Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

133. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 10, 1960, 3:45 p.m.¹

Washington, March 10, 1960, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Refugees

[Here follows the same list of participants as the memorandum of conversation, supra.]

The Under Secretary recalled the general proposals which the late Secretary Dulles had made for settling the Palestine problem. He expressed the hope that such a settlement might be forthcoming and felt that the Arab refugee issue was a key element. It was, of course, understood that Israel could not absorb a mass influx at one time. However, some sort of a phased repatriation program undertaken by Israel would in our view be a great step forward. We did not know whether the Arabs would agree to such a program, but the possibility was well worth exploring secretly. The Under Secretary emphasized that our interest in this matter was prompted by substantial public concern in this country at the lack of progress on the refugee question and by our conviction that progress on the refugee problem could lead the way to a general Arab-Israel settlement.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said this subject has two aspects: (a) a general settlement and (b) the refugee problem. If Egypt were not in existence, he said, it would be relatively easy for Israel to arrange a general settlement with the other Arab countries. Under present conditions, however, Qasim must compete with Nasser and, therefore, the key to any general settlement is Egypt. In this connection, it was necessary to recall the failure of U.S. efforts in 1955–56, when Egypt proved uncooperative. According to the Prime Minister, there might be some hope if Nasser could be made aware that all the great powers favored the status quo in the Near East. He would then behave. The question is whether Mr. Khrushchev would agree to such a proposal.

The Prime Minister felt there is a struggle going on in Nasser’s heart whether to concentrate on military strength or economic development. As soon as he would give up his dreams for building an Arab empire and concentrate on doing something to improve the welfare of his people there would be hope for an Arab-Israel settlement.

The Under Secretary interjected that the Prime Minister’s thoughts in this respect were identical with our own. We, too, felt that Nasser should emphasize economic development. Our modest aid program to the UAR had this as its primary purpose.

With respect to the refugee issue, the Prime Minister asserted that as far as Israel is concerned there is no possibility for repatriation. He reviewed the Israel version of history to the effect that the refugees had fled of their own volition and, therefore, are not Israel’s responsibility. He recalled that Israel has been compelled to take in 300,000 German displaced persons, 100,000 Iraqi Jews, 50,000 Yemeni Jews and others. Therefore, it would be a physical impossibility for Israel to take back the Arab refugees. The Prime Minister said that some people asked why it is that Israel is ready to take one million Jews from Russia and cannot take back the Arab refugees. The answer, he said, is simply that the Arabs are not capable of doing what a Jew can do in Israel. He pointed out that all the states surrounding Israel are technically at a state of war with Israel. Accordingly, for Israel to accept refugees from those states would be like an injection of poison. It would be suicide for Israel to accept the refugees.

The Prime Minister asserted that the only answer to the refugee problem is resettlement in the under-populated neighboring areas. This could be done in the context of a general peace settlement at which time Israel would be happy to try to cooperate, particularly by way of aiding in compensation for the refugee losses.

When the Under Secretary suggested that the program could be a phased one and would not involve large numbers of Arabs at any one time, the Prime Minister reiterated that even a small number would be like poison. They would enter Israel with the mission of destroying Israel. It was indeed a tragedy, he said, that Arab leaders were using the refugees as a political weapon. The Prime Minister said the Arabs are very good at making deserts of prosperous areas; they are not capable of “unmaking deserts,” which is an essential element in Israel’s progress.

Assistant Secretary Wilcox asked the Prime Minister if we were to understand that no progress could be made on the refugee problem in the near future. The Prime Minister replied that some progress is being made in Jordan where the government is trying to facilitate the settlement of refugees. To Mr. Wilcox’s inquiry concerning possible Israeli initiative, the Prime Minister suggested that Israel is collaborating on a most secret basis with high Jordan leaders toward progress in general Arab-Israel relations.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 886.411/3–1060. Secret. Drafted by Meyer and approved by U on March 11. See also supra, infra, and Document 135.