Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

146. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary to the General Staff of the United States Army (Bonesteel)¹

Washington, April 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

• “Third Country” Doctrine, Internal Security

There seems to be a growing tendency among some Americans to rely more and more upon the “third country” method of coping with internal security problems in nations receiving U.S. help. There can be a subtle sapping of the American character in this trend towards reliance upon others, when it means getting out of responsibilities we can and should shoulder ourselves.

Currently, I know that you and others in the Army have been as concerned as we about reports of plans to have British-Malayan advisors tell the Vietnamese how to run their counter-guerrilla operations against the Communist Viet-cong in the Fifth Military Region in Vietnam. There were curious gaps in some American reports from Saigon about this. I believe I now have more of the story, and pass it along to you because of the personal interest you have in the subject.

The following is the substance of what a reliable person in Saigon has told me:

During his visit to Malaya, President Diem was given a briefing on the counter-guerrilla operations there, but felt that the briefing officer was reluctant to talk freely. So, upon return to Vietnam, President Diem invited him to visit Saigon and discuss counter-guerrilla operations. Colonel Lee, a British officer, visited Saigon and gave a number of suggestions to the Vietnamese, including the establishment of jungle bases for operations.

Among themselves, the Vietnamese officers recalled that their own isolated Army and Civil Guard posts had been destroyed at will by the Viet-cong who had attacked each in superior strength. Also, the Vietnamese had been reticent in talking with Lee, recalling what they believe was a bad experience their officers had had at the Malayan Jungle School last year, which apparently had resulted in derogatory remarks about Vietnamese capabilities as field soldiers in contrast to other Asians.

A British-Malayan team then visited Saigon, talked to a number of officials, and held meetings with senior Vietnamese military officers at ARVN headquarters. The plans and suggestions given are still being thought over.

The Vietnamese government is hesitant about adopting British-Malayan methods, such as grouping people into large villages as in Malaya and then declaring all people living outside these villages as outlaws. The Vietnamese government already is embarked upon building “garden cities” or “agrovilles” and giving isolated farmers plots of land in these new cities. While this Vietnamese program has been criticized by some, as having alienated the population by forcing them to build their new homes without being advised of the reason or that their new homes and land were the gift of the government, it is believed that the government has now seen the error of inadequate psychological preparation and will correct it. The basic plan appears to be admirable, with possible splendid long-range results. The “agroville” at Vi Thanh, which is in an “unsafe” zone and thus unvisited by most Americans, was impressive, with well laid-out plots, houses, schools, hospital, market place, business houses, and a small air stip.

In brief, the Vietnamese government believes that the situations in Malaya and it Vietnam are widely different, the Malayans fought foreigners who were easily identified. Vietnam is fighting Vietnamese. Vietnam cannot afford great money expenditures such as were made in Malaya. The British and Malayans have been fighting the Communists for 12 years and their task is still not finished. The Vietnamese believe they cannot afford such long, drawn-out operations (they are a bit dubious about the “two-year guarantee of completion” by the British-Malayan team), and that in Vietnam the job must be done faster and more decisively, due to the proximity of Communist forces in North Vietnam.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Vietnam. Secret. Covering notes attached to the source text indicate that Lansdale sent a copy of this memorandum to Colonel Black who in turn passed it to Knight. Lansdale stated in his note of April 22 for Black: “Believe you will find the attached of interest—not only in light of proposals in Vietnam, but also the most recent ones in Laos. Time we gave further thought to this. Ed Lansdale.” A note on the source text, the copy Lansdale sent Black, indicates that Knight noted this memorandum.