Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

157. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Hawks for Israel

As you know, I have been brooding over the problem of the Israeli request for Hawks. I have also checked again with Jim Douglas.

The relevant facts at this end appear to be that the Hawk is a defensive weapon incapable of offensive use; it could be produced starting at the end of 1961 against Israeli contracts with at least individual training spaces concurrently available for Israeli personnel; and the total cost for six batteries with the missiles would run close to $40 millions. It should be mentioned also that provision of the Hawk and training for Israelis would present a declassification problem. It could also produce some problems with our NATO allies whose full needs would not be met from the NATO production line until after the Israelis had equipped themselves by purchases from the United States.

I have come to the conclusion that it would not be in our interest to agree at this time to make the Hawk available to the Israelis. The controlling arguments against doing so are, in my mind, the following:

1. The very size of the order and the sophistication of the weapon would, I think, be construed by the Israelis, our allies, and the Arab countries as an abandonment of our policy of avoiding the role of a major supplier of military equipment to Israel. It would almost certainly be interpreted by Nasser as a significant change in U.S. policy.

2. My judgment is that as a result of this interpretation Nasser would turn to the Soviet Union for increased shipments of weapons of the latest type and design. This would result not only in his moving politically closer to the USSR, but also in an increased economic dependence on the USSR since payment would presumably be in Egyptian exports. We could expect a corresponding deterioration in our own relations with the UAR.

3. I cannot help but feel that Ben-Gurion’s request, while openly based on a persuasive military rationale, has nevertheless concealed in it a desire to change our policy on supplying weapons and to worsen our relations with the UAR to Israel’s benefit.

Accordingly, I recommend that you reply to Ben-Gurion along the lines of Mr. Jones’ draft letter attached.² I would suggest, however, that it be somewhat shortened and that in turning down at this time the Hawk request on grounds of policy, it should nevertheless leave a little hope alive by saying something to the effect that this policy would be kept under constant review in light of changing circumstances.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5612/7–1560. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Merchant. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “Secretary saw 7/27 and approved.”
2. Not attached to the source text. A copy of the 4-page draft is attached to an undated memorandum from Jones to Herter (drafted June 29), which is in turn an attachment to a memorandum from Merchant to Herter, July 1, stating that a reply should be delayed until Merchant had an opportunity to discuss the Hawk problem further with the Department of Defense. (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 70 D 304, Ben Gurion Visit)