Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

126. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 18, 1960—8 p.m.

774. Re: Middle East.

1. At mtg called by SYG with US and UK Dels today SYG said he regarded situation in ME as serious (“potentially very serious”) and wanted to consult US re next UN steps. During course of long discussion he reviewed Suez Canal issue and Jordanian water problems along lines his conversation with Reinhardt (USUN 770)² but concentrated most of his remarks on current northern Demilitarized Zone (D/Z) problems.

2. He received letter on D/Z problems from UAR today for circulation to SC.³ Last para of this letter SYG regarded as “rather dangerous”. As read out by SYG para read “The Govt of the UAR impresses upon the SC the grave consequences if Israel’s serious violation of the demilitarized zone is unchecked. The UAR reserves the right to take whatever measures it deems right to rectify the situation.” SYG was afraid this para might be invoked by UAR as pre-warning under Art 51 of Charter; that it would alarm Israel and that it showed disturbing state of mind in UAR. He was asking Asha to change it.

3. Later in mtg Bunche received word that Asha had agreed to revise last sentence to read “UAR reserved the right to seek to restore the previously existing situation” and that he had formally submitted letter for circulation. After some discussion it was generally felt this was slight but not great improvement over original language, which Asha (UAR) had told Bunche was itself more moderate than language in his instructions. In any case, SYG still thought main problem was UAR governmental attitude which original wording reflected.

3. [sic] SYG also said he had received TS cable yesterday (Feb 17) from Gen Gyani (UNEF) saying he had been informed “formally” in Gaza by UAR that any military aggression on northern region of UAR would be considered act of aggression on UAR in both regions. This implied UNEF would be caught between parties in any serious conflict.

4. In all circumstances SYG said he was planning to send Council members letter tomorrow when text UAR letter was circulated. SYG’s letter would say recent developments may call for consideration of situation by SC (see USUN 775 for full text).⁴ It would also refer to anticipated report from Von Horn (UNTSO) with intention counteracting sharp reaction he expected in Israel from UAR note.

5. SYG made clear he felt border situation was serious and that he personally thought SC would have to meet in near future to deal with it. His idea was that SC should meet to avoid outbreak by showing it was fully aware of situation and that any move by parties would come under SC study and reaction. He has in mind SC would reaffirm either in res or consensus procedure its previous stands on status DZ and against unilateral action by parties. He would prefer Council be called by someone else but would not discard acting under Art 99 as he feels this would be fully justifiable constitutionally and in actual circumstances.

6. He does not feel Israelis are in “aggressive mood” but he does feel they intend to acquire control over northern DZ as they have done over El Auja because they will need this in connection with Jordan water diversion, which they regard as vital. He therefore considers DZ situation will continue to be serious, although he indicated both sides at fault in recent clashes. (Von Horn report on these clashes will be available NY this weekend and will be promptly circulated.)⁵

7. Dixon (UK) said UK had nothing to indicate Israel was in unsettled mood; in fact, everything they had pointed other way. He said SYG’s proposed letter would in effect compel SC mtg. It would be abrupt change from pattern of last two years in which SYG has been handling problem except in extreme circumstances. Such shift in itself might magnify problem. Beeley added that SC discussion on DZ would have certain lack of reality about it particularly since it would not touch canal or Jordan waters issues. While not ruling out possibility SC might have to look at DZ issue they question whether situation yet warranted such sudden move. They therefore suggested last para of SYG’s letter might be deleted. (After meeting Dixon called to say that while he had poured cold water on SC idea with SYG he intended to give it “fair wind” in report to London.)

8. SYG, while continuing to maintain his belief SC mtg ultimately has to be held, replied that what he might do would be to substitute for last para of his letter fol sentence: “I wish to call these reports to the urgent attention of members of SC”. He observed mere fact he felt it necessary to send covering letter of this sort would serve notice to SC of his concern, while leaving necessity of SC mtg somewhat more open.

9. I said I felt SYG’s assessment of situation, including letter from UAR and his information from Gyani, deserved serious consideration as did also Dixon’s observation implying sudden shift to SC might further magnify current issue. I thought Dept would probably prefer SYG’s alternate formula for letter but would like opportunity to consult. At same time, I pointed out SC mtgs in past had quieting effect on border issues, even when they had no positive outcome.

10. SYG said he intended we would have opportunity to consult but asked that we provide him with our views on text his letter to SC members by tomorrow (Friday) noon, as he could not delay publishing UAR letter further and wished get his letter out at same time.

11. Dept’s urgent instructions requested on formulation SYG’s letter. Also suggest Dept give full consideration to whether or not it considers SC action desirable in near future in light SYG’s concern.⁶

Barco

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2–1860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv and Cairo.
2. Telegram 770, February 17, transmitted Hammarskjöld’s views on the Suez transit question and UAR-Israeli relations. (Ibid., 986B.7301/2–1760)
3. For text of this letter, see U.N. Doc. S/4268.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2–1860)
5. For text of Von Horn’s report, see U.N. Doc. S/4270.
6. On February 19, the Department of State replied that it agreed with Hammarskjöld’s general assessment of the situation in the Middle East and was strongly supporting his efforts to reduce tension. It advised that the UAR letter be circulated as a routine matter and that, before any Security Council meeting was called, full consideration be given to whether a meeting would increase or reduce tension. (Telegram 696; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2–1860) Following remarks to the press on February 19, the Secretary-General decided that no Council meeting was needed.