116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon1

2474. Embtel 2209.2 You authorized respond Oueini on subject Jordan waters along following lines:

1.
Department appreciates forthrightness with which Oueini has presented to you dangers and difficulties facing Arab leaders re Jordan waters question. We have continually been impressed by constructive attitude which Oueini has exhibited toward this problem, refugee problem and other thorny aspects Palestine question.
2.
We fully share Oueini’s concern re possible Arab-Israel flare up over Jordan waters. We have long feared such possibility and earnestly sought to help avert it through Eric Johnston missions of 1953–1955. We had been very encouraged by fact that agreement for equitable distribution Jordan resources was clearly obtainable on technical level. Our hopes, however, had been dashed by shortsighted Arab League decision on political level. We realize difficulties solution of type proposed by Johnston poses for an Arab politician but still convinced some formula along lines that proposed by Johnston is only realistic solution.
3.
Our impression is that most Arab leaders, including those who actively concerned with Jordan problem at this time, have only vague knowledge of contents Johnston proposals. Fundamental principle under which Johnston operated was that first priority on Jordan water allocations must go to all lands within Jordan basin reasonably cultivable. Thus HKJ would receive sufficient water for East Ghor and West Ghor canals which would irrigate all lands reasonably and economically cultivable in valley in Jordan. According our estimates, some [Page 256] 200,000 Jordanians could today be living on lands irrigated under Jordan Plan had Arab politicians not blocked plan on political grounds. Similarly Syria and Lebanon legitimate needs were cared for, i.e., water provided for all reasonably cultivable lands. In case of Lebanon, Hasbani water was allocated even though usage Lebanese allocation obviously impractical for foreseeable future. Johnston Plan required no agreement or contact with Israel on part Arabs but rather commitments by both sides to US as friendly third party. Also, although some refugees were to benefit from Johnston Plan it was to be without any prejudice to their rights of repatriation or compensation.
4.
In our view it is illogical expect Israel stand still re its water development program merely because Arabs unable reach agreement among themselves re logical scientifically planned development River system to economic benefit of Arabs and to mutual advantage. Arabs should know that without in any way tapping waters at Banat Yacub or other demilitarized areas Israel by simple process pumping water from Lake Tiberias will be able take all water it wishes. Moreover further development Israel program creates more established water uses which could carry great weight in any international forum. Our impression is that Israelis still willing abide by Johnston allocations and our hope is they will do so. However, some rational approach on Arab side is needed or Arab interest will go by default.
5.
All foregoing is not designed to “sell” Johnston Plan. In our view problem is clearly one for peoples of area. We made earnest and vigorous effort be helpful without success. We would be ready again to seek be helpful should Arabs and Israelis so wish but initiative must come from parties concerned.
6.
We gratified Oueini shares our conviction that Jordan problem be resolved peacefully. As UN members Arab states have responsibility under UN charter to seek peaceful adjustment of differences with other states. Resort to military action would not be condoned by nations of world including US. In this connection it our opinion that in any airing of problem at issue Arabs would receive little sympathy since practical formula for solution of problem seems so readily available.
7.
Our hope is that Oueini will utilize his best efforts to inject realism and rationality into Arab League discussion concerning Jordan waters. This is problem where emotionalism cannot serve Arab long-run interests. Quiet rational approach with possible assistance from friends of both Arabs and Israelis seems only appropriate course to follow.

Other addressees may speak along above lines in conversations local officials should suitable occasion arise.

Merchant
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–1260. Confidential. Drafted by Meyer on January 13; cleared in draft with Ludlow, Wallner, and L; and signed for Merchant by Jones. Also sent to Amman, Cairo, and Damascus and repeated to Baghdad, Tel Aviv, London, and USUN.
  2. Supra.