Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

351. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Members of the Council¹

Washington,October 24, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5428²
• B. SNIE 30–3–55³
• C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 17 and 21, 1955⁴
• D. NSC Action No. 1447–c⁵
• E. Draft Record of Actions, 262nd NSC Meeting, Item 8⁶

The enclosed draft paragraphs, proposed as substitutes for paragraphs 10–13 of the supplementary statement of policy in NSC 5428, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 27, 1955.⁷

The enclosure includes the revisions tentatively agreed on by the Council at its meeting on October 20 (Reference E, item 8–d) and revisions prepared by the Planning Board as directed by the Council (Reference E, item 8–e).

It is recommended that the enclosed recommendations for revision of NSC 5428, in the form adopted by the Council, be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them; direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the United States Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr,

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REVISION PROPOSED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR PARAGRAPHS 10–13 OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY IN NSC 5428

10A. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid.

b. Embargo U.S. trade.

c. Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

[d. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, establish a blockade with Congressional authority.]⁸

[10B. Because the actions in 10A, a, b and c may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.]⁹

10C. The following actions should be taken either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10A;

a. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.

b. Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

11A. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in subparagraphs 10A, a, b, and c above.

11B. Develop plans unilaterally, as appropriate, to support the military action referred to above; and, at such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.

12. At a time and in a way he deems most likely to be effective, the Secretary of State should inform Israel and the Arab States privately that the United States, in accordance with existing policy, will seek to prevent resort to armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States and, if it should occur, will seek to stop it quickly.

13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in the above paragraphs.

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. The source text indicates that Lay also sent copies of this memorandum and its enclosure to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. See footnote 4, Document 326.
3. Document 335.
4. Document 340 and footnote 1, Document 344, respectively.
5. See footnote 9, Document 326.
6. See footnote 16, Document 345.
7. See Document 361.
8. Defense–JCS proposal. [Footnote and brackets appear in the source text.]
9. State proposal. [Footnote and brackets appear in the source text.]