Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

165. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Knight), Washington, May 19, 1960¹

Washington, May 19, 1960

SUBJECT

• Proposed Assignment of Brigadier General Lansdale as Adviser to President Diem

After discussion with the Acting Secretary and with his authorization, I telephoned to Mr. Knight to tell him that after full and careful consideration, the Department had concluded that it could not favor this assignment. I said that in the light of President Diem’s consistent unresponsiveness to representations from the Ambassador and also at times to the advice of General Williams, we had recently taken a firmer line with the President and his Government. The President, for his part, after parrying our Government’s views had turned around and requested the assignment of an officer congenial to him who had been useful in other circumstances years ago. It was possible that, if assigned, he would use such an officer to play off one group of American advisers against another and to obtain changes for courses of action which he desired but which were contrary to our Government’s views. It would seem, moreover, to be both strange and not useful from the standpoint of our prestige and influence to reward recalcitrance by acceding to this unusual request. It was on these grounds that we were opposed to sending Brigadier General Lansdale to Saigon.

I told Mr. Knight that we had made this determination despite an indication from Ambassador Durbrow that if he thought on balance the assignment would advance American interests and if certain conditions were met, he would concur in the assignment. I said I particularly wanted him to know that Ambassador Durbrow had taken this constructive view and was not blocking the assignment, although he had reiterated his reservations and misgivings. I added that if the Deputy Secretary of Defense who had discussed the matter with Mr. Dillon, as had Mr. Gates, desired to carry the matter further, Mr. Dillon would, of course, be glad to talk with him. The position I had taken, however, had been discussed with Mr. Dillon and had received his approval.

Mr. Knight said that the Defense Department did not want General Lansdale to go to Viet-Nam if the State Department was opposed to the assignment. However, there was a feeling in the Pentagon that this proposal had been prejudiced a bit by certain old scars at the working level here in State. More seriously, however, the Defense people felt that President Diem was a head of state in whom we have a big stake and that it might be a mistake to stand him in the corner as a bad boy. Furthermore, from the purely Defense Department viewpoint, General Lansdale was an asset to be used with this rather difficult President and Defense had a large investment in Vietnamese security. Mr. Knight recognized that our stated reason for opposing the assignment was a serious one and well considered one, but the Defense people could not altogether agree with it. However, in his view, what I had told him settled the matter. He hoped, however, that when we told the Vietnamese we would not again say that General Lansdale was unavailable, but would face the issue squarely and state that we did not consider the assignment appropriate at this time. He hoped we would reconsider it at some further date if circumstances indicated its desirability.

I, of course, said that we were always prepared to take another look at such things. With regard to the way we handled the matter with the Vietnamese, I told Mr. Knight that if we could not agree to state that the assignment was inappropriate and wished to give some other rationale to the Vietnamese, I would telephone to him before we used it so that he would have a chance to discuss the matter. Mr. Dillon, whom I have informed, sees merit in using the reason advanced by Defense.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, MC–Defense. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons on May 20. In telegram 2121 to Saigon, May 21, the Department of State informed Durbrow of this discussion and the decision on Lansdale’s assignment. (Ibid., Central Files, 751K.5811/5–2160)

   In a memorandum to Parsons, May 18, Anderson stated that there were four main reasons for opposing the proposed Lansdale visit. It would “further undercut the present Ambassador’s position already challenged by the Chief MAAG, General Williams”. Lansdale’s “position as an Air Force Officer … as presidential adviser requested by Diem but supposedly under the Ambassador’s authority would be anomalous. This at a time when our Government’s voice in Viet-Nam should be firm and clear.” Lansdale’s presence “would encourage Diem’s strong propensity to play off American advisers.” Lastly, four “Senior Officers who have served in Viet-Nam—three when Lansdale was there” had recommended strongly against the idea. “Knowing something of Lansdale’s views and methods, it is very unlikely that he would strongly support our views and policies—particularly on Vietnam’s attitude toward Cambodia—during private talks with Diem.” (Ibid., FE/VN Files: Lot 66 D 193)