118. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 28, 19601
SUBJECT
- Saudi Arabian Démarche re Jordanian Waters
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah Al Khayyal, Saudi Arabian Ambassador
- G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA
- Hermann F. Eilts, OIC, Arabian Peninsula Affairs, NEA/NE
Ambassador Khayyal said that following a meeting with his Arab colleagues on Israel’s reported projects to divert water from Lake Tiberias, he had decided to call on Secretary Jones to ask that the United States use its influence to prevent Israel from going ahead with these plans. The Ambassador acknowledged that it was the intention of the Arab states to try to hurt Israel as much as possible and that stopping the proposed Israel project was part of this program. He thought the Arab-Israeli situation re the Jordan River should be “frozen.” He hoped that the United States, as a friend of the Arab states, would take steps to stop the Israelis.
Mr. Jones said that, as he had earlier told the Jordanian and Lebanese Ambassadors, the United States is not involved in this matter.2 Israel, using its own resources, is planning to draw water from Lake Tiberias. He knew of no plan, however, that would take water from the Arab states in the next 3, 4 or 5 years. It was exceedingly [Page 259] difficult to stop the Israelis from going ahead with their water diversion plans when the Arab states are showing complete disinterest in any constructive proposals to use the Jordan waters.
Speaking personally, Mr. Jones said he was deeply disappointed at the lack of progress made with respect to productive use of Jordan waters. Between 1953 and 1955 the United States, in an effort to be of help, had assembled the best engineering talent available to study the water resources of the Jordan Valley and to make recommendations. The so-called Johnston Plan was based on purely scientific and technical considerations. It would have provided an impartial mechanism to allot fair quantities of water to the riparian states. It did not envisage any direct Arab contact with Israel. Rather, control would have been exercised through an international water master.
Arab technical experts had recognized this and approved the plan. Unfortunately, on the political level, the Arabs had rejected it. Syria, which has the least need for Jordan waters, was the loudest in condemning the project. Jordan, regrettably, is the principal loser. Had the Johnston Plan been accepted, some 200,000 additional Jordanians would now have land for cultivation. All of this, however, is a thing of the past. The United States is not trying to sell the Johnston Plan or any other plan to the Arab states. The problem is essentially one for the states in the area to resolve.
In a reply to an indirect inquiry whether the United States would assist the Arabs in any water plans affecting the Jordan River, Mr. Jones observed that funds are tight at the present time but that, again speaking personally, he felt that the United States would be prepared to explore how it might assist in furthering some feasible program.
Ambassador Khayyal said he was not acquainted with the technical details of the problem and asked whether he might have a copy of the Johnston Plan. Mr. Jones said that the Arab governments doubtless had copies, but that he would be happy to lend the Ambassador a copy. (Note: Mr. Eilts later delivered to Ambassador Khayyal a copy of our memorandum of September 30, 1955,3 for his study, but asked that it be returned once the Ambassador had finished with it.)
- Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 59, Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Eilts. Khayyal also met that day with Deputy Under Secretary Hare, who asked him to discuss the Jordan water question with Jones. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid., Central Files, 684A.85322/1–2060.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation with the Jordanian Ambassador is ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 62 D 25, Jordan Water Development; a summary of the conversation with the Lebanese Ambassador was transmitted to Beirut in telegram 2663, January 28. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.85322/1–1660)↩
- Not printed.↩