Tunisia, including the granting of increased financial and military assistance. We would, also, have to say that there would be grave doubts as to our ability to continue to support the French position on Algeria in the United Nations.

The difficulties to be anticipated in getting the FLN to accept a ceasefire cannot be minimized.

Faced with the increasing danger of disaster in North Africa, however, I feel that these risks should be taken.⁶

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2–2058. Secret. Drafted by Nes and Looram; initialed by Holmes and Calhoun; concurred in by Murphy, Smith, Elbrick, and Palmer; and sent to Dulles through S/S. The source text bears the handwritten notation “Sec saw.”
3. Regarding the crisis created by the February 8 French raid on the Tunisian town of Sidi Sakiet Youssef, see Documents 373 ff.
4. Scheduled for publication in volume XIV.
5. None printed.
6. These recommendations were reiterated in a March 3 report to Dulles by the working group on North Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3–358) Murphy reported on March 10 that Beeley had indicated the United Kingdom would welcome a peaceful solution in Algeria, but feared a British initiative would damage Anglo-French relations. (Telegram 4151 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/3–1058) Murphy advised on March 16 that the Foreign Office had reacted negatively to the proposal (telegram 1183 from Tunis; ibid., 751S.00/3–1658); on March 19, he reported that Macmillan had approved this reaction. (Telegram 4316 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/3–1958)