Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

76. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 63–59

Washington, May 26, 1959.

PROSPECTS FOR NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM²

The Problem

To analyze the current situations in North and South Vietnam and to estimate probable developments over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

1. The prospect of reunification of Communist North Vietnam (DRV) and western-oriented South Vietnam (GVN) remains remote. In the DRV the full range of Communist techniques is used to control the population, socialize the economy, impose austerity and direct investment to economic rehabilitation and development. The DRV maintains large armed forces. In South Vietnam, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime, there is far more freedom. Local resources and US aid are devoted to developing the armed forces, maintaining internal security, and supporting a relatively high standard of living, with lesser emphasis on economic development. (Para.9)

2. In South Vietnam political stability depends heavily upon President Diem and his continued control of the instruments of power, including the army and police. Diem will almost certainly be President for many years. The regime will continue to repress potential opposition elements and depend increasingly upon the effectiveness of the Can Lao, the regime’s political apparatus, which is run by Diem’s brothers Nhu and Can. (paras. 11–14, 29–31)

3. The capabilities of the GVN armed forces will improve given continued US matériel support and training. Continuance of the present level of training is threatened by a recent finding of the International Control Commission (ICC) that the US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) should end its activities by mid-1959. In any event, GVN forces will remain incapable of withstanding more than temporarily the larger DRV forces. The internal security forces will not be able to eradicate DRV supported guerrilla or subversive activity in the foreseeable future. Army units will probably have to be diverted to special internal security assignments. (Paras. 15–17, 33–34)

4. The GVN is preoccupied with the threat to national security and the maintenance of large military and security forces. It will probably remain unwilling to devote a significantly greater share of resources and attention to longer range economic development. Assuming continued US aid at about present levels, modest improvement in South Vietnam’s economic position is likely. However, development will lag behind that in the North, and the GVN will continue to rely heavily upon US support to close the gap between its own resources and its requirements. (c Paras. 19–22, 32)

5. There is little prospect of a significant improvement in relations between South Vietnam and Cambodia so long as the present leaders of the two countries remain in power. Relations with Laos will probably remain generally friendly. Continued suspicion that the French are intriguing in the area to recapture a position of major influence will probably prevent an improvement of Franco–GVN relations. (Paras. 25–27, 35)

6. Despite widespread popular discontent, the Government of the DRV is in full control of the country and no significant internal threat to the regime is likely. With large-scale Bloc aid, considerable progress has been made in rehabilitating and developing the economy with major emphasis on agriculture, raw materials and light industry. The regime will probably soon have laid the foundations for considerable economic expansion. (Paras. 37–38, 42, 44)

7. The DRV has no diplomatic relations with any country outside the Bloc and its foreign policy is subservient to the Bloc. We believe that it will continue its harassment of the GVN and of Laos, though a military invasion of either is unlikely. (Paras. 46, 48–49)

. . . . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE files. Secret. A partial text of this NIE is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1190–1195.

2. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

   “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 26 May 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”