137. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary of State Herter’s Residence, Washington, March 13, 19601
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- G. Lewis Jones—NEA
- Prime Minister Ben Gurion
- Avraham Harman, Israeli Ambassador
- Yaacov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Prime Minister Ben Gurion (hereafter BG), Ambassador Harman and Minister Herzog called at the residence of the Secretary at 4:30 p.m. on March 13 having earlier lunched with Vice President Nixon and Mr. Dillon.2
The Secretary opened by saying that we were “gratified” by the low key in which BG had handled the press. He referred specifically to the story in the New York Times of March 13 in which BG was quoted as having said that he hoped that Israel would make no more headlines: that it would become one of the “world’s dullest countries” making news only in economic developments.
[Page 297]The Secretary then said that Israel’s note requesting arms assistance was under study at the Pentagon with regards to availability and costs: this was particularly true with regard to AA equipment and Electronic Early Warning Equipment.
BG said Israel’s arms request was in two parts: one urgent—one NOT urgent. If the US study of the latter were to take weeks or months, Israel would not mind, even though Nasser has three times more weapons than Israel.
In the urgent category the big danger for Israel will be if and when Nasser gets the MIG 19s which he has been promised. Nasser has told his military that when he receives these he is going to “finish” Israel. BG did not discount the possibility that the non-delivery of MIG 19s might be “saving Nasser’s face” but the fact remains that with MIG 19s the UAR believes it can finish Israel.
BG said that if Israel can get AA missiles and Early Warning Equipment it believes it can prevent its being “finished”. It already has Mysteres which BG thought could handle MIG 17s and UAR bombers. However, UAR bombers by attacking Tel Aviv area could “paralyze” Israeli mobilization.
The Secretary said he would amend what he had just said. The U.S. would consider the Israeli request “sympathetically and urgently”.
BG then assured the Secretary of Israel’s ability to keep secrets. He said, “We are a small country and can keep a secret absolutely”.
The Secretary said that he thought shipment would best be made from some NATO country.
BG reverted to the question of secrecy and told the story of Israel’s Sinai campaign to destroy Nasser’s bases in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. He said this was the only action possible for Israel following the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordan Tripartite Treaty. He pointed out that not even the U.S. knew of Israel’s plans to launch the Sinai campaign.
The Secretary said in regard to secrecy that he “wished we could profit from your example: we have many leaks around here”.
At this point Minister Herzog intervened to say that the Israelis knew that the U.S. has supplies of “Hawks” in NATO countries under U.S. control: he thought these would be easy to transfer.
BG continued to emphasize Israel’s ability to keep things secret and told a story of not even showing new tanks in Army Day parades.
BG then addressed the Secretary and said: “Am I right in believing that I can consider your reply a positive one?”
The Secretary replied: “That is a fair assumption”. He then qualified this statement to the extent of saying that this was a fair assumption unless factors which he (the Secretary) did not now know about were brought to his attention.
[Page 298]BG went on to say that he understood from his talk with the President that the U.S. cannot be the principal supplier of arms to Israel. He said: “This is not necessary”: he thought arms could be obtained sooner or later from France, the UK and West Germany. However, BG said: “Israel must supply its immigrants with everything”. The Negev is the only place where new Jews can be settled: he expected more Jews both from Moslem countries and the USSR. BG said he did not want to raise living standards in Israel too high—for example he was against TV. He was sending the best of Israel’s youth to the Negev and at this point said: “We are grateful for your help in bringing water to the Negev from the Jordan River”.
Bringing the subject back to arms, BG said that the UAR gets its arms from Russia at one third of the original cost price on long payment terms. He said that in October 1958 the U.S. made it possible for Israel to acquire some arms. He hoped something of the same kind could be worked out in connection with the AA missiles since Israel must spend its money on settling people and needs any help it can get to lighten its financial burden.
At this point Minister Herzog intervened to say that in 1958 the U.S. gave hidden economic aid to help Israel to buy arms.
BG then said Israel has deep faith in the spiritual world and he hoped Israel would be able to “repay” the U.S. by doing something worthwhile in the world. He referred to the “very modest contribution” which Israel is now making, but thought that Israel’s example would not be lost upon the peoples of Asia and Africa and might influence which way these peoples will go. He was grateful for all the support the United States has given.
Mr. Herzog brought the conversation back to missiles by saying that the Israeli Embassy has some ideas with regard to the financing of these missiles which it would like to present to the Department. He then spoke in Hebrew to BG apparently reminding the latter to bring up the question of a declaration at the Summit.
BG then referred to the difference existing in the Middle East between the Arabs and the non-Arabs (Turks and Iranians). He said he thought it would help if at the Summit the President could arrange for a Declaration by all the powers, or at least by the United States and the USSR, to the effect that they favor a direct settlement between Israel and the Arab States and that they favor the “status quo”. BG said this might not bring peace: Nasser might make his usual protests but it would certainly make Jordan, Israel, Lebanon and possibly Iran “feel better”. It might even bring peace closer.
The Secretary replied that we had taken full notes of what he had said on this point to the President and to Messrs. Dillon and Merchant and implied that we would consider his suggestion.
[Page 299]The Secretary then said that he had been interested in BG’s presentation to the President regarding Khrushchev’s philosophy. The Secretary thought that much will depend on how much Khrushchev wants to disarm from the economic point of view. The Secretary said he expected that Khrushchev would like his niche in history to be that of the man who brought about economic progress in the USSR: Stalin’s niche would be that of the military buildup of the Soviet Union.
BG replied, speaking of the Summit, much will depend upon the extent of unity which the West displays.
The Secretary said that the U.S. is confronted by a difficult problem based upon the concept that the first Summit will be followed by future Summits. Everyone wants to be consulted. This was made evident in the recent tour of the President to Latin America. The problem of consultation which will satisfy everyone makes progress more and more difficult.
BG said that he thought the problem for the U.S. is how to treat foreign countries as “neighbors and brothers”: how not to arouse resentments arising out of U.S. superiority.
The Secretary inquired whether BG had noted in his contacts with the African states any moves towards federation.
BG replied that he had noted very little. Nkrumah had spoken of an “African personality” but he doubted if this really existed. All the African states seemed determined to have independence. This did not mean, however, that there could not be cooperation between the African states as free peoples. BG said Nasser is counting on Islam as a cementing force in Africa. It is true that there are many Moslems there but they are black Moslems—not Arabs—and BG was inclined to doubt that they felt any kinship with Nasser.
The Secretary said that both Nkrumah and Sekou Touré had asserted that they spoke for the people of black Africa. He supposed they were building themselves up and could not so speak.
He agreed but added that there should be no enmity between the African states. These states lacked cohesion—even internally. For example, Ghana is not a country, but a conglomeration of tribes, some of which did not even speak the same language. Nonetheless he had met in Africa “real idealists” with whom he thought the West would have to deal.
BG took his departure at this point (5:25 pm). He invited the Secretary to visit him in Israel and the Secretary replied that he “wanted to come”.
Following this conversation the Secretary told Lewis Jones that he had been in touch earlier in the day with Vice President Nixon, Secretary Anderson and Mr. Dillon and that he and they were agreed we should do something promptly in connection with Israel’s needs for air defense equipment for use in the event of an attack by the UAR. The [Page 300] Secretary said this means the supply of ground-to-air missiles and Early Warning radar. He said we should move ahead on this project promptly.
The Secretary emphasized that in helping Israel in this connection strict secrecy would have to be preserved. (This accounts for the Top Secret classification of this memorandum.)