202. Despatch From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1
REF
SUBJECT
- United States Military Assistance Program for Japan—Fiscal Year 1958
1. Pursuant to instructions contained in the reference Circulars the Embassy, in coordination with the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the United States Operations Mission, provided pertinent political-economic analyses and judgments necessary in the development of the Military Assistance Program for Japan for Fiscal Year 1959. The resultant material, particularly the economic assessment, was presented as Format E of the program submission which has been transmitted to Washington.
2. The Military Assistance Program for FY 1959 proposed by MAAG, Japan totals $84.3 million, distributed by Services as follows: Army, $9.3 million; Navy, $29.5 million; and Air Force, $45.5 million. This compares with previous years’ programs as follows:
| 1950–7 | 1958 | 1959 | Total | |
| Army | $578.2 | $15.7 | $9.3 | $603.2 |
| Navy | 351.9 | 69.5 | 29.5 | 450.9 |
| Air Force | 255.1 | 46.6 | 45.5 | 347.2 |
| $1,185.2 | $131.8 | $84.3 | $1,401.3 |
The program provides military “hard” goods such as weapons, ships, and aircraft on both a grant aid and cost-sharing basis. The furnishing of these items by the U.S. is premised, because of their complexity or long production lead times, on the necessity of avoiding dangerously protracted delay in the attainment of force objectives and acceptable standards of combat readiness. The Embassy agrees with the assessment of the Chief of MAAG that the probable consequence [Page 431] of a drastic reduction in current aid to Japan at this time would be “a net lowering of the Japanese defense capability” which “would seriously imperil the attainment of U.S. security objectives in the Far East.”5
3. It is the considered judgment of the Embassy that the Military Assistance Program for Japan for FY 1959, as developed by MAAG, Japan, is consistent with U.S. political, military and economic objectives in Japan. The Embassy recommends continued grant aid notwithstanding the small percentage (1.5%) of gross national product (GNP) which the Japanese are devoting at the present time to defense and despite the Japanese official approach to rearmament which has heretofore been characterized by hesitancy, in view of the political liabilities involved; by austerity, in view of the manifold and urgent demands for general economic betterment; and by an apparent lack of urgency, in view of the presence of United States Forces in and about Japan.
4. It is generally recognized that there have been substantial political obstacles to an increased force buildup and to the allocation of an increasingly greater portion of the government’s financial resources to defense. The Conservative Parties which have been in power since the establishment of the initial defense forces in 1950 have all been extremely sensitive to the basic Japanese repugnance toward war and toward “the military.” There has been widespread fear that Japanese rearmament could again involve Japan in a disastrous war. The Japanese deep dread of nuclear weapons undoubtedly provides a psychological basis for this fundamental force in Japanese politics. Coupled with this is a strong national feeling on the part of the Japanese people that they must have a stable and prosperous national economy before they can support a defense force adequate to fill the legitimate defense needs of their country.
5. The Embassy feels that the heretofore predominant negative aspects of the official and popular attitudes toward the establishment and strengthening of Japanese national defense forces are on the threshold of a significant reappraisal by the Japanese themselves. Progress will continue to be slow but the elements of a fundamental change are present. While the Japanese program of rearmament for self-defense has moved forward at a relatively slow pace since the initial reluctant steps were taken in 1950, there is mounting evidence that sure progress in certain fields is being made. In the past three years this has been particularly reflected in the establishment and buildup to date of the basic Self Defense Forces, Ground, Air and Maritime, and increasing acceptance of their role in furthering the well being of the nation. This program will undoubtedly be accelerated as [Page 432] the National Defense Council begins to fulfill its role of delineating national defense policies which will further legitimatize the achievement of military force goals.
6. Prime Minister Kishi is providing definitive leadership in planning for a respectable buildup of Japanese defense strength. Prior to his departure for the United States in June he directed the development of and obtained cabinet approval for both a basic national defense policy and an official defense plan covering Japanese fiscal years 1958, 1959 and 1960. While the details of the defense plan differ relatively little from the existing six year plan, its significance lies in the fact that the new plan has received “official” government approval while the previous plan remained for the past three years as merely a Defense Agency “proposal.” The only major substantive change is the provision for U.S.-Japan cost-sharing aircraft production programs.
7. The new basic national defense policy reveals a further insight to progress in official thinking on defense matters. The Government publicly released the policy on May 20, 1957 in the following terms:
“The purpose of National Defense is to preserve the independence and peace of the country founded on the principles of democracy by preventing both direct and indirect aggression or by expelling it if actually waged. The basic policy for the achievement of this purpose shall be as follows:
- “(1) To support the activites of the United Nations and to promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause of world peace.
- “(2) To promote national welfare and to enhance the spirit of patriotism and to lay a sound basis for National Security.
- “(3) To build up progressively an efficient and effective power of defense within the bounds of national capabilities and to the extent necessary for self defense.
- “(4) To cope with aggression with recourse to the joint security system of the United States of America, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the prevention and removal of aggression.”
8. Aside from the actions taken in anticipation of the visit as mentioned above, Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to the United States is expected to provide a significant impetus to the furtherance of Japanese defense preparations. Of particular importance are the resultant expressions in the communiqué of Japan’s adherence to the Free World and the intention of the United States to “substantially reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year” and the “prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces.” Japan will no longer be able to take for granted that it can relax in its own defense preparations because of the presence of United States Forces. At the same time, however, it should be pointed out, it would come as a devastating blow to them in their adjustment to the new conditions if [Page 433] the United States were also to concurrently drastically reduce direct matériel and equipment assistance under the Mutual Security Program. While this is an eventuality that they will have to ultimately adjust to, United States military assistance is essential to Japan for an indefinite period in the future.
9. Another encouraging and significant factor in the defense buildup of Japan has been the success of the joint production programs for F–86–F and T–33 aircraft which have been jointly financed by the U.S. and Japan. This technique and these programs are not only serving to provide badly needed modern aircraft for the defense of Japan but have provided an attractive vehicle for Japanese financial contribution to the country’s defense and the Government assuming greater responsibility in the establishment and maintenance of an adequate defense production base.
10. These defense developments under the present leadership contrast sharply with the actions of the country’s leaders just six months ago at the time of the Annual Defense Review in January, 1957. They considered at that time that their political purposes would be better served by approving a major tax reduction and appropriating increased funds for welfare purposes than to proceed with the planned defense buildup under the unofficial six-year plan which would require a substantial increase in defense appropriations. Unfortunately, the additional defense incentive which was anticipated as a consequence of the application of the defense-share reduction formula contained in the April 25, 1956 exchange of notes was not realized inasmuch as the Government merely increased the defense budget a relatively insignificant amount over the previous year. This is a matter which is expected will be remedied in the course of consideration to be given to the plans and budgets for Japanese fiscal year 1958.
11. The impression has long existed in Japan that such defense efforts as are exerted by the Government of Japan are the direct results of pressure brought to bear by the United States. Considerable progress was made in countering this impression in the course of these conferences to consider the Japanese yen contribution to United States Forces in Japan. The subsequent developments under Mr. Kishi have helped materially to bring to the fore the compulsions of Japan’s own role and responsibilities in its own defense. It has become increasingly evident to the more forward looking leaders in the Liberal-Democratic Party that the present strength of Japan’s defense forces is inadequate not because the United States thinks it is inadequate but because they themselves deem it insufficient in the international situation that prevails. The best interests of both countries will be best served by American officials avoiding any public pronouncements that would [Page 434] again give currency to the impression that the efforts by enlightened Japanese to further Japan’s defense policies and structure is the product of American pressure rather than Japanese self-interest.
12. In the following paragraphs there is presented a review of the highlights of the programs as proposed by MAAG-Japan and concurred in by the Embassy.
13. Most significantly, a substantial portion of the proposed MAP program ($44 million) is to be applied to cost-sharing production programs for P2V–7 and F–104 aircraft. Ammunition, which has been a major MAP item, has been eliminated as grant aid in the FY 1959 program. This entails a reduction of approximately $61 million from the net requirements considered by MAAG. MAAG considers that Japan will have the capability of producing and financing this requirement. Emphasis is placed upon encouraging Japan to assume increased responsibility for supporting her forces in conventional weapons, rocket weapons, mortars, recoilless rifles, radios, aircraft, ships, etc. No provision is made for Quartermaster, Medical, Chemical, or Engineering items; for so-called “soft goods” or for POL. Only a small quantity of advanced weapons has been included for limited research and development purposes.
14. (a) The Army program of $9.36 million will provide support for ground forces in being and permit the expansion of 10,000 men to a total 180,000 man force in JFY 1959. This will result in a force of six divisions, four combined brigades, and essential combat and logistical support forces. No provision has been made for conversion to Nike of the four existing GSDF 90mm AA gun battalions or for the activation of four additional 90mm AA gun battalions since there is no provision for these in the “Six-Year Plan.” The Army program is most directly affected by the ammunition cut-off decision since $61.1 million had been included for this item in GSDF estimates.
(b) The bulk of the Army program ($9.2 million) is for initial unit equipment, research and development items and “90 day war reserve” equipment. This latter item ($8.3 milliom) includes tanks, light and medium type; AA artillery weapons and field artillery pieces with prime movers. MAAG points out that the Japanese are either not now capable of furnishing them from their own resources or too long a lead time is involved in local production because of their complexity.
15. (a) The Navy program of $29.5 million will provide (1) for the support of MSDF Forces in being of 241 ships and small craft totalling approximately 90,000 tons, and 61/2 air squadrons and support planes, and (2) for base buildup equipment for three airbases and five regional districts. Two destroyers are also included in the 1959 program as loan vessels from the U.S. Reserve Heet (at no cost to MAP) with all cost of towage, rehabilitation, etc. to be borne by the Japanese.
[Page 435](b) $19 million is to be the U.S. 1959 share of the proposed cost-sharing program for producing P2V–7 (anti-submarine warfare) aircraft in Japan. This sum, together with a diversion of $41 million from FY 1958 funds for U.S. supplied aircraft, would make $60 million available as the total U.S. share in the joint P2V–7 program.
(c) $6.7 million is proposed for ordnance equipment for Japanese constructed vessels and a little over $1 million is included for electronic and communications equipment. While experience has clearly shown Japanese ability to construct destroyers and other vessels comparable to U.S. Navy vessels, it remains necessary, however, to provide certain components under MAP such as fire-control equipment, armament, electronics equipment, etc.
16. (a) The Air Force program of $45.5 million will provide for the support of 12 day-fighter squadrons utilizing F–86–F aircraft; 2 all-weather fighter squadrons utilizing F–86–D aircraft; 3 transport squadrons utilizing C–46 aircraft; 2 AA battalions, 120mm; 1 conventional depot; 1 jet depot; 8 airbases; and communications and electronics equipment for 24 AC&W sites, 20 airbases and for training purposes.
(b) The 1959 program includes $25 million for a cost-sharing program for F–104 aircraft to be produced in Japan. This is in addition to $25 million proposed in the FY 1958 program. The total proposed F–104 program calls for 200 airplanes at a cost of $201.4 million. While this program will start off on a 50–50% share basis, the over-all program ratio will result in a 65-35% cost to Japan and the U.S., respectively. (The Embassy assumes that if a Century-series aircraft other than the F–104 is selected that the estimates will not be materially changed.)
(c) $17 million is proposed for communications and electronics equipment required for 9 AC&W sites to be transferred from FEAF during 1959, airbases and for training purposes. Approximately 75% of the equipment for AC&W sites is already in place and will be transferred with the sites.
(d) Present plans are for the activation of two all-weather fighter squadrons in each of FY’s 1959, 1960, and 1961. The requirement for F–86–D aircraft through FY 1959 is 77, of which 60 are in the approved FY 1950-56 programs and 17 are in the FY 1958 program. No financing is proposed for these planes in 1959. An excess of 86 F–86–F aircraft is anticipated at the end of FY 1959. 66 of these aircraft however, will be used to equip 3 tactical reconnaissance squadrons. The balance will cover attrition needs.
Deputy Chief of Mission
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/7–2657. Secret.↩
- Circular telegram 791 contained instructions concerning the participation of Embassies and USOMs in Military Assistance Program development. (Ibid., 700.5–MSP/4–157)↩
- This circular airgram contained instructions supplementary to circular telegram 791. (Ibid., 700.5–MSP/4–1557)↩
- In telegram 3030, the Embassy sent to the Department a brief summary of the MAP proposal described in despatch 85. (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/6–1857)↩
- The quoted document has not been identified.↩