Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,September 25, 1955—5 p.m.

565. Department pass USUN for Secretary.² For Secretary from Johnston.³ From conversations Francis Russell London and Byroade here I understand that you are considering measures to be taken as result of Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement. While recognizing fully that many broad policy factors must be taken into consideration, I wish set forth briefly my views as to relationship Jordan valley negotiations to this question.⁴

Despite weakness of key Near Eastern Governments, frequent vacillation their leaders and frustrating delays, there is real possibility these negotiations can be carried to successful conclusion within next few weeks. Positions parties on division water and major technical issues are now so nearly identical that differences no longer stand in way understanding if nations concerned will take political plunge. Best judgment I can make is that they are now more nearly prepared do so than ever before or likely be in foreseeable future.

Quite aside from tremendous economic benefits plan offers all participants, its acceptance by both sides would have dramatic psychological impact on Israel-Arab relations and would probably provide genuine impetus toward political settlement US and UK are seeking. In contrast to Soviet policy of deliberate mischief-making, US achievement of plans acceptance would forcefully demonstrate to world US constructive efforts relieve tensions, avoid bloodshed and create opportunities for better life.

It should be recalled that Egypt Government throughout two years negotiation has cooperated fully in attempting bring other states to favorable conclusion water project. While some indication slackening of this support in present atmosphere, may be possible secure tacit if not active support sufficient to conclude matter successfully in immediate future. Confident you will wish take these considerations into account in any decisions you may reach regarding present Egyptian situation.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2555. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:01 p.m.
2. A notation on the source text states that this was not done.
3. Johnston returned from London to Cairo on September 24.
4. Byroade reported in telegram 548 from Cairo, September 23: “Nasser sent me word yesterday not to be concerned that there might be a change in Egyptian attitude on Jordan Valley project due to recent developments. He would continue do all he could see Arabs agree to this project.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/9–2355)