Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

360. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Villard) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, August 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Recommended Approach to the Palestine Refugee Problem

Discussion

According to your request, I have studied the attached IO–NEA memorandum² which reviews in detail the Palestine refugee problem. I am in general agreement with the Recommendations on pages 4–8 (see Tab) and believe that they form the basis for further study and action on a program looking to the eventual solution of this problem. To assist me and to be available in the implementation of any agreed course of action, I have assembled a very small working group from the interested bureaus of the Department.³

1. The timeliness of a fresh approach to the Palestine problem is evident. UNRWA is scheduled to end its activities on June 30, 1960 but in the absence of increased financial support—over and above what the United States can give under present commitments—its rehabilitation functions will soon have to cease and before long so will many of its relief activities. The number of registered refugees has increased 25,000 the past year and now totals 947,000. In these critical circumstances the future of UNRWA and the Arab refugees will be debated at the forthcoming General Assembly.

2. There is some evidence to the effect that conditions in the Middle East, including in particular the attitude of Israel, may be sufficiently propitious at this time to warrant a fresh approach to the refugee problem on the part of the United States. The extent to which this is so should be the first object of our investigation. It is difficult to say precisely how an answer is to be obtained but the forthcoming Assembly may afford an opportunity to take informal soundings with leaders of the area, or, if it should prove desirable, eventually to conduct negotiations within the UN framework.

3. Since the crux of the refugee problem is whether or not a refugee shall have the option of being “repatriated” to Israel or shall be compensated, as stipulated by the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, it seems clear that any progress toward a solution hinges on the possibility that Israel may now accept, within certain limitations, the principle of that resolution. Failure in the past to provide the Arab refugees with the means of exercising their option has remained one of the major obstacles in the way of an Arab-Israel settlement. Any attempt to prepare the ground for an amelioration of the refugee problem should therefore begin with discussions concerning the present position of Israel.

4. It is possible that we may be able to develop a certain leverage with the Israelis, who are pressing us for substantial amounts of economic aid. We might be in a position to provide some aid including an Export-Import Bank loan, over and above regular MSA funds, which might be a factor in persuading Israel to adopt a favorable attitude. Until the refugee problem is taken up, it would seem advisable not to make any commitments to Israel in regard to such additional economic aid.

5. Part of the complexity of the situation is the intransigent attitude in some Arab quarters toward any settlement of the refugee problems. Unless the Arabs are presented with a proposal which carries with it the principle of repatriation and which at the same time offers a just and feasible plan for the resettlement and assimilation of refugees who do not return to Israel, it will be futile to expect Arab cooperation. The most promising method of inducing cooperation would be, on the one hand, an offer of cash to refugees choosing compensation in lieu of repatriation, and, on the other, a proposal for economic programs designed to assist in resettlement and assimilation projects. Jordan and perhaps Iraq should be the starting point for discussions on this subject.

6. Needless to say any such program would not only commit the United States politically and morally, but also financially to a very substantial degree. (See estimates, Tab H⁴ of the attached memorandum) For this reason the utmost care must be exercised to see that the prospects for acceptance and implementation of a program by Israel and the Arabs alike are reasonably assured before opening discussions with Congress. It is our present estimate that were Israel to accept the proposals tentatively outlined in Tab D of the attached memorandum,⁵ thereby opening the way to the possibility of some affirmative action by Jordan and perhaps Iraq, we would be justified in beginning exploratory conversations regarding the necessary appropriations. Whether or to what extent we should attempt to use present MSA fiscal 1958 funds for the purpose could be determined in the light of the situation at that time, but until we are prepared to request Congressional action on a concrete plan we should limit our approach to informing a few key members on the most informal, personal basis of our intentions.

The IO–NEA memorandum did not attempt to evaluate the extent of financial assistance that might be envisaged for Iraq in connection with the absorption of refugees. I have requested that such a study be undertaken.

I have also requested that a study be undertaken to determine the extent to which the proposed program could be undertaken with available funds.

7. I believe it would be desirable, in view of the nature of the subject and the countries involved, to conduct further operations on a secret basis. Likewise, to avoid publicity at least at this stage, I would not favor sending a special envoy to explore the subject in Tel Aviv or in the Arab capitals, although it might eventually be necessary to pursue negotiations there on the spot. However, I think we should take the UN Secretary General into our confidence at an early date, as well as the British and perhaps the Norwegians and Canadians who have tended to be helpful in UNRWA matters.

Recommendations

1. Approval should be given to the IO–NEA memorandum as a basic working paper for the necessary further planning and for the implementation of any steps that might be agreed upon in carrying out a suitable program.

2. An initial approach should be made to Ambassador Eban after his return from Israel about September 6, at which time a proposed plan of action, carefully prepared in the interval, could be laid before him. Because of the importance of the subject and the desirability that our proposals should carry the full weight of Presidential authority, the Secretary might wish to be our spokesman on this occasion.

3. If the Israeli response is encouraging, recommendations 1, 4 and 5 of the attached IO–NEA memorandum should form the basis of exploratory conversations with the Jordanians and Iraqis. On the success of these conversations would depend the formulation of plans and proposals for development projects which could be taken up with the key members of Congress concerned with appropriations.

4. Meanwhile, the United States position during the 12th General Assembly should be that outlined in recommendation 6 of the IO–NEA memorandum. The United States should continue to support UNRWA at generally the present level and again be prepared to pledge up to $21,500,000 to the Agency’s relief and rehabilitation program for the fiscal year 1958. Possibly supplemental to our contribution to UNRWA, the United States should be prepared to enter into bilateral arrangements with Jordan to enable it to continue rehabilitation projects which UNRWA may have to abandon as a result of reduced over-all financial support to the Agency.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257. Secret. Drafted by Villard, Ludlow, and Gamon on August 6. The memorandum is item No. 2 of the “Palestine Refugee Problem, Villard Study, 1957–58”. A marginal notation on the source text reads: “Sec saw”.
2. Printed as Document 349.
3. The working group consisted of representatives from the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Miscellaneous papers of the working group are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Refugees. Ref 1 General Policy & Plans 1950–1957 and in Wilcox Files: Lot 60 D 113, Refugees.
4. See footnote 17, Document 349.
5. Attached to Document 349.