Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

228. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, December 1, 1958—8 p.m.

1659. Embassy telegrams 1624, 1635, 1639.² In course series conversations with local Mission Chiefs which I have been conducting during past several weeks, I called November 28 on Lebanese Chargé Ghaleb Turc who is old acquaintance from my Jidda days. After renewing situation generally and agreeing that Soviet danger here had reached critical point, I referred to efforts we had made improve relations with Nasser and UAR, despite which situation if anything worse than better as evidenced Nasser’s speech day before. Saying that in circumstances my cupboard of ideas getting very bare, I asked if he had any thoughts as friend, Moslem and dedicated nationalist. Turc said that offhand he felt we had been losing out in area (1) because we had made insufficient effort to understand Arab thinking and sentiment, (2) because our policy had been contradictory, e.g., following up our Suez stand by Eisenhower Doctrine and (3) because steps we had taken as symbols our desire improve relations with UAR had been inadequate regardless of fact US and UAR Governments might have agreed modest approach desirable. Admitting nothing particularly new in these thoughts, Turc said that, as Arab nationalist, he was very disturbed by Commie inroads in area to detriment of West and he would like to be helpful if he could. He was intimately acquainted with several persons in Nasser’s confidence, including Zulficar Sabri and Munir Ghaleb, head political section of presidency, and would be glad sound them out if I thought might be useful. Mindful of Bill Tilden’s maxim never to change winning game but always change losing one, I told him go ahead on understanding that acting on my personal initiative but at same time against general background of continuing desire USG normalize relations with UAR.

Reaction of foregoing developed much faster than expected in form call at Embassy this morning by Haikal at behest Nasser to whom calls by Turc on Sabri had been reported and who had discussed for 2 hours with Haikal yesterday with following results:

1. Regarding my reported disappointment with his speech Nasser wished make clear that reason was his feeling having been betrayed by leak our last conversation, not because of leak in itself but because he convinced had been done deliberately by USG in order embroil him with Soviets and Iraqis following pattern of previous efforts work against him and isolate him. When he had talked to me last time he had “cleared his conscience” by talking very frankly, only to have most sensitive matters discussed appear in press several days later. Not only that but it had been learned from UAR Embassy in Washington that matter had been topic wide discussion as revealed for instance in conversation of UAR Embassy officer with Dana Schmidt of New York Times. What had made still worse (Haikal said telling this on own responsibility, not authorized by Nasser) was that lowly UAR Embassy attaché had also been given substance conversation (Haikal did not say by whom but seemed possibly connected with alleged Schmidt conversation). This development had revived Nasser’s fear of being stabbed in back if he exposed himself and convinced him of inability work with US.

I replied knew nothing of so-called leak except for telegram (1386)³ from Department which had advised me of article in Washington Star which bore certain similarity part my talk with Nasser but for source of which Department had said unable account. I noted this telegram received long before question raised here which clearly established bona fides of Department denial. But more importantly leak would have been contrary our own interest in any event. Regarding Nasser speech quite true I had been disappointed not only because what said but because, if I had been as effective as I had tried be in last talk with Nasser, I didn’t think he would have spoken way he had.

2. Haikal then got down to what was obviously principal purpose his coming. I had asked through Turc, he observed, what could be done come to grips with situation. After serious discussion, Nasser was prepared make specific suggestion in form request for PL 480 wheat. At present wheat being obtained from Soviets in exchange for cotton. UAR would prefer reduce dependence on Soviets and for that reason to obtain wheat from US. As to terms UAR would be prepared (1) purchase for pounds under same terms as previous PL 480 wheat purchase, (2) purchase against pounds which US Government could use anywhere desired or (3) purchase against sale of cotton. Specifics regarding amounts, etc., could be worked out later by experts. All needed know now was whether we prepared to sell in principle. If so, can set about detailed arrangements; if not, just say so and “we’ll forget all about it”.

Commenting on proposal as authorized by Nasser, Haikal emphasized proposal could have “real impact” on US–UAR relations. On one hand, being in form food, it would have popular appeal and would serve dispel recollection economic sanctions imposed by US Government. Additionally, as far as UAR Government concerned, it would be reassuring regarding basic American attitude. On other hand, Nasser felt this type assistance would not pose difficulties for US Government as in case arms or industrial equipment and fact Israel already getting should allay objection on that score. Generalizing and concluding, Nasser said that, although US Government and UAR not now actively quarreling, obvious that paths dangerously diverging. Haikal added on his own without Nasser authorization that he felt proposal would also help UAR take stronger line on Commie issue.

Although Haikal may have added a few embellishments in presenting foregoing in Nasser’s name, approach has imprint of being real thing despite unorthodox way in which evoked and I believe it should be received in that way.

As to action I recommended that our response be immediate and affirmative.

Idea of action along this line is not new. It was developed in ICA master program book, discussed by Economic Counselor Whitman in Washington and is covered in further despatch going forward this week.⁴ Boiled down it comes to this plan at time when Soviets have been making dangerous inroads here, relations between US and UAR have been stuck on dead center as result inter alia of mutual inhibition over past. We made serious effort correct situation which failed make headway because various obstacles, greatest of which was psychological block of Nasser and UAR regime. Now Nasser, after having said would never again ask anything of us for fear being refused and humiliated, has unexpectedly reversed his field by making straight-forward request. This is not mere wheat deal but transaction in fundamental foreign relations.

My suggestion therefore is that we take leaf out of Khrushchev’s book and strike while iron is hot. There is of course risk it won’t work out but worst that could happen would be accumulation of Egyptian pound credit for which we would have no immediate use, and possible that, if successful, it might begin tipping scales in our direction to detriment Soviets. This, I submit, is good gamble which I recommend we take and hope reply possible in course current week.

Turc is unaware of foregoing reaction and in fact seemed somewhat discouraged by reaction he received from Sabri and Ghaleb. For tactical reasons, however, we believe best he be left in dark and also that discussion this matter be confined fewest possible persons. Needless say leak of this development would be catastrophic.⁵

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–158. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 1635 is supra. Regarding telegram 1624, see footnote 5, supra. Telegram 1639, November 29, confirmed Nasser’s violent reaction to the press leak on Iraq. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/11–2958)
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. Not further identified.
5. On December 2, Hare sent some second thoughts on the P.L. 480 deal, concluding that a prompt and favorable response was indicated. (Telegram 1670 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–258) On the same day, the Department replied that it was willing to undertake a new P.L. 480 sale of wheat to the UAR. (Ibid., 411.86B41/12–258) For text of the agreement, signed at Cairo on December 24, see 68 Stat. 455.