177. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, June 18, 1957, 2:30 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Walter Robertson
- Ambassador MacArthur
- Secretary Quarles
- Secretary Sprague
- Admiral Radford
- Mr. Hagerty
- General Goodpaster
The meeting was held to discuss matters likely to arise during the Kishi visit. Mr. MacArthur began the discussion, saying that we are entering a new phase in our relations with Japan. In the last eighteen months they have restored their political relations with seventy-two countries, and have regained economic viability. Prime Minister Kishi, he said, is a vigorous, dynamic, ambitious politician. He says there must be a readjustment in relations with the United States. The Socialist party has gained strongly in the last few years, largely because of lack of leadership on the part of the Conservatives. The press in Japan is not of top caliber. Owners are very conservative, but the material printed is very negative and leftist. Mr. MacArthur thought that if we do not work with Japan, within five years they will be headed in the wrong direction. They might adopt neutralism, perhaps on the Swiss, but perhaps on the Indian, model. They might even turn to work with the Communists.
Secretary Dulles said that with regard to security and defense, Japan has certain changes in mind, including amendment of the Treaty. Mr. Dulles thought it was not desirable to tinker with the Treaty, but felt that steps can be taken to put our relationship on a more cooperative basis. If the Japanese are simply trying to ease us out and then be independent, we should find this out, and probably pull out on our own. Mr. MacArthur said that if we give Kishi the measures he is requesting, he thinks he can get himself into position to make constructive changes in the Constitution within a year or two. Secretary Dulles asked what the group thought of the idea of joint control of disposition and use of forces. The President saw no objection to joint control of dispositions, in the sense of joint agreement on changes therein. Admiral Radford said the Joint Chiefs feel we cannot count on use of Japan, and therefore are willing to pull out. It was stressed that we should not agree to any joint control of the use of U.S. forces. Secretary Quarles said that with regard to withdrawal from Japan, Defense proposes to take out 40% in the next twelve months (i.e., approximately 40,000) including all our ground forces. Mr. MacArthur said that Kishi has asked for withdrawal of the maximum, including all ground forces.
The President said that he felt we should take the initiative in this matter, and shift the burden for proposals to continue our forces there from ourselves to Japan. Admiral Radford added that Defense is planning no longer to advise the Japanese as to the forces they should have, but rather to let them decide for themselves. One implication of this was that we would thereby reduce our obligation to support them.
[Page 359]Secretary Quarles suggested that the President might emphasize our mutual defense interest in the West Pacific, as well as the free world interest in security in that area.
Secretary Dulles next referred to territorial problems, indicating the Japanese want us to agree to pull out of the Ryukyus in some fixed period of time. The President asked if we could not connect our withdrawal to some development in the cold war situation. A major improvement in this situation would reduce the need for forces in the Western Pacific. Also, it would be possible to relate withdrawal to substantial disarmament steps. Secretary Quarles pointed out that such a condition is a rather “tough” one, since it does not seem to be in sight in any near future. He felt we should be very careful not to give them a claim to the Ryukyus or the Bonins. The President commented that we are staying there only because of the Communist threat, and Secretary Dulles pointed out that such a condition already exists in the security treaty. Little could be added by repeating it. If we give up our position in Japan, we have all the more reason to stay in Okinawa. The President still thought that this would be the best way to define the period we intend to stay in Okinawa.
With regard to Japanese proposals for the return of former residents of the Bonin Islands to those islands, State indicated readiness to agree to some number going back, but Defense was opposed to having any go back. Secretary Robertson suggested bringing back about 2500 (of the 7000 involved). Admiral Radford said that they will adopt an attitude of hostility toward our military organizations there, and will steadily demand more from us. The President asked why we have so different an outlook as between Germany and Japan in this matter. We are present in Germany only by their insistence. Secretary Dulles said he was inclined to feel that if we let the Bonin Islanders in, the result would be trouble for us. While the action might give Kishi some immediate prestige, he thought the matter could be left in abeyance until later in the conference. The President asked Admiral Radford to let him have a memorandum concerning the military requirements in the Bonins.2
On the subject of nuclear testing, the President suggested that State arrange for a thorough briefing of Kishi regarding our disarmament plans. The subject of war criminals was next discussed. Secretary Dulles wound up by suggesting that we should shift the responsibility on to the Japanese for deciding as to the parole of the remaining sixty-six in prison, and the President agreed, adding that we should make clear to the Japanese their responsibility for seeing that justice is maintained, since some of the offenses were quite heinous.
[Page 360]After discussion of problems in the area of United States-Japanese trade relations, it was agreed to point out the successful results of efforts of a voluntary character to keep problems under control. With regard to Japanese proposals for an economic development fund, Secretary Dulles said that Mr. Randall and Mr. Dillon are making a study of the Japanese plan. On the matter of trade with Communist China, Mr. Dulles said that we cannot prevent the Japanese from following the British course. He said that he felt our allies should have given more weight to our views, in recognition of the fact that we are carrying the major defense responsibilities in that area. He said that the Japanese will now say that they must follow the British because of the need to maintain their competitive position.
[1 paragraph (6½ lines of source text) not declassified]
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on June 22.↩
- See Document 185.↩