Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

143. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices¹

Washington, May 10, 1956—7:16 p.m.

777. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Geneva for Johnson. Department’s Circular 749.² At May 9 meeting 16³ Deputy Under Secretary Murphy emphasized US continues believe we can no longer delay action correct prevailing inequitable NNSC situation. He informed group US had learned Sweden willing postpone reply latest Communist proposal leave one team each side until after 16 decided course action. Murphy then requested views on US proposal (Circular 749).

Australian continued oppose conference as useless but, while recognizing necessity unilateral action on NNSC, questioned whether US proposal best way proceed. He proposed modifying note to Chinese Communists by expanding description inequities in present NNSC situation and possibly detailing Communist violations to demonstrate complete frustration of effective NNSC supervision by Communists. Australia opposed indicating in reply intention take NNSC action and proposed UNC first give notice in MAC of intention suspend provisions Armistice re NNSC, allow time assess reactions Communists and public opinion generally and subject assessment situation then prevailing then remove teams.

Canadian reiterated concern re possible implications proposed NNSC action on situation Indochina and possible effect on existing détente Asia. Canada favored delay between statement in MAC and actual expulsion teams.

Ethiopians and Belgians without instructions. Korea urged complete abolition NNSC. Colombia absent.⁴

UK took position MAC announcement should not be made until after reply Chinese note transmitted and thereafter Chinese and north Koreans should be given opportunity state views before action taken to eject NNSC teams from south thus giving 16 time for consultation.

Philippines Thailand Turkey and Greece supported US proposal. Dutch also agreed generally but indicated would not oppose delay proposed by Commonwealth since Dutch believed action should be taken with tact and flexibility. Luxembourg supported Dutch views.

New Zealand agreed conference proposal should be rejected but was concerned by possibility UNC might be accused taking precipitate action contrary Armistice obligations in proposing expulsion NNSC. Therefore favored as first step Swiss and Swedish acceptance Communist proposal leave one team each side and stressed need avoid unfavorable reaction from world public opinion.

French expressed concern over possible implications NNSC actions for Indochinese situation, inclined agree with Australian proposal and considered Swiss and Swedes should be asked once again withdraw.

Commenting on above Murphy emphasized strong US view announcement on NNSC and action expel teams should be practically simultaneous and pointed out obvious disadvantages giving Communists time in which make propaganda against UNC and possibly rally neutral opinion against proposed course action. He considered 24–48 hours might be permitted elapse between reply Communist note and announcement in MAC and virtually concurrent expulsion teams.

Next meeting of 16 May 16.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–1056. Secret. Drafted by Brown of UNP and by Norred; approved by Sebald. Sent to Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bogota, Bern, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Ottawa, Manila, Paris, Seoul, Taipei, Wellington, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Geneva, and USUN.
2. Document 136.
3. A memorandum of conversation at this meeting, prepared by Brown, is in Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp.
4. The Union of South Africa was also without representation at the meeting. Earlier in the day the South African Ambassador, Dr. J.E. Holloway, had informed Murphy that his government had decided to withdraw from participation in the Sixteen. It was agreed, however, that it would be a silent withdrawal, and that no reference to South Africa’s absence would be made at the meeting later in the day. (Memorandum of conversation by Hemmendinger, May 9; ibid., Central Files, 795.00/5–956) Although general reference continued to be made to “the Sixteen,” there were, after May 9, only 15 participants in the discussions which took place in Washington among members of the U.N. Command.