Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

333. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 11, 1955¹

Washington, October 11, 1955

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Concern at Egypt–USSR Arms Deal; Soviet Efforts to Penetrate the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

• Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Gideon Rafael of the Israel Foreign Office and the UNGA Delegation
• Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché, Israel Embassy
• NEA—George V. Allen
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

Ambassador Eban said that Israel was following developments with great interest and recalled Mr.Allen’s earlier statement that we would exchange views. He was anxious to learn anything Mr.Allen could say about his trip to Cairo.

Mr.Allen replied that as a result of his trip to Cairo he had formed certain opinions, among them were: the Czech-Egyptian transaction would go through; it would not be of token proportions; the USSR having committed itself would make every effort to deliver the goods. He did not know the size of the transaction, he had not asked Nasser and Nasser had not volunteered the information. Mr.Allen was not in a position to comment on newspaper speculation as to the items for which Egypt had contracted. We had to face the fact that Nasser had become a “man on horseback” with the Arabs.Nasser had been deeply impressed by accounts in theNew York Times and elsewhere of massive Israel superiority in men and matériel over the Arab states. This feeling of inferiority in the face of Israel was shared by most Arabs.Nasser could not turn back from the deal even if he wished to.

Mr.Allen said he was disturbed by the recent tendency of the Egyptian press to speak of past U.S. aid to Egypt in derisive terms and to refer to the USSR as “objective”.Nasser had first tried to justify this transaction to Mr.Allen on the basis that it was merely a commercial operation—an exchange of cotton which Egypt could not sell elsewhere for arms which Egypt could not obtain elsewhere—but while Mr.Allen was still in Egypt,Nasser had alleged that the West was intriguing to keep Egypt inferior. Mr.Eban noted that everything Mr.Allen had said made Israel’s anxiety more profound. He wished to describe how the situation looked to Israel and then explore the possibilities of what the U.S. could do to help in this crisis.

Mr.Eban understood that the Secretary had agreed with his analysis regarding the gravity of the situation. A near Eastern government had opened its door to Russia after Russia had been kept from the area for over 200 years. The area had been kept free from Communist influence ever since the Soviet revolution. This action on the part of Russia so soon after the Geneva conference increased Israel’s skepticism of Russia’s professed intensions. He was sure that similar thoughts were present in our minds.

From the local view point there was a regime in Egypt which was willing to superimpose an international conflict on a local conflict and bring the horrors of an arms race to the area. Israel had scrapped any feelings she may have had that in Nasser lay a hope of working toward a Near Eastern settlement. The U.S. should do the same. Israel had “utterly and irrevocably” lost the belief that progress could be made with the Nasser regime. In her relations with Nasser they found nothing but a trail of broken promises.

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Base agreement Israel had pointed out that she did not oppose Egypt’s obtaining her national aspirations. However, Israel thought that before British evacuation took place Egypt should firmly commit herself to working toward “our” objectives of peace and stability in the area. The U.S. and others had said that first Egypt should be given the benefit of British evacuation, after which the Egyptians should be prepared to work toward a settlement. An Egyptian assurance of a desire quickly to press forward on a settlement with Israel had been relayed to the Israelis.

Mr.Allen here interposed that one thing which had surprised him during his visit to Egypt had been that every foreign observer with whom he had talked agreed that Egypt’s attitude toward Israel had changed sharply since the Gaza raid of February 28, 1955.

Mr.Eban resumed and pointed out that the process had begun well before that time. There had been no movement toward a settlement after evacuation. When Egypt occupied the two islands in the Straits of Tiran in 1950 she had submitted a memorandum that there would be no interference with the right of innocent passage.² Every year since then has seen her siege of the Straits tighten. There were Egyptian assurances that the blockade of Israel would be relaxed. There has been no evidence of such relaxation. During this period of no progress Nasser had been “smothered, indeed pampered”with aid by the West. He had been given economic aid without conditions attached to it. He had been offered military aid. The reasons he had rejected it looked sinister. He evidently had been unwilling to sign a commitment against aggression.

Mr.Allen here interposed that he felt that this was not the reason, since Nasser had already signed such an undertaking in his 408(e) agreement with the U.S. The difficulty there had been the U.S. requirement that it send a military mission.Nasser had feared that he could not permit such a mission to operate in Egypt in view of the opposition such a mission could create in Moslem Brotherhood and similar circles.

Mr.Eban said he would like to finish the catalogue.Nasser had promised that there would be no death sentences for the “Zionist spies” who were tried in Egypt last December. Several of these people were then hanged. This had played a major part in the Israel raid on Gaza of February 28. In mid-August General Burns and others had conveyed to the Israelis the message that Nasser would prevent infiltration into Israel from Gaza. He then sent commandos into Israel territory. Although this behavior had been utterly unprovoked Egypt had boasted of her accomplishments. Even before the deal with the Soviets Israel had reason to be skeptical of Nasser.

Any illusions which Israel held had now been shattered by this deal with the Soviets. If Nasser were going to bring the Communist conspiracy to Israel’s doorstep, if behind him there should arise a hinterland of Soviet support, this was a menace to Israel’s survival. The USSR would have no compunction in being a party to Israel’s extermination. Israel could not bear such a development.

Mr.Eban said that he would have thought that the U.S. would have a similar reaction.Nasser could no longer be believed. The assurances that even after he obtained superiority over Israel he would not attack her could not be accepted. The facts needed a harsh examination. This was not the kind of Near East that Israel could live in. Israel was disturbed by press reports, which seemed semi-official in character, and which gave the impression that the U.S. viewed the situation less drastically. He hoped the U.S. could agree that Egypt was not inferior but superior to Israel in war matériel. While Israel would win in a fight with Egypt it would not be because of an Israel advantage in war equipment. Mr.Allen stated that if Mr.Eban were referring to the story from Cairo quoting a “high diplomatic source” he wished to make it clear that although his name had been mentioned later in the article, he had not been that source. Mr.Eban rejoined that he was disturbed at the tendency to play this matter down. He had been relieved that earlier in the conversation Mr.Allen had taken a very serious view of the developments.

Mr.Eban continued that a situation existed where one Arab state had made a deal with the Soviets, others might also do so. Economic aid had also been offered. The USSR and her allies had approached Israel saying that she too could avail herself of Soviet aid. There had been approaches from the Poles. A member of the Soviet delegation to the UNGA had invited Mr.Eban for dinner tomorrow night. The Soviet bloc representatives were frank in saying that they wish to extend Soviet influence in the Near East. They felt that so long as there was no such influence the area remained a vacuum which inevitably America and her allies would fill. They wished to build up Soviet influence so as to carry out the “peaceful objectives” of the USSR in that area. Mr.Allen asked why Israel did not publicize this offer. Mr.Eban replied that a Soviet representative in Washington had invited the leading Israel journalist to lunch today to tell him the same story. In this conversation the Soviets also stressed their dissatisfaction with the present vacuum in the Near East.

Mr.Allen said that many Arab nationalists thought that the most pressing problem of the Near East was the removal of imperialism from the area. We had replied by pointing out Soviet intentions to penetrate the region. The Arab nationalists then rejoined by saying that Israel is an extension of the West and therefore an instrument of imperialism.

Mr.Eban said that the remedies as Israel saw them included the hope that the West would not compete with the Soviets in furnishing arms to the Arab states. Israel appreciated U.S. assurances to this effect and hoped they would be maintained. This was not enough, however, to preserve the present balance. At this point Israel must invoke the long declared policy of the three Western powers of maintaining a balance in the area. Israel hoped that the West would assure her that she would not be overtaken in the quest for arms. Israel did not wish to divert a high proportion of her slender resources to arms but circumstances required this. There was a framework for Israel arms purchases in this country in the 408(e) agreement between us.³ Israel would shortly be making a request to purchase arms in this country which she hoped the U.S. would sympathetically consider. The Secretary of State had said at least four times recently that the basic solution to this problem lay not in an arms race but in a collective security guarantee. His argument that such a guarantee should be linked to a settlement was now outmoded. The time for such security measures was now. Israel would undertake not to attack her neighbors in exchange for guarantees that she would not be attacked.

What were the alternatives for Israel? To stand back and watch a hostile power increase in strength? Israel public opinion would not permit such a development.

Mr.Allen referred to a hint earlier in the conversation that Israel felt a change of regime in Egypt was in order. Mr.Eban replied that he had made no such hint but would be interested in hearing what Mr.Allen had to say on the subject. Mr.Allen said that while he did not wish to minimize the implications of this development it was possible that Nasser, or for that matter any of the Arab leaders, would not wish to shake the hand of the Communist powers to the extent that it would endanger their own position in their own countries. Mr.Eban replied that the Egyptian deal and similar arrangements in other Arab states could mean that the Arab world was closely linked to the Soviet orbit. The momentum toward complete Communist penetration would be hard to stop. Mr.Allen replied that perhaps what Moscow desired in the Near East was a bloc of neutral states. It was not a foregone conclusion that the USSR desired major hostilities in the area. Moscow could be the loser in such an eventuality. A final tie-in of Soviet objectives with those of the Arabs could be fatal.

Mr. Rafael pointed out that the signal for hostilities would not have to be given by Moscow. Once strengthened by the Soviets, the Arabs could act independently without their help. The USSR in offering arms to Israel had laid down two conditions: (1) that Israel forego any security arrangement with the West and (2) that the deal be worked out in the framework of a commercial transaction.

Mr.Allen said, semi-seriously, that perhaps the Soviet offer to Israel should be developed further, to find out what the Soviets had in mind. Colonel Salmon evidently expected Mr.Allen to urge the Israelis to publish the Soviet offer. He stated that publishing the offer would help the Arabs by taking them off the hook and permitting them to say that Israel also had been offered the same facilities which the Arabs were accepting. Speaking to the same point, Mr.Eban said that he opposed publication because there were a few people in Israel who would urge his government to accept such an arrangement. Israel could not be a party to any arrangement which might increase Soviet ability to bring her influence to bear either in Israel or elsewhere. Mr.Allen said what he had in mind was that he was curious as to what a probing of the Soviet offer to Israel would reveal. Mr.Eban replied that what the USSR wanted was an assurance that Israel would not permit an extension of U.S. influence in the area. Mr.Allen commented that Nasser had maintained that there had been no such condition attached to his deal.Mr. Rafael said that the Soviets had told the Israelis that their deal with Nasser had been not only commercial but they had also obtained from him assurances that he would not link Egypt in any way with the West. When the Israelis pointed out to the Soviets that Nasser was already linked to the West by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the Soviets had stated that they had received further assurances from Nasser that he considered this arrangement to be a dead letter.

Mr.Eban said that as regards the Gaza raid of February 28 the Israelis’ theory was that it had not been this development but the conclusion of the Turk-Iraq pact which had changed Nasser’s attitude toward Israel and the West. He asked if the U.S. were any nearer a position whereby a reply to Israel’s proposals for dealing with this situation could be expected. Mr.Allen replied negatively. He had been able to report on this matter only hurriedly to the Secretary. We had not as yet come to a fixed policy on the subject. It was hard to make an estimate on the situation when there was so little real information available.

Mr. Rafael returned to Israel’s experience with Nasser and emphasized that Nasser had been forthcoming with promises but not with performances. Israel was convinced that since the Gaza ceasefire had come into effect Nasser had moved the base of terrorist operations to Syria and Lebanon. These operations were being conducted partly by people who had been locally recruited and partly by trained Egyptian agents who had been sent through Israel to the other Arab states.

Colonel Salmon stated that he was leaving for Israel that night. He wondered if he could convey any contemplation on the part of the U.S. Government of available courses of action. Mr.Allen said that there was one thing in the air, which was a possibility of an agreement on the Jordan water scheme. He had been discouraged by Lebanese opposition to such a scheme which had recently emerged. Mr.Eban recalled that the USSR had been consistently hostile to the Johnston Plan. He said that at the time of the Jisr Banat Ya’aqub discussion in the Security Council, Vishinsky had told him that the Soviets had used their veto only because they thought that Israel’s action on the upper Jordan River had been an implementation of an American plan. The Soviets were obsessed over the point of American influence in the area.

In departing Mr.Eban said that he would be in touch with the Department relative to the arrival of the Israel Prime Minister in this country.⁴ Mr.Sharett wished to discuss these questions with the Secretary before he went to Geneva. If this were not possible then Mr.Eban might be asking to see the Secretary some time before the Geneva conference.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–1155. Secret. Drafted by Bergus.
2. For information on the Egyptian occupation of these islands in the Straits of Tiran, see telegrams 102 and 122, January 30 and February 5, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 711 and 722.
3. Israel and the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on July 23, 1952. For texts of the notes exchanged, see 3 UST (pt. 4) 4985.
4. According to a memorandum from Russell to Hanes on October 19, the Israeli Embassy advised the Department that Sharett had to defer his visit to the United States and cancel an October 21 appointment with Secretary Dulles because his designated successor as Prime Minister,Ben Gurion, was ill. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.84A11/10–1955)Lawson informed the Department of State on October 21 that Sharett “was seeking urgently appointment with Secretary Dulles in Europe.” (Telegram 389 from Tel Aviv;ibid., 684A.86/10–2155)Dulles met Sharett in Paris on October 26; see Document 359.