366. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Recommended Response to Israel Arms Request

Discussion

I refer to my memorandum of August 13, 1957 (Tab C), transmitting the original of Ambassador Eban’s letter of August 10, 1957, on the question of purchases by Israel of military equipment in this country.2

In conversations in the Department and with leading American Jews, Ambassador Eban has stressed the importance of the principle involved in U.S. refusal to make any military goods whatsoever available to the Israelis. The Israelis have not [now] made the point that our attitude threatens their security. Our own estimate remains that there is no present military threat to Israel from inside the area. We have also felt that there was merit in our adherence to a strict interpretation of the provision of the November 2 United Nations General Assembly resolution which calls upon United Nations members to refrain from introducing military goods into the area.

It is probably unrealistic, however, for us to attempt to maintain a position whereby even spare parts for U.S. military equipment already in Israel hands are effectively denied. Accordingly, I recommend that we indicate to the Israelis our willingness to grant export licenses for certain spare parts. The list of priority items transmitted with Ambassador Eban’s letter includes not only spare parts but items such as helicopters, C–82 aircraft, machine guns, half tracks, ammunition, etc. Although the Israelis will doubtless insist that these are “replacement items”, I believe that it is to our interest to continue to avoid shipping [Page 713] identifiable arms as such to Israel. Accordingly, I recommend that we grant licenses only for what are genuinely spare parts. I attach a short analysis3 (Tab E) of the Israel priority list indicating the items we recommend for release.

Recommendations

1.
That I be authorized to convey orally to the Israeli Chargé the points set forth in the attached talking paper3 (Tab D) as a response to the Ambassador’s letter.4
2.
That we proceed with the issuance of export licenses for spare parts as set forth in the attached summary(Tab E).5
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/8–2357. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on August 22; concurred in by Walmsley and Gardiner (U/MSA); and forwarded to Dulles by Rountree through Herter and Murphy, both of whom initialed it.

    Originally, the memorandum referred to Tabs A, B, and C, but the references were changed by hand to read Tabs D, E, and F. The source text, however, has no attachments, and the editor has been unable to ascertain why the change was made.

  2. Eban’s letter of August 10 is ibid., 784A.56/8–1057. Rountree’s memorandum to Herter of August 13 with an attached copy of Eban’s letter and a “List of Priorities as supplied to Mr. Bergus on May 31, 1957” is ibid.,NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957. Rountree’s covering memorandum describes Eban’s letter, which was delivered to NEA/NE on August 12, as “urging in the strongest terms the resumption of the sale of arms to Israel”. Eban had spoken previously with Rountree on the subject on August 9. (Memorandum of conversation by Roberts, August 9; ibid., 784A.56/8–957)
  3. Not found in Department of State files.
  4. Not found in Department of State files.
  5. Dulles initialed his approval of this recommendation.
  6. Dulles initialed his approval of this recommendation and made the marginal notation: “Note change in Tab C”.

    Telegram 167 to Tel Aviv, August 27, reported that the Department of State on August 27 informed the Israeli Chargé that it was prepared to release items on the Israeli list which were bona fide spare parts for U.S. military equipment already in Israeli possession and that the United States would determine which items fell within that category. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/8–2757) In telegram 173 to Tel Aviv, August 28, the Department added that it had emphasized to the Israelis the need for secrecy regarding the U.S. decision to release spare parts. (Ibid.)