Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

81. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Termination of NNSC Activities in the Republic of Korea

We have given careful consideration to various courses of action which might be taken to terminate NNSC activities in the territory under UNC control. Among the courses and variations thereof which we have considered, the three set forth below seem worth your consideration. In adopting one of these courses, we will need Defense concurrence, and we should then inform the Sixteen of our decision.

Course A

1. Inform the Swiss and Swedes that we are instructing the UNC to state in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in the immediate future that the proposal of the NNSC for its reduction in size is unacceptable and announce the UNC decision to terminate the Commission’s activities in the territory under UNC control for the following reasons:

(a) Two basic guarantees of the Armistice are full and accurate reporting to, and effective inspection and supervision by, the NNSC. The demonstrable failure of the Communist side to report and the prevention of effective inspection and supervision by Czech and Polish members have resulted in obstruction and frustration of the Commission’s activities in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone.

(b) It has become increasingly problematical that the UNC can insure the safety of the Communist members of the Commission in the midst of an understandably hostile populace.

(c) The continued existence of the Commission tends to foster the false belief among some that it is an effective mechanism and in so doing serves only the Communist propaganda purpose.

2. Express to the Swiss and Swedes our appreciation of their eminently fair approach to the problem and of their strenuous efforts to persuade the Communist members to permit the Commission to function effectively.

3. Express our hope that the Swiss and Swedes will concur with the propriety of the UNC announcement and will instruct the Swiss and Swedish representatives to withdraw from the Commission accordingly.

4. Authorize the UNC to announce in the MAC as soon as possible the termination of the NNSC activities south of the Demilitarized Zone and to request the Czechs and Poles to leave the territory under UNC control, forcibly ejecting them if necessary.

Course B

1. Instruct the UNC to state in the MAC as soon as possible that it has no objection to carrying out the reduction proposed by the NNSC on May 3; that it regards this, however, as a temporary measure; and that the Communist obstruction and frustration of the Commission have made its abolition the only satisfactory solution to the problem.

2. One week later² send notes to the Swiss and Swedes which make the following points:

(a) We have accepted what we understand was intended as a first step toward achieving their final objective, i.e., complete dissolution of the Commission.

(b) We would appreciate being informed of any plans they may have for a second and final step which we are hopeful could be taken before October 15, 1955 and which would result in the Commission’s dissolution.

3. If the Swiss and Swedes fail to give reasonable assurances that they will take a second and final step by October 15, 1955, instruct the UNC to act at once to terminate NNSC activities within ROK territory and to limit those activities to receiving in the Demilitarized Zone reports from the UNC.

Course C

1. Instruct the UNC to state in the MAC that it has no objection to implementation at this time of the reduction proposal of the NNSC; that it considers continuation of the Commission even with such reduction, however, reasonable and proper only if the terms of the Armistice were being fully complied with by the Communist side; and, therefore, that it can countenance the continuation of the NNSC even in reduced form only if:

(a) the Communist side within two months has complied fully with the reporting provisions of the Armistice including the submission of complete reports on the military reinforcements introduced from the inception of the Armistice; and

(b) has provided full facilities to the NNSC to make possible adequate checking of both delinquent and current reporting; and

(c) the Communist members of the NNSC cease to obstruct and frustrate the work of the Commission.

2. Inform the Swiss and Swedes of this proposed action expressing the hope that this fully meets their approval and that if the Communist side fails to comply with these reasonable conditions the Swiss and Swedes will lend support in their public statements to the action by the UNC to terminate NNSC activities within the area under UNC control.

Discussion

Course A has the advantage of terminating NNSC operations promptly and would probably meet Defense approval. Our Allies would consider this an unwise step to take at this time but would probably be understanding in view of our position with the ROK. The Swiss and Swedes would probably be glad to see the Commission’s activities abolished without having to share the responsibility for such action. The U.S. would be criticized in some circles for having yielded, as it will appear, to pressure from the ROK and also for its failure to carry out a provision of the Armistice Agreement.

Course B has the advantage of greater acceptability to our Allies and, if the Swiss and Swedes should decide to withdraw completely within two months, it would be the most effective way to solve the problem in terms of our public position. It has the disadvantage of prolonging the Commission for perhaps two months and thus of renewed violence in the ROK. It is doubtful whether the Swiss and Swedes will give the desired assurance that they will withdraw within two months, although the Swedes have indicated that this would in fact be their intention.

Course C has the advantages of reasonableness as a public position, probable acceptability to our Allies, and the virtual certainty of a termination date for the NNSC since compliance by the Communist side could be only at the impossible cost of admitting continual violations. While there seems to be almost no possibility of Communist compliance with the conditions set forth above, there is the possibility that the Communist side may be able to make gestures in the direction of compliance which would tend to obscure the issue when the UNC acted to terminate the NNSC operations in its area.

In adopting any one of the above courses it would be important to place the full onus for the UNC action on the Communist side and the Communist members of the NNSC. As soon as a course is decided on and concurred in by Defense, we should, therefore, make every effort, through our official statements and through such media as USIA, to establish the fact of Communist frustration and obstruction of the Commission’s functions as evidenced in the NNSC record and by the fact of continued Communist violation of the Armistice.

Action under any one of the above three courses almost certainly would take place during or just before the General Assembly Session beginning September 20. Consequently, it will be necessary to prepare as strong a statement as possible to present to the Assembly of our reasons for action. It will also be necessary to develop maximum support for our position among the Sixteen and other members of the United Nations.

Recommendations

1. That you approve Course B as the most acceptable procedure at this time;

2. That a high-level meeting be called where Defense concurrence would be sought; and

3. That following Defense concurrence, the Sixteen be informed of the selected course and their cooperation requested.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–1955. Secret. Drafted by Jones and concurred in by Wainhouse of IO, Assistant Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant of EUR, and Assistant Legal Adviser John M. Raymond. Sent through Murphy.
2. Dulles crossed out the phrase “One week later” and wrote in “Shortly thereafter” to replace it.

3. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendations. The Department of Defense concurrence was obtained in the telephone conversation between Sebald and Gray, summarized infra.

   On August 26, McClurkin briefed representatives of the Sixteen concerning Dulles’ decision. He pointed out that October 15 was not a “magic date” but was useful as a date for reference. A summary of the discussion at this meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–2655.