Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 3, 1955—3:58 p.m.

3113. Re Athens 1381, rptd London 113, Nicosia 26.² Department encouraged by indications reftel that Karamanlis and Makarios remain anxious seek some understanding with Harding. Also it is politically important for Karamanlis make some progress re Cyprus before elections. Feel stiff tone Eden message November 28³ may be fatal unless we move rapidly.

Accordingly request London promptly tell Foreign Office we have indications that despite apparently negative attitude Karamanlis and Makarios they desire achieve an understanding by talks between Harding and Makarios. We aware British do not intend go beyond formula but feel would be proper hold talks for purpose clarifying formula and exploring method application. Theotokis has told us (reftel) that if HMG can assure him door open to clarification and discussion he would recommend to Makarios that he approach Harding before Commons debate. We suggest most earnestly this opportunity not be lost. We hope HMG will promptly instruct Peake to make approach (with Thurston if desirable) to Theotokis and/or Karamanlis to assure that door remains open and that in HMG’s view Harding–Makarios talks for purpose clarification (but not expansion) formula and its application are desired and that indeed purpose of formula was to elicit such talks. Thurston hereby instructed support any request that GOG recommend to Makarios he see Harding before Parliamentary debate.

London should also discuss possibility rephrasing formula along lines reftel not to expand it but to make Makarios acceptance easier.

Athens authorized promptly inform GOG that we are approaching HMG to request they show willingness leave door open and discuss clarification but not expansion. Accordingly U.S. Government strongly urges GOG and Makarios avoid public comments formula and take no steps which would reduce possibility of progress.

Department will await suggestions from Athens re further approaches by Courtney to Makarios but feels preferable present initiative come only from GOG without apparent U.S. coordination.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia and USUN.
2. Dated December 1, not printed. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. In telegram 296 from London, December 5, Aldrich informed the Department that he had met with Macmillan on December 4 regarding telegram 3113. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary had instructed the Foreign Office to prepare a telegram to Athens that would follow the suggestions contained in the second paragraph of telegram 3113. Macmillan also included a paragraph in the proposed telegram that indicated his view that the Greek Government was attempting to “hustle us” into making changes in the British formula. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–555)

   In telegram 1405 from Athens, December 5, Thurston informed the Department that he had conveyed the contents of this telegram to Karamanlis and that the Prime Minister expressed “warm appreciation” for active U.S. interest in the Cyprus problem; referred to the Greek Government’s decision not to submit the Cyprus question to the U.N. General Assembly on an emergency basis in this session; indicated that a reply to Eden’s latest message was being prepared; pressed Thurston for his views regarding the nature of new British approaches; and expressed the hope that the debate on Cyprus in the House of Commons on December 6 would be “low key” with an “emphasis on fluidity and delicacy of present situation.” (Ibid.)