Office of the Historian

115. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin)1

Pearl Harbor, March 14, 1960.

142355Z. Admin CINCPAC take as T12 for info. This is continuation of my 140630Z.2

Regarding Diem’s plan to recruit commandos and raise force level 10 or 20 thousand above currently recognized ceiling, CINCPAC expressed his views as follows in a 4 Mar msg to CHMAAG:3 “British experience in Malaya and experience of the Phils in Huk campaign reveal that anti-guerrilla capability has developed with org of the reg armed forces and did not req special volunteer comm type force envisaged by Diem. Believe force for anti-guerrilla operation Vietnam can be obtained by changing emphasis of training for selected [Page 329] element ARVN and other security forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare. In any event development of this capability should not serve to increase GVN force level ceilings.”

CHMAAG reported he concurs fully the above views and is pressing the point in Saigon. He says, however, that fact remains that instructions were distributed on 24 Feb directing formation command [commando] force without further consultation CHMAAG although CHMAAG explained to Diem on 20 Feb the drawbacks to the plan. Thuan has Diem as saying am at war—am going ahead. CHMAAG states he is now endeavoring persuade Diem modify figure to 4 or 5 thousand thus remaining at 10 thousand level. [?] CHMAAG believes it impossible get Diem to rescind the 24 Feb directive.

An interesting fact of this problem is fact that Diem has been maneuvering for some time to get US agreement to increase in force level. Gen’l I.D. White, CINCUSUSARPAC, had audience with Diem on 23 Feb.4 Latter talked at length about Viet Minh threat and emphasized his army is not big enough to meet the threat. He said he told Pentagon when he was in Wash DC that he needed 170,000 troops. He made the point that now in addition to external threat he must also face guerrilla warfare and needs 20 thousand additional troops for this alone but because of lack of money he wants to start with 10 thousand. He said his army is not properly trained for anti-subversion role and is of opinion that field army should be trained to combat subversives. With this latter opinion CHMAAG, Ambassador Durbrow and CINCPAC concur. However, we do not concur that additional troops should be raised and trained to fulfill this objective. CHMAAG is trying to hold the line5 as indicated in the par above and Amb Durbrow will return to the fray as soon as he returns to Saigon upon completion Baguio Conference.

  1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1960 (71). Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Chief MAAG in Vietnam and to JCS.↩
  2. Dated March 15, this message deals with equipment for the ARVN. (Ibid.)↩
  3. CINCPAC 040459Z. (National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 99, 9155.3/4060 (15 Feb 60))↩
  4. A memorandum of this conversation is in Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 30 Nov 59–22 Aug 1960 (163).↩
  5. See Document 130.↩