Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

123. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 16, 1960, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, February 16, 1960, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Arms Request

PARTICIPANTS

• Avraham Harman, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel
• Moshe Erell, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
• Col. Aharon Yariv, Military, Naval and Air Attaché, Embassy of Israel
• NEA—G. Lewis Jones
• NE—Armin H. Meyer
• NE—William L. Hamilton

Ambassador Harman said the purpose of his call was to supplement his Government’s note of February 9² requesting United States assistance in procurement and financing of Israel’s arms requirements. The note, he said, is the product of a study requested by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion some months ago and completed recently at which time he presented the rather alarming conclusions of the study to his Cabinet.

Israel’s examination of its defense posture had revealed four objective factors which might be defined as follows:

1. The appearance of a dangerous gap in the quality of matériel possessed by Israel as compared with the Arab states, and

2. A large gap in relative quantities of matériel.

3. The absence in Israel of adequate warning systems, especially against air attack.

4. The growth of Arab capacity to manipulate and employ their military machine. This last factor could be described in terms of an actual growth in the size of UAR armed forces as well as increases in a) trained personnel and b) organization of training facilities.

Ambassador Harman said that the study had not addressed itself in any direct way to an appraisal of Arab intentions towards Israel despite the fact that there had been a substantial increase in Arab expression of hostility against Israel in the last 6 or 8 months. He said Arab intentions were not relevant at the moment. What Israel feared deeply was the prospect of finding itself in a situation which could not be remedied after it became apparent that danger was imminent. The principal danger was that of a surprise air attack because of Israel’s circumstances, mounting of an air attack does not require long preparation if any enemy has the aircraft.

The Ambassador said that the list of arms appended to the Israel note represents the gap as it now exists between Israel’s equipment and what is required to re-establish the previous equilibrium. He said it might be divided into three categories: 1) The equipment needed to improve the quality of Israel’s equipment and replace items rendered obsolete by the Arabs’ recent acquisitions. 2) Minimum additions vital to achieve relative equality in a quantitative sense. (The Ambassador commented at this point that Israel was not thinking of an overall increase in its forces or equipment.) 3) Items needed to increase Israel’s capacity to alert itself to sudden attack.

The magnitude of the deficiency, according to Ambassador Harman, places Israel in a terrible dilemma. Security is a consideration overriding all others, but without assistance Israel could reduce the gap only by seriously undermining its capacity for economic growth. He suggested that the problem of repairing Israel’s defense posture was of importance to the West, arguing that Israel’s defense capacity had been one of the factors contributing to the relative stability prevailing in the area since 1957.

He said he wanted to underscore the fact that the gap results entirely from Soviet intervention in the area. How the situation could be corrected is a matter that his Government would like to consider in consultation with the United States. They would welcome suggestions. There was no rigidity in their views as to what processes could best meet the problem.

In response to Mr. Jones’ inquiry, Ambassador Harman said that Israel defense expenditure represents some 26 to 30 per cent of the Government’s budget, plus other items which had a direct bearing on Israel’s security but were not defined or revealed in the budget.

Mr. Jones complimented the Israelis on the eloquence with which their note presented the Israel case. However, he said, United States consideration of the request has only begun. He said the Department of Defense has been asked to provide some estimates of cost and availabilities without reference to the political factors which Mr. Jones described as far-reaching. He reminded the Israelis of U.S. reluctance to become a principal source of supply for the area in the belief that introduction of large quantities of arms there is not a good thing.

Mr. Jones indicated that we would be interested in any further statistics the Israelis might care to produce on the Arab buildup. He commented that the Department had not been conscious it was as great as the Israelis asserted.

Col. Yariv said that there had been a marked growth in the size of UAR forces. Outfits which had once existed only on paper were now full strength and very well-equipped. New units had been added. While Iraq was not a “first-line threat”, as compared with the UAR, it also has increased the size of its forces and the state of its general competence. He reported a greatly accelerated rate of training since 1956 and replacement of all the equipment the UAR had lost in the Sinai campaign. Since then, he said, all UAR officers who had field commands had been in the Soviet Union for training. He credited the UAR with great improvement in its paratroop outfits, under water or “frogmen” units, submarine crews, etc.

Mr. Meyer asked the Israelis if they had a timetable on UAR acquisition of equipment. Col. Yariv replied it is Israel’s belief that there had been steady substantial deliveries from 1955, when the Czech Arms Deal was signed through the middle of 1959 after which they may have tapered off.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–1660. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hamilton on February 17. The source text is labeled Part I of II. For Part II, see infra. Briefing papers for the conversation, February 15 and 16, are in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 62 D 35, 1960 Chron. A summary of the discussion of the I/S MAC meeting was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 613, February 16. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86B/2–1660) A memorandum of a similar conversation among Erell, Tariv, Meyer, and Wahl, February 12, is ibid., 784A.56/2–1260.
2. See footnote 2, supra.