175. Background Paper Prepared by Sidney Weintraub of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs1
JAPANESE MILITARY SITUATION
Size of Japan’s Self-Defense Force
Japan’s defense forces remain inadequate either to meet the need for Japan’s own self-defense without substantial United States assistance, or to contribute in any material way to free world defense in the Far East. As of March 31, 1957, the strength of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces was as follows:
| Unit | Personnel | Organization and Equipment |
| Ground Self-Defense Force | 143,000 uniformed men | 2 corps (6 Divisions) |
| 12,000 civilians | 2 brigades | |
| 8,000 reserves | ||
| Maritime Self-Defense Force | 22,716 uniformed men | 5 regional headquarters |
| 1,345 civilians | 2 squadrons | |
| 140 ships, 62,000 tons, including 2 destroyers, 1 submarine, 2 destroyer escorts, 18 frigates, 50 landing craft for coastal defense and 81 naval six-craft (including 40 antisubmarine, 22 trainers). | ||
| Air Self-Defense Force | 14,434 uniformed men | 1 fighter squadron |
| 1,866 civilians | 542 aircraft, including 131 fighters, 30 transports, and 349 trainers |
Projected 1960 Force
Prime Minister Kishi, in his discussions with Ambassador MacArthur prior to the present visit, referred to Japan’s six-year defense plan, now in its third year and scheduled for completion by the end of JFY 1960 (March 31, 1961), which if adopted, will bring Japanese forces to the following levels:
| Unit | Force Goal | Target Year |
| Ground | 180,000 men | 1958 or 1959 |
| Maritime | 107,000 tons vessels | 1960 |
| 220 aircraft | 1960 | |
| Air | 1,300 aircraft (including 1960 777 combat planes of 33 squadrons) | 1960 |
Personnel Program and Budget Slippages
Present Japanese efforts in achieving time-phased personnel requirements under their six-year plan indicate in the third year (JFY 1957) of operation slippages in the Army of 27,000, in the Navy of 3,700 and the Air Force of 9,400. Indicated below are actual strengths compared to presently authorized and originally planned 1957 strength and Japanese estimated strength levels required to complete 6-year build-up:
| 1957 | Army | Navy | Air Force |
| 6-yr. plan: Objective for 1957 | 170,000 | 27,761 | 25,600 |
| Presently authorized | 160,000 | 26,000 | 22,600 |
| Actual Strength | 143,000 | 24,000 | 16,000 |
| 1960 Objective | 180,000 | 33,240 | 44,050 |
It has been estimated by the U.S. MAAG in Japan that there will be slippage of two years with respect to the Navy program and of at least one year with respect to the Army and Air Force program. There are, for example, only 91 qualified Japanese pilots available against an on-hand inventory of 160 F–86 aircraft.
While the budget requirements under the six-year plan were met in 1955 and 1956 (the first two years of the plan) there was a slippage of 20% in JFY 1957 as summarized below:
| 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | After 1960 | |
| Required Budgets under 6-year Plan | 241 | 278 | 350 | 416 | 477 | 533 | 598 |
| Actual Budget Performance | 241 | 278 | 281 | ? | ? | ? | ? |
It should be noted that the Japanese estimate of their level-off maintenance support cost is more than double their present defense effort. If Japanese efforts cannot be substantially increased, U.S. military aid, now in the magnitude of over $100 million annually, would only fill one-third of the gap between present budget levels and the ultimate maintenance requirement.
Japan’s leaders face serious popular opposition and political problems in carrying out any rearmament program. While the six-year plan outlined above represents a considerable increase over existing military forces, it remains far below what Japan is capable of doing from the standpoint of economic and manpower considerations.
[Page 354]Japan Defense Expenditures
The following table shows the comparatively small amounts spent by Japan for its own defense based on Japan’s economic capacity.
| Japan Fiscal Years | ||||
| 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | |
| Total budget | 2,775 | 2,814 | 3,027 | 3,160 |
| Defense budget | 369 | 369 | 391 | 392 |
| Japan Defense Agency | 207 | 241 | 278 | 281 |
| Contribution to U.S. Forces in Japan | 148 | 105 | 83 | 82 |
| Facilities for U.S. Forces in Japan | 14 | 22 | 29 | 29 |
| Defense budget as per cent total budget | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| Defense budget as per cent national income | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 |
Note: Japan fiscal year is April 1–March 31.JFY 1957 began April 1, 1957.
Japan’s defense budget over the last six years has averaged annually less than 2 per cent of its gross national product (GNP). This is among the lowest of all countries to which the United States has given military assistance. The general average of other countries is from 5 to 7 per cent of GNP. The U.S. Country Team in Japan has indicated that the Japanese economy can support without adverse economic effect a defense budget equivalent to about 5 per cent of its GNP.
United States military assistance programmed for Japan for USFY’s 1955–1957 has been $484 million, of which $66 million were in FY 1956 and $81 million in FY 1957. Proposed military assistance to Japan for USFY 1958 is $170 million. In addition, about $525 million of Army equipment and certain Navy equipment was transferred to Japan from U.S. stocks prior to the first regular military assistance program in USFY 1955.
The Psychological Problem
During the Korean War, Japan was used by United Nations forces as a staging and base area. It is doubtful that Japan would give permission for a similar use in the future in the event of limited or localized hostilities. Because of the psychological impact of the World War II atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the fear that Japan would again become a target area in the event of a future war, the Japanese are not likely in the near future to permit stationing in Japan by U.S. forces of nuclear weapons, particularly of an offensive nature. The Japanese Government appears to be interested in acquiring eventually tactical nuclear weapons for its own forces. In this connection, recent statements by Prime Minister Kishi that Japan can possess nuclear [Page 355] weapons for “defense against external aggression” represent a major modification in previous Japanese Governmental opposition to any form of nuclear weapons, offensive or defensive.
- Source: Department of State, FE Conference Files: Lot 60 D 514, Nobusuke Kishi P.M. of Japan. Secret. Attached to a covering note by Robert K. German of the Reports and Operations Staff. Prepared for use during the Kishi visit.↩
- “Original J.C.S. Goal” as used here refers to the goals set forth in the Appendix to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Wilson dated December 21, 1953. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 1560.↩
- “Revised J.C.S. Goal” apparently refers to goals set in the spring of 1956. A letter from Horsey, in Tokyo, to Parsons dated November 27, 1956, reads in part: “You probably know that new JCS force goals for Japan were established this spring as being more realistic in terms of what Japan could be expected to do and in terms of what we might be prepared to support through MDAP.” (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/11–2756)↩