150. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 7, 19601
SUBJECT
- Senator Fulbright’s Observations of the Middle East
PARTICIPANTS
- Senator Fulbright—Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Carl Marcy—Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- John Newhouse—Member of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- G. Lewis Jones—Assistant Secretary—NEA
- Francis O. Wilcox—Assistant Secretary—IO
- Parker T. Hart—Deputy Assistant Secretary—NEA
- Woodruff Wallner—Deputy Assistant Secretary—IO
- John O. Bell—Deputy Coordinator—U/MSC
- Armin H. Meyer—Director—NE
- Nicholas G. Thacher—Deputy Director—NE
- James M. Ludlow—UN Advisor—NEA
- William D. Brewer—Officer in Charge (UAR—NE
- Theodore A. Wahl—Lebanon-Israel—NE
- Stephen E. Palmer—U.N. Political & Security Affairs
- Robert L. Funseth—U.N. Political & Security Affairs
Senator Fulbright met with Department officers at their request to discuss informally with them his observations of his recent visit to the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel. Aside from the Senator’s general impressions of the area and his brief remarks on the exchange program, the greater part of the informal discussion was devoted to the problem of the Palestine refugees.
[Page 331]Senator Fulbright said that the positions of the United Arab Republic and Israel on the refugee question as expressed to him by President Nasser and Premier Ben-Gurion did not deviate from their previously stated and well-known views on this particular problem.
President Nasser regarded the UN resolution 194 (III) of December, 1948, providing for the repatriation or compensation of the Palestine refugees, and the resolution providing for freedom of transit of the Suez Canal, as inseparable. In his view, without implementation of the former, there could be no implementation of the latter. President Nasser did not mention the resolution on the partition of Palestine.
Premier Ben-Gurion said there could not be repatriation of any of the refugees because their presence in Israel would constitute a “fifth column” jeopardizing the security and very existence of the state of Israel. He said they should be resettled in the neighboring Arab states. However, Foreign Minister Golda Meir at least mentioned, if only in hypothetical terms, the figure of one hundred to two hundred thousand when discussing how many refugees could theoretically be returned to Israel. In this connection, Mr. Gershon Avner, Director, United States Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, hinted to Mr. Marcy that the time may have come when Israel could seriously consider accepting the repatriation of a specific limited number of refugees. Senator Fulbright said that he should not be misunderstood as radiating optimism but he felt that even these guarded comments might be significant.
An unnamed but prominent Palestinian in old Jerusalem told Senator Fulbright that if a fair and reasonable offer of compensation were made only a limited number of refugees would choose to return to their former lands in Israel. He recommended that a group of non-political personalities, social scientists for example, from countries not identified with the Palestine question, be asked to conduct private discussions with all of the parties directly concerned with an aim of arriving at an acceptable plan providing for repatriation or compensation.
In his own personal view, Senator Fulbright said that the specific problem of the Palestine refugees was one of those seemingly insoluble problems with which we are often confronted and for which we must continually be striving to find a solution. He drew a parallel between it and our own problem of civil rights which was viewed by many as being equally insoluble, but he said the consistent efforts to find a solution to the civil rights problem were finally meeting with some success and perhaps in fifty years it would be solved. However, he said that, like the civil rights problem, the Palestine refugee question was a very delicate and difficult problem in which we must be very sensitive to the emotional reaction of those directly involved. [Page 332] Therefore, he wished to stress that in his view the approach, that is to say how it was done, was as important if not more important than what was done.
Senator Fulbright emphasized that, because of our own close identification with the Palestine question, it was best for the United States to remain in the background. It would be much better if we could have a friendly third party or power actually take the initiative or perform the negotiation of an agreement which we could then support.
Asked if he thought such an initiative might be complicated at this time by the United States presidential election, Senator Fulbright said that of course we had to recognize the realities of American domestic politics but he thought the refugee problem was so complex that we probably would not have made much headway by the time the national election campaign was over.
Senator Fulbright said he had met Dr. Davis, Director of UNRWA, in Jerusalem and was favorably impressed by UNRWA’s limited vocational training program. He said it was obvious that, regardless of where the Palestine refugees ultimately settled, they would have to have some training and help if they were to be useful citizens. At present the overwhelming majority are unskilled agricultural workers of whom there is a surplus in the Middle East. With training they could become the kind of citizens who would be more easily absorbed by any state, whether it be Arab or Israeli. However, as presently constituted, UNRWA’s vocational program is little more than a pilot project and would have to be greatly expanded if it were to make any significant contribution to the solution of the problem. He felt UNRWA’s approach was sound but stressed that it was severely limited due to a lack of resources.
In the discussion of the possibility of taking an initiative now, the Senator was asked if he thought the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), which had been mentioned in last year’s General Assembly resolution, might not be an appropriate body to undertake a renewed effort. The Senator said he had no strong views about the PCC but he had left the Middle East with the feeling that a new forum, one not previously identified with the problem, might have a better chance of success. However, he was not sure about this. When asked if he thought a Turk might be an appropriate disinterested third party, he observed that at the present time Turkey seems to have enough problems of its own. As an example of the kind of disinterested third party he had in mind, the Senator suggested perhaps a Danish or Austrian private citizen, but he emphasized that he had no firm thoughts on this question. He also mentioned that President Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development seemed to enjoy the full confidence of at least the Egyptians.
[Page 333]Senator Fulbright stressed the importance that the Department not give up in its efforts to find a solution. He said that all present were aware of how increasingly difficult it was to get Congress annually to appropriate funds for UNRWA without ever being given any glimmer of hope of an ultimate solution. He said there is always the great danger that one of these years Congress will not come through and then we will be confronted with a dangerous situation of unknown dimensions.
In closing, the Senator repeated again his view of how important it was to consider the manner in which any solution was presented as this was as important as the substance of the solution itself.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–FU/6–760. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth on June 9. Initialed by Jones and Wilcox.↩