Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

100. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)¹

Washington, November 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Jordan Water Project

Discussion:

In discussing Israel’s water problem with Lewis Jones following the Secretary’s staff meeting on October 5,² you suggested a reappraisal of our attitude toward Israel’s program for water resources development. Specifically, you suggested that we seek to be helpful with respect to: a) the Beit Shean project in Israel; and b) a proposal from the Israelis for DLF assistance to a “Central Israel Water Conduit” project.

We have studied this matter further in the light of your suggestions and have had the benefit of the technical views of Mr. Wayne Criddle, the State Engineer of Utah and water engineer on Eric Johnston’s mission. The following observations have emerged:

1. Importance of Water to Israel. Israel’s Finance Minister recently told an American official who was visiting Israel, “Wherever you go in our country you will be confronted by one word, ‘water’”. Ground water supplies in Israel are apparently being depleted, while irrigation needs are mounting. In the well-conceived plans for Israel’s economic development, the need for water will be increasingly acute, particularly if Israel is to achieve its objective of attaining sufficient economic growth to compensate for the sizable external assistance currently being received from West Germany which is due to terminate in 1963–64.

2. Conflict between Israel and Johnston Plans. It is unfortunate that the strenuous efforts of Eric Johnston and the Department to work out a unified Jordan water development plan in 1953–55 did not culminate in success. As you know, Ambassador Johnston achieved general agreement on the technical level. His efforts foundered when his plan reached the political level, notably at the Arab League. It has been our feeling that his efforts were not in vain and that the virtual technical agreement which was achieved is highly valuable and the progress which was made should be preserved.

In a note dated July 17, setting forth Israel’s water proposals (Tab B)³ the Israelis indicated to us that “Israel’s attitude toward the future implementation of a unified plan such as that discussed by Ambassador Eric Johnston will not be affected by Israel’s prior utilization of Jordan water” and that “there will be no difficulty in incorporating the Tiberias–Western Israel project in its entirety within such a unified plan.” Our position heretofore has been that by unilaterally proceeding with its ambitious plans for diverting water out of the Jordan basin, Israel would ultimately have the capability for obtaining all waters allotted to it under a unified plan without prior or concomitant guarantees to the other affected states as to the proper allocation or control of the waters of the river system. Having established this position, the Israelis would then have little incentive to negotiate an agreement.

Since receipt of the Israel note of July 17, plus the receipt from the Israelis on a confidential basis of their master water plan, our position concerning the prejudicing of prospects for an ultimate agreement has been reinforced by a clear analysis that the Israel project, as it is in fact already being constructed, entails a capacity for diverting waters, without any international check or control, at least 25% to 35% in excess of the water allocations envisioned for Israel in the Johnston negotiations.

According to the Johnston Plan, as it is interpreted by Engineer Wayne Criddle, Israel would be allowed to divert 231 MCM from the Jordan basin to Western Israel and the Negev. According to the Israel master plan, 320 MCM’s would be diverted, although the diversion in “Stage One” would be only 180 MCM’s. Moreover, the actual capacity of the Israel structures is 425 MCM’s. There are other divergencies from the Johnston Plan, which, when coupled with the 320 MCM diversion, appear to deprive the Kingdom of Jordan of 124 MCM’s or roughly 25% of its water needs as envisaged by the Johnston Mission. It is obvious that there is considerable discrepancy in the Israel and American interpretations of the terms of the Johnston Plan.

The repercussions in the Arab world of our identification with Israel projects incompatible with the Johnston proposals would be sharp. Upon learning about it the various Arab governments and peoples, particularly Jordanian, would bitterly resent what they would consider to be a very partial action, and they would demand redress. The present relatively tranquil atmosphere in the Near East, both with respect to Arab-Israel relations and Arab-American relations, could be expected to become radically altered. It is possible, however, that some advance understanding with the Arabs could be obtained, using the Johnston Plan as our lodestar, which would mitigate Arab reactions. Such understanding might involve an indication of our willingness further to assist Arab projects for developing the Jordan water resources in accordance with the Johnston Plan.

What appears to be a fundamental incompatibility between the Johnston and the Israel water proposals has rendered difficult any consideration to going along with the Israel project as though the Johnston technical plan were already in effect. Besides the excess structural capacity which the Israelis are building, there would be no means of checking or controlling Israel water off-takes as had been provided under the Johnston Plan. For these reasons our conclusion has been that we should not become a participant in the project as proposed by Israel, since it would amount to an undermining of Eric Johnston’s endeavors and the plan whose technical features had virtually gained acceptance on the part of all parties. Thus our position until now has been that Israel might proceed on its own, as it is doing in any case, and that our assistance to Israel should be in alternate fields or at least only in such water projects as would not upset the technical arrangements negotiated by Johnston.

3. United States Draft Reply. In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the Department and other interested agencies have produced a draft reply to the Israel note of July 17 (Tab A). In substance it re-states our support for the principle of unified development of the Jordan system and our wish not to see prejudiced the prospects for international agreement or for carrying out the technical arrangements negotiated by Eric Johnston. In a deliberate attempt to avoid being completely negative, the note repeats the suggestion that United States assistance might be available for the Beit Shean project and suggests talks between U.S. and Israel technicians to iron out differences in interpretation of the Johnston Plan.

4. Beit Shean. In our opinion, the Beit Shean component, which is common to both the Johnston and Israel plans, is probably of a type which we can support without prejudicing the prospects for future international agreement or without undermining the Johnston proposals. In this respect, it is similar to the East Ghor Canal project in the Kingdom of Jordan which we are assisting. The two projects are also in general similar as to water off-take, utilization within the basin, and expense of construction. Israel argues that the Beit Shean project is being undertaken solely to offset the adverse effects of Jordan’s East Ghor diversion. We would be pleased to compare our figures with those of the Israel technicians to see if Israel’s fears on this score can be mitigated.

5. Central Israel Water Conduit. In apparent anticipation that the United States Government might not wish to identify itself with its plan for diverting ultimately 320 MCM’s of Jordan water to western Israel, the Israelis subsequent to their July 17 note have submitted a DLF application for $12,000,000 to assist with the “Central Israel Water Conduit.” The proposal suggests this conduit would be utilized at least in the beginning for moving coastal water resources to the Negev. Since these resources are under 100 MCM’s, the Israelis do not, of course, hide the prospect that the conduit will eventually carry Jordan water in accordance with the ultimate Israel water plan. In point of fact, this 108-inch conduit is already being laid. It represents an impressive commentary on Israel’s manufacturing and engineering ability. (See Tab E)

We have given thorough consideration as to the possibility of aiding Israel on this isolated and somewhat camouflaged project, including the possibility of DLF financing through an intermediary such as the Israel Industrial Development Bank, to which DLF last year loaned $10,000,000. Our conclusion continues to be that in view of its involving us in a project which inevitably will not only prejudice prospects for negotiating an international agreement on the Jordan waters but also could effectively undermine the Johnston proposals, it would be preferable for us not to become so involved. One alternative which has come to mind, subsequent to your expression of interest in this project, would be to inform the Israelis of our readiness to support the conduit project financially on the condition that they will give us written assurance that they will abide in their water development program strictly to the terms on the Johnston Plan as we interpret that Plan. Before undertaking this alternative or suggesting it to the Israelis, we should however, as a first goal, seek Israel’s concurrence in our interpretation of the Johnston Plan.

6. International Agreement. There would be, of course, a distinct element of unfairness in expecting the Israelis to suspend all of their water development plans until Arab political agreement is achieved, particularly when the prospects for the latter are not bright. Nevertheless, as originators of the Johnston proposals, as impartial friends of both sides on this highly explosive issue, and as possible policemen in future years should either side violate the technical arrangements so nearly consummated by Eric Johnston, we believe we should continue to adhere to the objective of unified development of the Jordan system. This does not preclude Israel’s proceeding on its own.

In the meantime, we should remain alert to possibilities for achieving agreement among the riparians. In this connection, Eric Johnston on October 13 broached the subject of Jordan waters with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi in New York (Tab C). Somewhat surprisingly Fawzi evinced what appeared to be a genuine interest in concluding water arrangements as worked out technically by Johnston in 1955. Fawzi agreed to telegraph Nasser to determine whether Nasser might not renew consideration of this matter with Johnston, and Fawzi repeated several times that the Arab choice is reduced to either “slogans” by a “noisy minority” or water. Fawzi’s thinking seemed to be in the direction of: a piecemeal approach, in accordance with the Johnston Plan; U.S. negotiations with individual riparian countries rather than another Arab League fiasco; and a minimum of publicity. This is indeed an encouraging development and we have followed it up in communications with Ambassador Hare in Cairo (Tab D). Until now, Nasser has not, as far as we know, responded to Johnston’s approach.

Recommendations:

(1). That you initial the Department’s note (Tab A) in reply to the Israel note on July 17, call in the Israel Ambassador and hand it to him. This will again record our support for unified development of the Jordan so that all riparians may have an equitable apportionment of the water resources of the Jordan–Yarmuk system.

(2). That in handling the note to the Israelis you make the following oral observations:

a) Very much aware of Israel’s water needs, we have given the most thorough study to Israel’s water proposals with a view toward ascertaining whether there might not be some way in which we might be helpful.

b) As indicated in our note, our study has convinced us of the importance of hewing to a unified development plan such as that of Ambassador Johnston which would assure for all the riparians an equitable apportionment of the Jordan–Yarmuk water resources. We are highly gratified that Israel, as indicated in its July 17 note, shares our belief in the importance of a unified development plan.

c) As had been indicated previously and as reiterated in our note, we believe the Beit Shean project is of the type which does not conflict with the achievement of a unified development program and which we, therefore, might find it possible to assist financially. (Cost to U.S. would be under $1 million.)

d) Our consideration of the major element of the Israeli proposals, the project for diverting 320 MCM’s of Jordan water to Western Israel, has brought us to the conclusion that there are significant discrepancies in the Israel interpretation and our own as to the specific terms of the Johnston water plan.

e) That, while we would not wish at this time to commit ourselves to any specific response to such proposals as that of the Central Israel Water Conduit, which the Israelis have presented separately as a DLF proposal, we believe it would be helpful to both the Israelis and ourselves that there be a clear understanding of our interpretation of the specifics of the Johnston water proposals so that assurances on the part of the Israelis to adhere to those proposals would mean the same to both our governments. Accordingly, we believe it would be helpful for Dr. Wiener, Israel’s water expert who is currently in the United States, to meet with our water technicians to seek to assure that Israel’s concept of the Johnston Plan coincides with our own understanding of that plan. Such a meeting would also provide Dr. Wiener an opportunity to set forth what he considers to be the effects on Israel of the East Ghor project in Jordan.

(3). That no indication be given to the Israelis at this time that any approach is being made by Eric Johnston to the Arabs for achieving agreement on the Jordan unified development plan.

(4). That we bear in mind that if we eventually agree to assist Israel with the Central Water Conduit, it will also be necessary for us to further assist Arab water projects, particularly those in the Kingdom of Jordan. We will in effect be proceeding with a unified development program on a piecemeal basis under the assumption that the Johnston Plan is actually in effect. This will, of course, require assurances to us from the Arabs as well as the Israelis that they will abide by the terms of the Johnston Plan.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/11–1759. Confidential. Drafted by Meyer on November 4 and revised on November 17; concurred in by Baxter, Ludlow, L, L/NEA, E, ICA, NEA, and L/SFP. A preliminary draft of this memorandum, October 7, which is shorter and has different recommendations, is ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 61 D 43, Tel Aviv.
2. See Document 94.
3. None of the tabs is attached to the source text. Regarding Tab B, see footnote 6, Document 85. Regarding Tab C, see Document 95. None of the other tabs has been found. According to airgram G–29 to Tel Aviv, November 20, Hart handed Harman the note (Tab A), which gave the U.S. position as outlined here, on November 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/11–2059)
4. Dillon initialed his approval of all the recommendations on November 18.