69. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1492. My talk with Nasser (Embassy tel 14812), … information from Egyptian War Department (Embassy tel 14713) when read in conjunction latest cables from Tel Aviv make it clear that Egyptian-Israeli tension reaching, or has reached, new and dangerous high. Incidents are rarely clear cut, but am convinced Egypt has no interest in touching off war with Israel at this time. I believe Nasser’s statement this effect and that within limits human endurance he will exert his influence in direction of caution and restraint of hot heads. On other hand, he cannot take another Gaza-like attack by Israelis lying down without seriously jeopardizing his leadership on Egypt.
There probably has been some skulduggery from Egyptian side since Gaza, in addition intelligence gathering which Nasser admitted. Altho Israelis may continue to insist otherwise, believe history of border indicates some time required for area to calm down after Israelian military action.
Have made Department’s views unmistakably clear to both Fawzi and Nasser and have supplemented this démarche by warning re situation inside Israel. Today we received more evidence that they took our approaches seriously.
Can not help but associate final para Tel Aviv’s 8554 re fluctuating attitude Israeli Govt towards Nasser regime.One fact I think we must weigh carefully is whether there will be Israeli attempts by [Page 145] aggression to destroy present Government of Egypt.Nasser would have two alternatives (a) to take it lying down or (b) launch counter-operations which would without doubt end in defeat for Egypt. I doubt that United States could save Nasser in either event.
Of even more importance is our own position vis-à-vis Middle East as whole if there is repetition of Gaza-like attack or as appears, possibly a worse incident. United States position in Arab States will suffer drastically in event we unable to take some dramatic act in addition to normal UN recourse.
Have just received Tel Aviv’s 187 and 188.5 It should be recalled Egyptians have promised cooperate with General Burns on carrying out recent Sugar Charlie [SC] resolution re border situation, This probably far easier for Nasser in period following Gaza than for him send high level emissary to meet with Israelis. If Department decides comply Sharett’s request for use our good offices arranging such a meeting believe it important that we take position General Burns be present as observer. While I hesitate make recommendation, am inclined to think we should tell Israelis SC has just passed resolution on best way to deal with borders situations and that Egyptians have promised to cooperate. We could separately thru UN urge Burns arrive on the spot without delay.
In addition US and UK can again talk even more sternly to both sides. We might in addition consider strengthening Burns’ hand thru UN by immediate increase his facilities including more observers, helicopters and own logistics facilities.
If above not sufficient to deal with situation believe United States Government, in conjunction UK and perhaps others, faced with most difficult decision. Perhaps nothing will suffice but some act implying a willingness use measure of force, not necessarily military but perhaps with implication this ultimate possibility.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–655. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:33 p.m. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.↩
- Byroade reported on April 5 that he had had a discussion the previous evening with Nasser, who, among other points, “gave me his personal word that Egyptian Government not involved in Pattish incident or land mine cases”; that “he did not want war with Israel and Gaza not worth fighting for”; but that “if there was another Israeli attack upon his armed forces he would have to react other than through United Nations.” (Ibid., 674.84A/4–555)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 674.83/4–455)↩
- The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on April 4 that one element within the Israeli Government, largely within the Foreign Ministry, believed Nasser’s survival was in the long-term interest of Israel, while another element had adopted the contrasting attitude that Israel’s interests would be better served if Nasser’s regime fell and was replaced by a weaker government. It was significant, the Embassy believed, that both groups assumed that the “position RCC is a fragile one and that Israel military action might be decisive in leading to its collapse.” (Ibid., 674.84A/4–455)↩
- Printed as Documents 65 and 66.↩