Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

130. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of the Republic of Vietnam (Diem) and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams), Saigon, April 6, 1960, 9 a.m.–12:15 p.m.¹

Saigon, April 6, 1960, 9 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

1. President Diem began the conversation by saying that the VC had now entered an active phase in their guerrilla campaign. The government forces had now a certain advantage in that they knew the location of the VC bases of operation. Prior to this time, in the time of Colonel Yi, guerrilla operations had been carried out sporadically and little was known of their bases of operations.

The French had never really controlled the Delta area. They had controlled only the main communication centers and the roads. The VC had operated during all that time and continued to do so. They therefore knew the area very well.

(President Diem now went to the map and pointed out several areas throughout the 1st and 5th Military Regions from which the VC were operating and indicated also the towns and communications centers that were threatened by the existence of these bases. He pointed to an area on the west coast of the Cau Mau Peninsula, just north of the Song Dong Cung River, and said that this area constituted the most dangerous base of all. The VC were concentrated on the little island off the coast (there are two islands called Les Mamelles) and along the coast just opposite the island. The problem here was that there was no way of attacking this base. It could not be reached by land because it was surrounded by impassable marshes; and it could not be attacked by an amphibious landing because the transports would have to lay off too far from shore and it would be suicidal to make the long approach by boat. President Diem suggested that perhaps with the aid of amphibious carriers it would be possible to land troops there. General Williams said that he would have the Navy Division look into this matter in order to have their opinion of these beaches and their approaches from the sea.[)]

Still speaking from the map, President Diem indicated a location in the general vicinity of the Can Tho where he hoped to build a Dakota strip. He added that it would take some time because of the spongy nature of the soil. In reply to General Williams’ question he said that the method he had spoken before for the speedy building of such strips was in the experimental stage and had run into some difficulties.

President Diem now turned to discuss the projected construction of regimental camps. He said that although he was not a military expert, it was his opinion that since Highway 14 would serve as the line of defense in case of a Viet Minh all out attack coming down through Laos and Cambodia and directed against Saigon, that he believed the camp in question could be built close to that highway not far from where it intersects with Highway 13. At any rate, the original location proposed, bordered as it was by a river, was quite undesirable because in case of attack from the north, the troops in that area would be trapped. The river could not be crossed due to the marshes that bordered it along its banks. It would be better to move this proposed camp (from Ben Cat ?) northeast in order better to control this entire area.

President Diem pointed to the Province of Kien Hoa and said that the VC were very interested in gaining control of this area because it permitted them to be supplied from the sea. This was an old base of theirs and they had occupied it against the French.

In general, the President concluded, the danger zones were the Cau Mau Peninsula, Kien Hoa, the Plaine de Jones, Can Tho and the mountainous and marshy areas along the Cambodian frontier southwest of Chau Doc.

2. In reply to General Williams’ question, President Diem replied that he estimated that in the 1st and 5th MR’s there were between 3,000 and 5,000 active VC.

General Williams agreed, and pointing out the fact that in those two Military Regions ARVN had three to four times that many soldiers, he asked President Diem how many more soldiers would be needed to pacify the area.

President Diem replied that what he needed was about 5,000 more Civil Guards. He then explained that the situation which warranted this increase in the Civil Guard was the following:

In a complex of hamlets constituting a “village”, the present number of Village Guards could maintain a good degree of security only over a portion of the village; people living in the outskirts of the complex were exposed to VC terrorism and were therefore afraid to cooperate with the Government. In addition, the VC had tied in the different parts of the village complexes which they controlled. In this way they could easily hide out in the villages and even move from one to another in safety.

What President Diem proposed was to get enough additional Civil Guards to cover the villages completely. In this way the ARVN forces could concentrate on pursuing the VC in the open country and not have to waste their time trying to flush them out of the villages. The interior of the village complexes themselves would be protected by trained youth who would replace the present Village Guards. Instead of ten guards each village would then have 40 young men. These young men would serve only one month out of twelve; they could therefore be paid less and the overall cost would not be greater than the cost of the present program. There would be, of course, a permanent cadre of NCO’s who would ensure continuity. They would have tours of perhaps six months and would have to be paid higher wages.

As far as the 40 guards are concerned, it would be necessary to raise and train 40 X 12 or 480 a year. Of these, in an average village complex, perhaps only 200 would be entirely reliable. The other 280 would be subject to VC influence due to their living in exposed parts of the village complex.

This brought President Diem back to his discussion of VC bases. He pointed out the fact that the kidnapping or winning over by terrorism of the youth was in a way a handicap to the VC, because the presence of these young men in their ranks served to lower their combat effectiveness and laid a heavy logistic burden on them. It was for this reason, among others, that the VC were laying great stress on obtaining bases of operation. They could then establish training camps for the young men and prepare them as guerrilla fighters.

At this point General Williams said that he had received some information from his Senior Advisor with the 7th Division concerning the young men being trained by that Division in implementation of the President’s program. General Williams had received a report that the health conditions in the camp occupied by the trainees as of 30 March 1960 was not good. There was an average of 100 trainees turning in sick per day. One of the principal complaints was dysentery and it appeared that one reason for this was that the drinking water was not being boiled nor was it being treated in any other way before drinking. Medical supplies in general were short and were not being received from the Department of Public Health or any other agency. Finally, it appeared that the 15$00 per day per trainee was not sufficient and that as a result the trainees were even more exposed to disease due to malnutrition.

President Diem replied that he was aware of the situation and that he did not believe it was that bad. He said that fifteen piasters a day per man was sufficient and that medical supplies for two weeks had been sent to the camp. He added that some of the trainees were complaining because they had expected to be treated as if they were on vacation at a summer camp where they could eat and rest. However, he called in his military aid and gave him instructions to look into the matter.

3. In reply to General Williams’ question, President Diem replied that the next Presidential elections would take place next May or April (1961); he doubted very much whether any other candidate could gain enough public support to endanger his reelection.

General Williams now asked how long the President thought it would be before the country could be thoroughly pacified; he expressed the opinion that the problem was not entirely military and that it would be necessary to win over the entire population on the one hand and on the other, to strengthen the civil and administrative cadres.

President Diem replied that he thought the problem could be solved by military means. He said that what he needed was another 4000 to 5000 Civil Guards and to train the local youth to protect its villages and replace the present village guards.

General Williams then asked President Diem what the ultimate purpose of the VC was. Did they hope to overthrow the Diem Government, get in someone friendly to the Ho Chi Minh Regime and eventually unite the country under communist rule?

President Diem replied that in his opinion this was exactly their plan.

General Williams then asked why, in the President’s opinion, the communists had picked this particular time to go into active guerrilla operations.

President Diem replied that they were following a pre-deter-mined schedule. As far back as 1957 and 1958 they had tried to initiate guerrilla operations in the Plateau Area but had failed. Now they had shifted their operations to the south. To do this they had had to wait for the situation to deteriorate sufficiently in Laos and Cambodia and they had had to wait also until after the rice harvest in order to have the cash with which to operate.

President Diem said that in spite of the conditions in the West, in his opinion the real danger lay in the East (i.e., Tay Ninh, area north of Saigon) especially now that the rainy season was about to begin.

In reply to another question from General Williams, President Diem said that the present Queen of Cambodia² could not remain as head of state and that a King would have to come to the throne. Sihanouk himself would be eligible but would not want to occupy that position because he preferred to rule as Prime Minister; as King, he would have to have another man in that position.

4. President Diem referred now to Mr. Thuan’s visit to the United States and said that Mr. Thuan was going to look into the possibility of obtaining some small or medium dredges (12 in). With this equipment President Diem hoped to be able to speed up his project for building the road along the Cambodian frontier for some 300 kilometers from the Gulf of Siam inland.

General Williams now said that he would like to pass some information to the President on a confidential basis. On 2 April 1960 General Williams had informed the other members of the Country Team, (Ambassador Durbrow, Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Natsios and Mr. Anspacher) that he, General Williams, wanted to go on record as stating again that a military budget of $165,000,000 was not adequate to support an armed force of 150,000; that a figure nearer 169 to 170 million would be more realistic. General Williams added that he had sent a message to CINCPAC and to the Department of Defense to this effect.³

Now, coming back to the budget, General Williams said that one thing that made his position weak when he argued for a bigger military budget with the other members of the country team was that they, and especially Ambassador Durbrow, could always come back and say that the Vietnamese Government did not need more money; that they must have enough and more since they could afford to raise a force of 10 to 20 thousand commandos over and above the force level of 150,000.

President Diem replied that it was no longer his intention to raise such a force of commandos. He said that he intended to raise some three to four thousand commandos and to maintain that force within the 150,000 force level authorized. He said that at present the Vietnamese Armed Forces fell short by some 6,000 men of the 150,000 ceiling. By raising 3,000 commandos he would not go over the 150,000 but would still be 3,000 men short.

General Williams replied that he was very happy to hear this, because Ambassador Durbrow repeatedly quoted the figure of 10,000 to 20,000 commandos over and above the 150,000 ceiling. He asked President Diem if [he] had thoroughly understood him and if it was President Diem’s intention to remain within the 150,000 force level including his commando forces.

President Diem said that that was correct and that his intention was to remain within the 150,000 force level including his commando forces.

President Diem now said that he had a confidential matter to impart to General Williams. The Vietnamese Government had agents in North Vietnam who had access to the discussions of the Viet Minh “braintrust”. As a result of information received from these agents there were two important reasons why US aid should not be reduced:

1) The Viet Minh felt that without US Aid, or with a reduced aid program, they could continue to undermine the government in South Vietnam and eventually to overthrow it. On the other hand, they felt that with the continued and increased aid from the US, the VC would not be able to attain their objectives in South Vietnam.

2) From a psychological point of view it would be a great blow to the Viet Minh if the US were to increase its aid to South Vietnam and conversely it would be very favorable to them if it were announced that US Aid had been cut. For that reason, it would be advisable to announce an increase in US Aid even if only for psychological reasons.

President Diem terminated the conversation by referring once more to the commando forces. He said he hoped to absorb them eventually into the Marine Corps.

6. The conversation ended at 1215 hours.⁴

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 30 Nov 59–22 Aug 60 (163). Secret. Neither an interpreter nor a drafting officer is indicated on the source text.
2. Queen Kossamak.
3. MAGCH–SA 462 to CINCPAC, April 4 (040631Z), repeated to OSD for information. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWX’s 1960 (71))
4. In a memorandum to Durbrow dated April 7, Williams summarized most of this conversation but did not mention the subjects discussed in the first two paragraphs of numbered section 5 or the “confidential matter” discussed toward the end of that section. (Ibid., Conversations with Diem 30 Nov 59–22 Aug 60 (163))